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ABSTRACT
This study concerns Sir Reginald Wingate as High Commissioner in 
Egypt. It discusses his administration, connection with the Arab revolt, 
relations with the Foreign Office, and the reasons for his dism issal in 1919. 
Chapter I is devoted to a discussion of source materials with particular 
emphasis upon collections of private papers relating to the field. Chapter II 
recounts the situation in Egypt prior to Wingate's arrival and the events which 
led up to his appointment. Wingate's involvement with and consistent support 
of the Arab revolt are dealt with in Chapter III.
In Chapter IV the internal state of affairs in Egypt during the War is  
described. The various demands placed upon Egyptian resources by the 
military and the political events which occurred during the War are also 
discussed. Relations between British civil servants, Foreign Office officials, 
and Wingate were often tangled during these years. Wingate's involvement 
with the confusion in the administration, and his attempts to reassert his own 
control, are dealt with in Chapter V.
Chapter VI describes the growing nationalist agitation in Egypt after the 
Armistice, and Wingate's endeavours to have the British government offer con­
cessions. These developments led to Wingate's departure in early 1919 for 
London, where he hoped to carry his recommendations concerning the
Egyptian national movement. His failure to do so and his subsequent 
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CHAPTER I
SURVEY OF SOURCE MATERIAL
The following discussion of source materials concerning Egypt from 
1914-1919, and more particularly to Sir Francis Reginald Wingate’s High 
Commissionership, will be limited to a brief investigation of first-hand 
accounts, private papers, government archives, and newspapers. In the 
case of Arabic materials, which owing to the nature of the subject and scarcer 
documentary evidence are fewer in number and less well known than English 
language accounts, published memoirs, selected secondary sources, and 
newspapers will be noted. Arabic sources relating to the Arab revolt which 
is discussed in Chapter III are mentioned in passing. For convenience the 
remarks will be divided into two parts: the first dealing with British 
materials and the second with Arabic.
A. BRITISH SOURCES
I Public Record Office
(a) Foreign Office records: Series F0371 contains official corres­
pondence and minutes from Egypt and the Foreign Office. F0141 series  
contains the embassy and consular reports, memoranda on finances and 
other Egyptian administrative problems, propaganda reports, and m isce l­
laneous material concerning the Egyptian government.
(b) Cabinet records: CAB 21, 22, 24, 27 and several other Cabinet
report series contain scattered references to Egypt and British policy in 
that country and in the Middle East. Most of these references deal with 
military questions; however, a few concern policy decisions and adminis­
trative problems.
(c) Collections of private papers:
(1) The Milner Papers, F0848, contain reports on the Milner 
Mission to Egypt in 1919-1920 and accounts on the finances and members of 
that Mission. The material contains many reports concerning events and 
financial affairs preceding and during the War.
(2) The Grey Papers, F0800/43, contain Grey’s correspondence 
from 1912-1916. References to Egypt are few, but the letters concerning 
Egypt give a fair background into official British opinion and Wingate’s 
appointment as High Commissioner.
(3) The Curzon General Papers, F0800/152, consist of letters 
written while Curzon was Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The 
bulk of Curzon’s voluminous correspondence, on deposit at the India Office 
Library, is not yet open to the public. The handlist of that Collection reveals 
that there is some correspondence with and about Wingate between 1918 and 
1919 among these papers.
(4) The Balfour and Cecil Papers, FO800, have a few references 
to the Middle East Department and the administration in Egypt.
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(5) The Kitchener Papers, PRO30, contain a few remarks on 
the state of affairs in Egypt prior to Kitchener's departure. These bear 
a close relationship to the Mark Sykes Papers, FO800, which have some 
letters concerning the Arab revolt and British policy in the Middle East.
II Private Collections
(a) Sudan Archive, Durham. This collection contains all of Wingate's 
private correspondence and many copies of official correspondence found in 
the PRO. Wingate assiduously saved his correspondence and kept copies of 
all letters which he wrote. These are organised according to date in indexed 
boxes. The material deals not only with Egypt, but also with the Arab 
revolt. While not keeping a diary, Wingate did make copious notes which 
have been preserved and attached to relevant letters or reports. He also 
kept first and second drafts of important letters or reports; these reveal 
the evolution of his thoughts and opinions.
The collection incorporates Sir Gilbert Clayton's correspondence 
during the War as well as Sir Lee Stack's. Also to be found there are Bishop 
Gwynne's diaries, a complete set of the Arab Bulletin, the Revue Sioniste, 
and the Annual Reports on Egypt from 1915 to 1920.
(b) The Milner Papers in the Bodleian contain Milner's correspondence 
between Milner and Osmond Walrond, Milner's former private secretary 
who was attached to the Arab Bureau during the War. The papers also contain 
the diaries of Milner's secretary, Hugh Thornton. Milner's diary on the 
Mission gives a daily account of the events which took place during the time the
11.
Mission stayed in Egypt.
(c) The collection of papers at St. Antony's College in Oxford includes 
the diaries of Mervyn Herbert, Second Secretary of Chancery in Cairo 
during the War, and the unpublished manuscript on Egypt and Arabia by 
J.W .A. Young, a British civil servant in the Middle East from 1899 to 1925 
who served in Jeddah during the War. His account is rather well written, 
and his narrative on the Hijaz government under the Sharif is noteworthy.
(d) The Hardinge Papers in Cambridge University Library are well 
indexed. They contain correspondence between Wingate, Graham, and 
Hardinge and are of particular use for the latter.
(e) The Storrs Papers in Pembroke College Library, Cambridge, are 
collected in boxes by date, but they have no ind-x. The bulk of Storrs *s 
papers and writings was destroyed in a fire in Cyprus while he was High 
Commissioner, 1926-1932. However, some of the diaries kept on his 
journeys to Arabia remain, as do a few of his letters to his mother and 
personal friends. These letters provide light into Storrsfs thoughts and 
opinions on the Egyptian administration and Wingate. For this reason, they 
are a useful source, but remain a rather neglected body of material. The 
letters form a supplement to the diaries which are, for the most part, 
quoted at length in Storrs's book, Orientations.
(f) The Balfour and Cecil Papers in the British Museum are well 
indexed, but they provide little additional material other than a few letters 
on the personal relationship between Balfour and Cecil. Cecil's papers have
12 .
obviously been carefully sorted; no letters from his brother, Edward, 
remain. The collection also contains a few letters from Curzon to Balfour. 
These dwell on Wingate's dism issal and his subsequent activities.
(g) The Lloyd George and the Bonar Law Papers are housed in the 
Beaverbroolc Library in London. The papers are well indexed by individual 
names and by date. The Lloyd George papers contain a few memoranda on 
Egypt and the Middle East as well as letters and notes by officials and by 
Philip Kerr, Lloyd George's private secretary. The collection is of par­
ticular interest for the account by Edwin Montagu on his visit to Egypt in 
1917. Bonar Law's papers contain a few letters on Wingate's dism issal.
(h) The Lothian Papers in the Scottish Record Office contain the 
correspondence of Philip Kerr. The second part of Montagu's account of his 
Egyptian tour and some scattered references to Egypt in general are found 
in the collection.
(i) The Chamberlain Papers in the Birmingham University Library 
are of use for the letters written by George Ambrose Lloyd, later High 
Commissioner in Egypt, while he was in the Intelligence. Bureau in Cairo 
and Jeddah.
(j) The diaries of George H. Rose from 1914-1918, in the Essex Public 
Record Office, give an account of the life of a British soldier in Egypt during 
the War.
Ill Newspapers
(a) The Egyptian Gazette was an English daily published in Cairo for the
benefit of British and foreign residents in Egypt. It reviewed the Arabic 
press and carried full coverage of British social functions and activities.
It was the best of the British newspapers in Egypt and enjoyed a longer life 
than most of the papers which were generally short lived .
(b) Le Journal Officiel du Gouvernement Egyptien was the official 
government newspaper and was published in French with an occasional 
proclamation or new law in Arabic. This journal carried full accounts of the 
meetings of the Legislative Assembly, all new laws passed, and, during the 
Vv'ar, all declarations or proclamations issued under martial Taw. It is a 
valuable source of information on the administrative and economic situation 
in Egypt.
B. ARABIC SOURCES
I Memoirs and Letters
(a) Muhammad An is, Pirasat fi wathaTq thawrat sanat 1919, deals in 
his introduction with the relationship between Sa*d Zaghlul and ‘Abd al-Rahman 
Fahml and the organisation of the wafd in Egypt during 1919. The text con­
tains the letters of Zaghlul and Fahml which were written while Zaghlul was
in Paris as the head of the Egyptian delegation to present the Egyptian demands 
for independence to the Peace Conference. The latter part of the collection 
contains scattered letters from *Abd al-Rahman Fahmi to ‘Abd a l - ‘Aziz Fahml 
and letters from other Egyptian nationalists as ‘Umar Tusun. Anis has 
annotated these le tters.
(b) ‘Abd al-*Aziz Fahml, in Hadhihi hayati, offers his account of the
formation of the delegation led by Zaghlul and the events during the War 
which caused Egyptian grievances. Fahmi's account is generally a fair 
one which does not overestimate the weaknesses or strengths of other 
Egyptian national groups. It is, however, clearly an account which gives 
Zaghlul's viewpoint.
(c) Muhammad Husayn Haykal in his Mudhakkaratifi Tsiyasa al- 
Misriyya discusses the growth of nationalism within Egypt from Muhammad 
Abduh. For the most part, Haykal's account closely parallels Fahmi's,
although the former may give more emphasis to the support of Zaghlul by 
Rushdl and Sultan Fu’ad.
(d) 3n Hayatf by Ahmad Lutff al-Sayyid the events leading up to the 
formation of a delegation are described. Lutff constantly corroborates 
Fahmi's account. Lutff's account is particularly useful for its discussion of 
the acceptance of the British Protectorate by Rushdf and other Egyptians.
(e) IsmaTl Sidqf in his Mudhalckarat seeks to justify his membership 
of the delegation under Zaghlul and of his eventual repudiation of the wafd. It 
not a full account and dwells primarily upon later years .
(f) ‘Umar Tusun in Mudhakkarat writes on the formation of the delega 
tion in detail and gives interesting sidelights on the co-operation of the 
Egyptian princes with the nationalist movement. Tusun's account is well 
written and for the most part agrees with Fahmi's and L utff's.
II. Secondary Sources
(a) ‘Abbas Mahmud a l - ‘Aqqad in Sa‘d Zaghlul traces Zaghlul's par-
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ticipation in the delegation and his leadership of it. The account is favour­
able to Zaghlul and is the only one which attempts to recount fully his life .
(b) ‘Abd al-Rahman al-RafiT devoted his life to the study of Egypt 
during the 19th and 20th centuries. Although his later works are not totally 
objective, his account of nationalism and the w‘afd in Egypt remains 
valuable. No other single source gives the student so complete an account 
of the 1919 events and of the personalities involved in the national movement. 
Al-RafiT, as a member of the wafd, was closely related to these events and 
was, therefore, in an excellent position to gather material, all of which has 
been included in Thawrat sanat 1919.
(c) Ahmad Shaffq was closely involved with the Palace staff. His 
account, Hawlfyat Misr al-siyasiyya,reflects that fact. His work offers a 
good contrast to al-Rafi‘i and accounts written by Zaghlul's supporters.
(d) Amin Sa‘fd, in al-thawra al- ‘Arabiyya al-kubra provides a history 
of die Arab .revolt from its inception through the activities of the Peace 
Conference with regard to the Arabs.
(e) al-thawra al- ‘Arabiyya al-kubra, edited by Sulayman Musa, is a 
collection of documents, including the Husayn-McMahon correspondence and 
other letters from the Sharif, relating to the Arab revolt. It has recently 
been assembled and published by the Jordanian government. None of these 
documents are recent discoveries; indeed, most can be found translated 
into English in the PRO.
1 6 .
Ill Newspapers 
The Egyptian National Library (Par al-Kutub) in Cairo contains an 
almost complete collection of newspapers and periodicals published during 
the relevant years of this study. These collections are catalogued in the 
Fihris compiled by Mahmud Isma/il *Abd Allah in a two-volume work which 
lists the newspapers by name, place of publication, editor, and year of 
publication. The following list contains a partial account of those papers 
which are most useful to the student of Egyptian and Arabian history during 
World War I. The relative merit of Egyptian newspapers, which were 
severely censored by the British, has been called into question by some 
historians of Egypt, but a careful perusal of the Egyptian press can give the 
student a fairly clear picture of the Egyptian grievances against British 
tutelage. The newspapers are also of help in showing where important 
personages were on a given day and in placing the British government and its 
officials in a proper perspective. In reading Egyptian newspapers published 
during this time the student should bear in mind that each newspaper was 
generally financed and supported by a particular interest group or politician. 
The newspapers do not generally give objective coverage of the news; rather 
they present a given point of view. During 1919 the newspapers were given 
a fair measure of freedom to express grievances against the British adminis­
tration, economic plans, and the desire for Egyptian autonomy; however, 
more blatant complaints and anti-British editorials remained censored.
Later newspapers contained accounts of the leading delegates who went to
17.
Paris, and still later ones give detailed narratives of the formation of the 
delegation.
(a) Al-Ahali, an Alexandrian daily, was edited by ‘Abd al-Qadir 
Iiamza who adopted a nationalist trend for the paper. Although a Coptic 
paper, al-Ahalf warmly supported the wafd and gave full coverage to its 
activities. From April 15 to June 19, 1919, the paper ran a series of per­
sonality sketches of the 14 delegates to Paris; these sketches are useful in 
gathering information on these Egyptians and their main in terests.
(k) Al-Ahram, a Wafdist Cairo daily, is the main source of informa­
tion concerning the v/afd and the growing nationalism within Egypt. From 
March 18 to March 25, 1927, the paper published a series of interviews with 
Rushdf in which the former Prime Minister discussed the establishment of 
the Protectorate and Egyptian reaction to it. This is  one of the few sources 
where Rushdffs thoughts on the matter may be ascertained. At this time 
the paper published the letters exchanged by the Khedive ‘Abbas with the 
Sultan in Constantinople, and with Kitchener during 1914. On January 9, 1935, 
al-Ahxam covered the opening of the first Wafd conference and the speech 
given by Mustafa al-Nahhas. The following day the full text of Makram 
‘Ubayd's speech on the formation of the wafd according to Zaghlul's inter­
pretation is given. This is the most complete extant account of the creation 
of the delegation and largely agrees with the published memoirs of Lutfi, 
Fahmf, and Tusun. Al-Ahram in the same issue contains an illuminating 
article on the participation of Egyptian women in the nationalist movement
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of 1919.
(c) Al-Kawkab, a Cairo weekly, was published under the auspices of 
the Arab Bureau. An English account of the formation of this paper may be 
found in the monthly reports of the Arab Bureau, F03 71/2670. That this 
paper enjoyed British support was well known by the Egyptians,
(d) Al-Manar, a Cairo monthly edited by Rashid Rida, was a literary 
journal which contained a series of articles on the Arab Revolt. This series  
was primarily aimed at convincing Egyptians that the revolt was acceptable, 
although it was directed against another Muslim country.
(e) Al-Minbar, a Cairo daily, was edited by George Tannus and 
adopted a moderate line with regard to the Nationalists.
(f) Al-Muqatt;am, a Cairo daily edited by Ya*cubSarruf and Dr. Faris 
Nimr, adopted a moderate line and often supported British policy in Egypt. 
Therefore, it received British support and was frequently quoted by British 
officials. During 1919 the circulation of the paper dropped drastically because 
the Egyptians refused to buy a paper which they considered to be supporting 
British occupation. Al-Muqattam contains adequate coverage of foreign news 
and besides al-Ahali was probably the best written of the Egyptian papers, 
although it is less informative than some of those papers which were clearly  
nationalist in tone and content.
(g) Al-Ni?3m, a Cairo daily edited by Alx Sa'fd ‘A ll, was clearly  
nationalist. It first appeared, as many such papers did, in 1919 and was 
immediately severely censored by the British. When the paper did appear
19.
it was always virulent in tone against the British and avidly for Egyptian 
independence.
(h) W adi'l-Nil, a daily published in Alexandria, was nationalist and 
gave a good picture of the extent to which Egyptians hoped to carry their 
demands for independence. Poetry was frequently used to appeal to the 
nationalist sentiments of the Egyptians.
20.
CHAPTER II 
SIR REGINALD WINGATE’S APPOINTMENT
This study is an examination of the role which Sir Francis Reginald
Wingate played in Egypt from 1916 to 1919. Wingate came to Egypt in 1916
as High Commissioner after spending the greater part of his career in the
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. He was attached to the Egyptian army as early as
1883, served on the Relief Expedition of 1884-5 to the Sudan, participated in
the reconquest of the Sudan from 1896 to 1899, and held the office of Governor-
General of the Sudan from December 1899 until 1916. During these years in
the Sudan, Wingate observed the evolution of British administration in Egypt
1
and continually offered suggestions concerning it . Through frequent trips
to Cairo and personal acquaintance with numerous British officials there,
Wingate became aware of Egyptian problems. He was kept informed of the
activities of the British officials in Egypt through his correspondence with 
2Ronald Graham , the Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, and Gilbert
1 For more on Wingate's early career in the Sudan see: Ronald Wingate,
Wingate of the Sudan (London, 1955); Wingate’s earlier career is the 
subject of a dissertation in preparation for the Ph.D. degree by 
Gabriel Warburg, Administration in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1894-1916, 
University of London.
2. Ronald Graham was Adviser to the Ministry of Interior, 1910-1916,
was in the Foreign Office, 1916-1919, and was Ambassador to Italy 
prior to W.W.II.
21.
3 4Clayton , the Sudan Agent in Cairo after 1914 . Most of their letters dealt
with the activities of the Residency staff or with British civil servants, not
with Egyptian administrative or financial problems. This factor may have
contributed to Wingate’s inclination to place more emphasis upon changing
personnel in Egypt than upon developing new plans for the administration of
the country. Wingate's interpretations of Egyptian affairs were also largely
coloured by his Sudanese experiences. In Khartoum, V/ingate acted more or
less independently, although he looked directly to Cairo for approval. Within
the Sudan, he worked with a small staff of closely knit officials with whom 1
ti
he consulted before making any definite decisions. This time-consuming !
process worked fairly well where problems were not pressing, as contrasted 
with the situation in Egypt.
Before discussing 'Wingate's Egyptian administration and the events 
which preceded his dism issal, it is necessary to describe briefly the state of 
affairs in 1916. When the War erupted in 1914, Great Britain had controlled 
Egypt for thirty-two years. During this time Great Britain had developed a 
complete, if somewhat complex, administration which had been superimposed 
on the Egyptian governmental organisation. After the suppression of the 
'Urabf revolt in 1882, the British government appointed Evelyn Baring, later
3 Gilbert Clayton was in the Sudan civil service, was Chief Secretary, 
Government of Palestine, 1922-1925, and was High Commissioner in 
Iraq- when he died in 1929.
4 This correspondence is in the Sudan Archive, Durham; it is filed 
under Wingate's personal correspondence, 1910-1916.
Lord Cromer, as Consul-General. In effect, he ruled Egypt from 1882 to
1907 with the Egyptian Khedive and his ministers acting as subordinates.
The Chancery, staffed by British civil servants, served as a communications
5link between the governmental departments and the Egyptian ministers . By 
1914 there were five British advisers: one to the Education, Finance, 
Interior, Justice, and Public V/orks Ministries respectively. To a great 
extent, the importance of the adviser depended upon personal considerations, 
but, in general, the Adviser to the Ministry of Finance was in a position to 
exert more influence, because the realisation of the projects recommended 
by other advisers depended upon Treasury approval. This approval was 
subject, until 1904, to the control of the Caisse de la Dette which had to be 
dealt with diplomatically in order to avoid international controversies.
For administrative purposes the country was divided into 14 provinces 
headed hy m udirs. The provinces were further subdivided into markazes 
(marakiz), consisting of groupings of villages headed by an 'umda^. The 
judicial arm of the government retained the local Muslim qaffi, but sim ul­
taneously maintained the Mixed and Native Courts which allowed the foreign
5 Memorandum to the Residency written by Milne Cheetham, Head of
the Chancery. It is undated,but was probably written in December 
1916. SA151/11.
6 For more on the governmental divisions of Egypt see: J.I. Craig,
.' The census of Egypt*, L'Egypte Contemporaine (1917), pp.221-22; 
Robert L. Tignor, Modernization and British colonial rule in Egypt 
(18S2-1914) (Princeton, 1966), where the position of the *umda is 
discussed, pp.208-13; Somers Clarke, 'The unrest in Egypt;
Part II. Tales of the Qmdeh*, MP16S.
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communities and religious minorities in Egypt judicial privileges they
7would not have had under strict application of the Shari‘a . The Organic 
Law of 1913 created the Legislative Assembly which was composed of 91
m em bers: 8 ministers, 66 members elected by second degree election,
8
and 17 members nominated by the government.. It had the power to delay 
legislation by prolonging debate, but could not reject decisions passed by 
the Council of Ministers in conjunction with the British advisers. The 
Assembly had the right to recommend measures, but these were decided 
upon by the m in isters. Thus the Legislative Assembly was essentially an 
advisory body and could not, although it was indirectly responsible to the 
electorate, be considered a legislative body.
The taslc of the political system as described above was to act upon 
the demands which originated from the British government. Prior to World 
War I, Egypt was nominally subject to the Ottoman Sultan, to whom it paid 
tribute, although his government had no power within Egypt, as Qreat Britain 
was the governing authority. The Consul-General received instructions 
from the British Foreign Secretary, who was ultimately responsible to 
Parliament. The demands of the British government were strictly limited in 
scope. Its aims were to preserve law and order within Egypt, to prevent 
other foreign powers from gaining ascendancy, and to maintain the safety
7 J.N .D . Anderson, 'Law Reform in Egypt: 1850-1950', Political and 
social change in modern Egypt, ed. P.M. Holt (London, 1968),pp.212-18.
8 Malcolm Mcllwraith, 'Egyptian nationalism', Edinburgh Review (July, 
1919), pp.60-77. Anderson, p .218.
of the Suez Canal, which was the principal route to India and the British
9
possessions in the Far East .
Id. this system, the Consul-General was the authority dominating the 
scene: as long as he maintained order the British government was content | 
to allow him a free hand in ruling Egypt. Both Cromer and Kitchener 
plainly exercised all the prerogatives of their office. Egyptians and the 
British administrators looked to them for approval or criticism . On the 
other hand, under Sir Eldon Gorst the governmental departments assumed a 
greater degree of control over administrative p o licies. Gorst adopted this 
method of government, because he believed that the Egyptian national move­
ment was a genuine one, and because he wished to delegate more authority 
to the Egyptians. When these steps appeared to diminish the power of the 
Consul-General and the British officials, Gorst's regime was criticised*^.
9 For a fuller analysis of the importance of Suez in British foreign 
policy see: Ronald Robinson, John Gallagher, with Alice Denny, 
Africa and the Victorians, (London, 1961).
10 For example, in a private letter marked 'BURN THIS1, Wingate 
wrote to Slatin Pasha (Rowdy) on March 23, 1910, that Gorst 
never asked for advice. 'It is a 1000 pities - for he must know 
that I, for one, am one of those who have had much experience
in this country and its people and I am only too anxious to help him 
all in my power - more especially when I do feel the honour of 
our country is at stake. I do not hesitate to tell you in strict con­
fidence that I view the whole situation with great dissatisfaction.
'The Egyptian Ministers are, most of them Nationalist at 
heart and waverers are being intimidated; they grope about for 
a sign of firmness and decision from the Home Government and 
so far they have found none - The general impression is that our 
Government is so concerned in Home Politics that they have no 
thoughts for anything e lse .' SA431/11. This subject is being
25.
After Kitchener became Consul-General in 1911, he promptly r e ­
asserted personal control, an action which was widely approved by 
British officials in London and Cairo. Through his reputation as a military 
leader, Kitchener secured a measure of popularity, or at least recognition, 
among the Egyptians. Enjoying the support of the government in London 
and the native population, Kitchener was able to effect his development 
plans for Egypt. His work was terminated by his appointment as Secretary 
for War in 1914, but he planned to resume his position in Egypt after the War 
ended.
The beginning of the War brought increased numbers of British army 
personnel into Egypt, placing demands for materials and men upon the 
administration. These requests had to be satisfied quickly and efficiently 
because of Egypt's strategic geographic position. Britain had to maintain 
firm control over Egypt - its land, people, and resources. This necessity  
was intensified after the Ottoman Empire declared war on the Allies, which 
raised the question of the legal status of Great Britain in Egypt. Undoubtedly, 
the position of Great Britain derived from her superior military power and 
visible presence in the country, but until the War, Great Britain had stead­
fastly maintained that she planned to remain in Egypt only until the Egyptians
studied in a Ph.D. dissertation in preparation by Peter Mellini,
British Imperial Policy and Egyptian nationalism (1907-1914),
Stanford University. Also see: Tignor.
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11were able to rule themselves . Publicly, Great Britain adhered to the ideal
expressed by Palmerston when he remarked that he did not want Egypt,
or wish it for ourselves any more than any rational man 
with an estate in the north of England and a residence in 
the south, would have wished to possess the inns on the 
north road, All he could want would have been that the 
inns should be well kept, always accessible, and furnish­
ing him when he came with mutton chops and post-horses. 12
There were, however, officials who were concerned over the tenuous legal
position of Great Britain in Egypt* As early as May 23, 1914, Kitchener
had raised the issue of British status in Egypt to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs. In his letter to Grey, Kitchener enclosed a
draft Proclamation consisting of 21 clauses, which aimed to isolate Egypt
from contact with the enemies of Great Britain in time of war. Among other
things, the Proclamation forbade commercial agreements with enemy powers
although, the Proclamation was subject to modification in respect to the 
13Suez Canal . After the War broke out, the British immediately began to
consolidate their position hi Egypt* On October 18, 1914, Ism ail Rushdf 
14Pasha , Prime Minister of Egypt, delayed the opening of the Legislative
11 Most writers did not envisage Great Britain would depart soon from 
Egypt. They felt it would be many years before the Egyptians could 
rule them selves. Sidney Low, Egypt in transition ( London, 1914); 
Alfred Milner, England in Egypt (11th ed ., London, 1904).
12 Palmerston to Lord Cowley, November 25, 1859; Evelyn Ashley, 
The life and correspondence of Henry John Temple, Viscount 
Palmerston, Vol. II (London, 1879), p .338.
13 Kitchener to Grey, May 23, 1914, CAB11/77. Original destroyed 
November 23, 1923.
14 Husayn Rushdf Pasha was Minister of Justice under Kitchener 
and Prime Minister from 1914 until 1919.
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15Assembly for two months
Discussion in Great Britain and Egypt continued over whether the best
course was annexation or the declaration of a Protectorate. On November 1,
161914, Grey telegraphed Milne Cheetham , acting Consul-General,
You will of course postpone declaration of protectorate 
until rupture with Turkey is complete, for this would 
alter status of Egypt, but there is no reason for post­
poning proclamation of martial law. 17
Following this telegram, General John Maxwell, Commander-in-Chief of the
British forces in Egypt, declared martial law. On November 3, 1914, the
18proclamation was published in al-Muqatt;am
The declaration of martial law removed the necessity for further 
postponement of the opening of the Legislative Assembly. It was not, how­
ever, officially prorogued, a fact to which the Nationalists were later to refer 
when they called for the reinstitution of the Assembly. It is beyond the 
scope of this study to explain the reasons propounded in favour of annexation
15 Cheetham recommended delaying the first session of the Legislative 
Assembly in a telegram to the Foreign Office on September 29, 1914. 
Grey agreed on October 1, 1914, FO407/183.
16 Milne Cheetham was Councillor to the Agency under Kitchener, and 
Head of Chancery and Acting High Commissioner in the High 
Commissioner’s absence after 1914. After 1919, he was assigned 
a position in the Foreign Office and later served in the Embassy in 
Paris.
17 Grey to Cheetham, November 1, 1914, FO407/183.
18 al-Muq attain, November 3, 1914. The Arabic text of the publica­
tion may be found in FO 891/14.
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or for the Protectorate. It suffices to note that Kitchener favoured annexa­
tion as did other British officials, but owing to the strenuous objections
19from the men in Cairo, namely Ronald Graham, Edward Cecil (the
Adviser to the Ministry of Finance), and Milne Cheetham, the Foreign
20Office decided to declare a Protectorate in Egypt . The Protectorate was
declared on December 18, 1914.
His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs gives notice that, in view of the state of war aris­
ing out of the action of Turkey, Egypt is placed under the 
protection of His Majesty, and will henceforth constitute a 
British protectorate.
The suzerainty of Turkey over Egypt is terminated, 
and His Majesty’s Government will adopt all measures 
necessary for the defence of Egypt, and protect its inhabitants 
and in terests. 21
The text of the Protectorate was drawn up by Cheetham, William
22 23Brunyate (IChedivial Counsellor), Graham, and Ronald Storrs , the
24Oriental Secretary . The Arabic word used for ’Protectorate* was Himaya,
19 Edward Cecil served in the Sudan and became Financial Adviser under 
Kitchener. He was the brother of Robert Cecil in the Foreign Office, 
and a first cousin to A.J. Balfour.
20 On November 13, 1914, the Foreign Office sent a telegram advising 
that Egypt be annexed. Cheetham asked them to reconsider. Ronald 
Graham told this story in a letter to Lord Hardinge, then Viceroy of 
India, on January 7, 1915, HP, Vol. 71(1915); Grey Papers, F0800/48.
21 FO407/183. The text was published in Le Journal Officiel on 
December 18, 1914.
22 William Brunyate began his Egyptian government service in 1898, was 
Judicial Adviser from 1916-1919, and acting Financial Adviser from 
1917-1919. c, i
23 Ronald Storrs became Oriental Secretary in 190% He was Military 
Governor of Jerusalem from 1917-1920.
24 Ronald Storrs, Orientations, (London, 1937), p. 142.
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Later this choice caused much debate, owing to the unfortunate historical
connotations of the word. In a conversation between Storrs and Rennell Rodd,
a member of the Milner Mission, Storrs related that when the text declaring
the Protectorate was being written he had consulted Rushdf Pasha concerning
the Arabic terminology. Storrs contended that Rushdi himself had used the 
25word Himaya . Whatever the word may have signified to the populace, 
the proclamation of the Protectorate was received quietly in 1914. Under 
the terms of the Protectorate, the Consul-General became the High Com­
m issioner. According to international law Egypt became a territory where
the interference of another foreign power was precluded, and where the
26protecting state assumed full sovereignty " .
Rushdi Pasha later attempted to justify his acceptance of the Protec­
torate on the grounds that the Egyptians had no alternative. After hearing 
about the intention of Britain to declare a Protectorate, Rushdi discussed  
the matter with Ahmad Lutff al-Sayyid, Sa‘d Zaghlul, and ‘Abd al-'Aziz
Fahm f. Following a lengthy conversation they decided that Egypt had to
27accept the terms offered by Britain . Lutfi al-Sayyid in his memoirs 
corroborates Rushdf's interpretation and adds that Rushdi talked to Wingate
25 Memorandum on a conversation between Rodd and Storrs for the 
Milner Mission, n .d . circa January 1920, MP165.
26 For more on the legal status of a protecting power and the protected 
state see: Arthur Berriedale Keith, The Governments of the British 
Empire (London, 1936).
27 al-Ahram, March 18, 1927. This interview with Rushdf deals with 
Husayn's acceptance of the throne. It contains copies of the letters 
written by Husayn and Rushdf concerning the Protectorate and 
deposition of Khedive ‘Abbas.
30 .
prior to the declaration of the Protectorate. At this time, Wingate told
Rushdi that Egypt had to support Britain during the War, and that after the
War the question of Egyptian independence would be considered. After
Turkey declared War on the Allies, Rushdf talked with Storrs who confirmed
28Wingate’s analysis . Feeling that there was no other choice, Rushdi accepted 
the British Protectorate over Egypt, but expected that the terms for indepen­
dence would be discussed imme diately following the Armistice.
On the same day as the proclamation of the Protectorate, the Foreign
29Office announced the appointment of Sir H^nry McMahon as High Com­
m issioner, the deposition of ’Abbas Hilmf, who was in Turkey, and the
30accession of Prince Husayn Kamil with the new title of Sultan. Husayn 
was reputedly pro-British, and his accession to the Sultanate was favoured 
among British officials. On December 21, two days after the French had 
recognised the Protectorate, Husayn was installed as the Sultan of Egypt.
28 Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, IJayatf I (Cairo, n .d .), pp. 163-67.
29 Henry McMahon was Foreign Secretary to the Government of India 
from 1911-1914.
30 McMahon’s appointment surprised some officials who felt it was a 
poor choice. On January 6, 1915, Hardinge wrote to A. Nicolson, 
permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office,that he was amazed. 
On January 27, he wrote Graham that the appointment had been made 
over his head. Hardinge added, ’as a matter of fact, what I should 
like to have seen would have been your appointment. ’ HP, V ol.93(1915). 
The idea of Graham’s appointment had been raised when Kitchener 
became Consul-General. Tyrrell, in the Foreign Office,told Hardinge 
on June 8, 1911, 'No better choice could be made if he were a little 
older and an interval had occurred between his present post and the 
top one but everybody, with any knowledge of Egypt, agrees that it 
would be a mistake to turn him on the spot from being a servant of the 
Khedive into his m aster.' HP, Vol. 92 (1911).
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McMahon arrived in Egypt on January 9, 1915, His views of the duties of
the High Commissioner contrasted noticeably with those of his predecessor;
therefore a greater proportion of governmental responsibility was delegated
to his advisers. McMahon considered that his main tasks were to keep peace
among army officials in Egypt and to facilitate the work of the civilian and
military administration.
In order to understand the problems with which Wingate had to deal
when he became High Commissioner, it is helpful to view the position of the
army within Egypt during the War, From the onset of the War, Great
Britain feared that the Central Powers would attack the Suez Canal. For this
reason, Great Britain had strongly fortified the area. Under General 
31Maxwell , the army repelled a half-hearted Turkish attack on the Canal in
February 1915. During 1915, Alexandria was used as a base for the
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, which fought in the Dardanelles, under
Sir Ian Hamilton. After the inception of the Dardanelles Campaigns, Egypt
32became the sick station for soldiers returning from that front .
On December 24, 1915, Grey telegraphed to McMahon that Maxwell, 
who was in command of both the Canal and the Western Egyptian fronts, and
31 General John Maxwell served in 1882 as ADC for General Wolseley, was 
Commander of British troops in Egypt from 1908-1912, served in 
Ireland from 1916 to 1918, and accompanied the Milner Mission to 
Egypt in 1919,
32 Sir David Semple, Director-General of Public Health Department, 
report to High Commissioner, July 3, 1918. R.W. Ford, Surgeon- 
General, to Semple, March 26, 1918, ’Egypt became one huge Military 
Hospital from Alexandria right up to Luxor, to say nothing of the 
Provinces'.1 FO141/790.
was responsible for maintaining martial law within Egypt, had too much
administrative work. Grey reported that the War Office wished Maxwell to
continue as commander over martial law but wanted him relieved of his
military command over Suez. Grey asked if Maxwell could be attached to
33the High Commissioner as the Military Administrator of Martial Law .
McMahon replied that this arrangement would further complicate the situation.
34Nevertheless, on January 7, 1916, General Murray took command of Suez
operations. Maxwell was retained as administrator of martial Law and as
35commander over the Western front operations against the Sanusf .
With so many generals stationed within a limited geographic area,
competition was bound to a r ise . McMahon wrote to Hardinge that there were
36100 generals in Egypt ; he later reported that the number had increased to 
37150 , Remaining optimistic, McMahon thought that the difficulties would
sort themselves out in time, but Graham felt that the relations between
Murray and Maxwell, not to mention the other generals, would remain 
38strained . Wingate, who had been informed of the rivalry between Maxwell
33 Grey to McMahon, December 24, 1915, Grey Papers, F0800/48.
34 Archibald Murray was Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian 
Expeditionary Force, 1916-1917.
35 McMahon to Grey, January 11, 1916, Grey Papers, F0800/48.
36 McMahon to Hardinge, January 6, 1916, HP, Vol. 72 (1916).
37 McMahon to Hardinge, January 31, 1916, HP, Vol. 72 (1916). On
February 29, 1916, Sir Markham, in Commons, asked if there were 
117 generals in Egypt. The reply did not contain the exact number. 
Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), LXXX(1916), 872.
38 Graham to Hardinge, March 1, 1916, HP, V ol.72 (1916).
and Murray by Clayton, doubted that matters could remain permanently 
unsettled.
The general arrangement for the division of the command 
in Egypt shows that the breaking up was no easy matter, 
and it certainly seem s an odd arrangement, but then our 
military system, from beginning to end, is , I think, open 
to that qualification, and I suppose we shall arrange 
matters somehow or other and eventually come out on top 
in spite of the defects of our qualities. 39
The rivalry between the two generals did not continue long, for by the end of
March Maxwell had left for England, and Murray was left in full command.
40In spite of the competition among the officers , the army kept a firm grip 
on the internal Egyptian situation which remained calm. Great Britain con­
tinued to be confident that the Egyptians had accepted the Protectorate and
41were content with the new status
After Maxwell*s departure, McMahon, who had relied heavily on him 
for advice, became more and more dependent for support upon Edward Cecil. 
McMahon's position within Egypt was further complicated by rumours of
39 Wingate to Clayton, February 11, 1916, SA470,
40 These rivalries were so well known that poems were created con­
cerning them. One such example may be found in the Bonar Law
Papers, 52 /3 /7 .
41 For example, Kitchener told the House of Lords on January 6,
1915, that *the change has been most warmly welcomed by the 
native populace. * Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Lords), 
XVIII (1915), 240.
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42friction between himself and Sultan Husayn . Clayton and Graham both
informed Wingate of these difficulties and urged him to come to Cairo in
order to remedy the situation. Wingate refused these requests, saying that
he was too busy with Sudanese problems to journey to Egypt. Discontent
among the civil servants continued to grow. Lord Hardinge, on his return
trip to England, where he was to become permanent Under-Secretary at the
43Foreign Office, stopped in Cairo and reported to Whitehall concerning the 
dissatisfaction over McMahon's work as High Commissioner.
Matters drifted until Kitchener's death in June 1916. After this, the 
Foreign Office began to consider seriously the advisability of appointing 
another High Commissioner. With this fact in mind, Hardinge wrote per­
sonally to Graham in July 1916 to say that both Wingate and Graham were 
being considered for the position.
42 In his diary, Mervyn Herbert mentioned in November 1915 that 
McMahon was becoming a cypher. PPC. Graham wrote to 
Hardinge concerning McMahon's dependence upon Cecil, September 9, 
1916, HP, Vol. IV (25), 1916. Kenny to Wingate, September 12, 1916, 
wrote about the friction between McMahon and the Sultan. 'The H.C. 
does not now lift his little finger without Cecil's advice and the 
latter always belittles the Sultan and preaches a policy of "Though 
there is not annexation, carry on as if there was". * SA160/1,
43 During Hardinge's visit in Egypt he talked with Graham, McMahon, 
and other British officia ls. From all evidence, McMahon does not 
seem to have been aware of the rumours concerning his inadequacies.
Now that Kitchener has gone the question has been 
raised of appointing a permanent su ccessor. Please 
keep this absolutely to yourself. I gather that the 
choice lies between you and the Sirdar. Grey is most 
favourably disposed towards you but is doubtful whether 
it would not be better for you to have a really good 
Legation in Europe fir s t . 44
In a letter dated July 20, 1916, Graham replied:
I must say I think the Sirdar would do very well in many 
ways - he is excellent with natives and would be sure 
to get on capitally with the Sultan and the M inisters. In 
the Soudan he had a wonderful hold on the Sheikhs etc . . .  
but is disliked by the British officials whom he fusses and 
worries to death. I am inclined to think he would be the 
best selection - he will give you lively times at the F.O . 
with his 10 page telegram s. Socially the W's would do 
their duty nobly and make the Residency functions if 
possible more boring than they are now. 45
That Wingate found it easier to establish a rapport with Egyptians than with
his British subordinates was to be an important factor in causing difficulties
when he became High Commissioner. Because of his predilection for long
dispatches, the Foreign Office was inclined to scan his correspondence or to
presume that the case had been overstated. In this letter, Graham spoke of
Cecil's continued domination of the administration. He felt that McMahon
expected to remain High Commissioner indefinitely and was using Cecil as
his main support. With regard to the clique about Cecil, Graham remarked,
44 Hardinge to Graham, this letter is undated,but was obviously 
written soon after Kitchener’s death. From the reply Graham 
wrote it may be assumed that this particular letter was written 
in the middle of July 1916. HP, Vol. I (22), 1916.
45 Graham to Hardinge, July 20, 1916, HP, V ol. II (23), 1916.
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'I have never concealed my opinion as to how badly they want shaking and
*, 46 routing out,
After receiving Graham's reply, Hardinge wrote a second letter, hi
this message, he told Graham that Grey had discussed the new appointment
with him on several occasions.
The two candidates for the post are the Sirdar and your­
self. It was questionable whether the Sirdar could be 
spared from the Soudan where he is considered to have 
done remarkably well . . .  I may as well say at once that 
the Sirdar is first favourite, although Grey has the 
highest opinion of your services and ability, and I know 
he intends to propose the Sirdar to the Prime Minister. 47
Since Graham would not, therefore, be receiving the appointment as High
Commissioner, Hardinge suggested he come to the Foreign Office as an
assistant Under-Secretary, a position which Hardinge felt held promise for
48future advancement . Graham promptly replied to express his gratitude 
for the offer, but doubted that his past experience gave him the necessary  
qualifications for a position in the Foreign Office. In confidence, he told 
Hardinge the lines along which he had planned his career.
46 Ibid.
47 Hardinge to Graham, n .d . This letter, like the first, is not dated, 
but its contents reveal it was written after Graham’s reply of 
July 20. Hardinge probably wrote it during the third week Df July. 
Graham replied to it on July 25. HP, Vol. 1(22), 1916.
48 Ibid. Hardinge confided to Graham that after the War he would be 
going to the Paris post. He suggested that Graham would then be 
the ideal candidate for permanent Under-Secretary.
The strength of my position here lies not so much in 
my administration as in the personal equation, which 
counts for so much in the East, and the fact that my 
staff especially the native portions of it, like and trust 
me . . .  I confess that the career that I had vaguely 
mapped out for myself was to leave here as soon as I 
could be spared, to have a good rest, to go to a Diplo­
matic post in a decent climate and possibly, some day 
or other, to return here. 49
This indicated that Graham considered himself qualified to be High Com­
m issioner. This fact should be borne in mind, in light of later developments. 
Graham repeated that Wingate would do a fine job, as he understood the 
country. After a further written exchange, Graham accepted Hardingefs 
offer of a position in the Foreign Office. While Graham kept Wingate in­
formed of the intrigues between Cecil and the other civil servants, he did not 
tell him of his personal aspirations or of his correspondence with Hardinge.
Although he was ignorant of Graham's expectations, Wingate had 
formed an opinion concerning the friction among the High Commissioner, 
the Commander-in-Chief, and the British civil servants. He had also thought 
out the problems presented by the lack of communication between the 
Foreign Office and the various governmental officials in Egypt. In a long 
letter of September 13, 1916, Wingate analysed these problems, discussing 
the rivalry of Maxwell and Murray, and McMahon's ambiguous position. He 
pointed out that it was absolutely necessary to have clear-cut lines of 
command, and then considered the friction existing among the governing
49 Graham to Hardinge, July 25, 1916. HP, Vol. II (23), 1916.
o ff ic ia ls .
What actual operations are in progress, duality of control 
generally spells muddle if not defeat - I take it that 
Maxwell's unpopularity, in certain quarters, was due to 
the fact that he worked on the lines that martial law made 
him supreme in Egypt - evidently the F .O . who look on 
Egypt as their pigeon, were too strong for the W.O.
In the present case, I presume that the Gov’t, has 
acquiesced in the F.O . point of view that the Resident 
(who is after all, a soldier) should be considered supreme 
and that the ultimate decisions both civil and military - 
should rest in his hands - If this is so, then I am puzzled 
at Murray's attitude and can only conceive that the very 
evident friction . . .  is the outcome of the generally un­
defined situation whereby our Gov't, seeks to "carry on 
somehow", in their anxiety not to upset the various 
authorities - whereas if they only clearly defined their in­
structions, much trouble would be avoided.
However, the removal of Maxwell (who of course knew 
infinitely more about Egypt than McMahon) and his sub­
stitution by an inexperienced C-in-C did not work the 
miracle which the H.C. expected - nor will it ever be work­
able so long as the C-in-C knows his business and 
appreciates the lessons of history - all of which go to show 
that when actual operations are in progress there can be only 
one head -
Hence the constantly increasing friction between the 
C-in-C and the H.C. because of the nebulous situation - 
each thinks he has a right to "boss" the other and the govern-’ 
ment will not apparently put its foot down. 50
In concluding, Wingate reiterated his dependence upon Clayton as an
intermediary between the High Commissioner and the Commander-in-Chief.
He bemoaned the fact that too many of the officials in Egypt did not have their
minds fixed upon the primary goal at hand, which was to win tho- War.
50 Wingate to Clayton, Septem ber 13, 1916, SA 236/5.
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. . .  but unfortunately this vitally important issue is often 
obscured by personal jealousies and personal ambition - 
a condition of affairs which is of very rapid growth in the 
intrigue soaked soil of Egypt. 51
Within Egypt, British personnel were rapidly moving into other 
positions or leaving Egypt entirely. After Graham accepted the post in the 
Foreign Office, a dispute ensued over the new appointment of the Adviser to 
the, Interior. Graham supported Clayton for the position, while Cecil and 
McMahon backed James Haines, former Chief Collector of Taxes . Hardinge 
enquired whether Cheetham would be a suitable candidate, and Graham 
answered:
I am afraid Cheetham would not do at all, even as a stop­
gap - he does not know a word of Arabic, very little of 
the country and practically nothing of the people or officials 
and though accurate and pains talcing is terribly slow - he 
would never get through the work. 52
It was imperative that the Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, who was 
the major British contact with the Egyptians, should have a thorough know­
ledge of the country and its people. For this reason, Graham considered
both Haines and Cheetham inappropriate choices. Graham rejected Haines,
53for he was Cecil's nominee, 'which damned him with the natives'.
After Hardinge heard Graham’s opinions, he asked for McMahon's views, 
while pointing out that matters could become serious if the Adviser was not
51 Ibid.
52 Graham to Hardinge, September 9, 1916. Graham's estimate of 
Cheetham's abilities will be noted when Cheetham takes control of 
the administration in Wingate's absence. HP, Vol. IV(25), 1916.
53 Ibid.
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54'eminently suited* for the post. McMahon responded that Haines was
popular with the natives, and that Clayton's appointment was impossible
because he could not be spared from his work in the Arab Bureau. McMahon
indicated that Clayton was disliked in some native quarters, owing to his
55connection with the military . After a period of indecision, Haines was 
56
appointed
When Graham's impending departure was announced, the Egyptian
ministers planned a series of farewell parties. These and other tokens of
57native regret caused Graham to have second thoughts about leaving Egypt ,
but on September 27, he and his wife left amid a large-scale Egyptian send- 
58off . Following this, Aubre}?- Herbert wrote to Wingate that Graham would be
59missed, and that he wished Wingate would be appointed High Commissioner
By this time, Wingate's appointment was nearing realisation. Rumours 
of it were widespread among British officials long before it was publicly
54 Hardinge to McMahon, September 21, 1916, HP, Vol. IV(25), 1916.
55 McMahon to Hardinge, September 25, 1916, HP, Vol. IV(25), 1916.
56 Clayton told Wingate he was sorry he had not received the appointment.
Graham reported to Hardinge, September 27, 1916, that he had pushed 
hard for Clayton, but had been defeated by the joint opposition of 
McMahon and Cecil. HP, Vol. IV(25), 1916.
57 Graham to Hardinge, September 9, 1916, HP, Vol. IV(25), 1916.
^  The Egyptian Gazette, September 28, 1916.
59 Aubrey Herbert to Wingate, October 16, 1916, SA160/4. Aubrey 
Herbert was from the Herbert of Wilton family and was attached to 
the G.O.C. 's staff during the War.
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announced. Mervyn Herbert in his diary mentioned in September, while in
London, that he had heard of Wingate’s appointment. When he returned to
60Cairo, he told Cheetham the news . On October 11, 1916, Grey asked 
Wingate if he would consider becoming the High Commissioner. In this 
letter, Grey told him that McMahon's appointment had been temporary, and 
that with Kitchener’s death the Foreign Office wished to make a permanent 
nomination. Grey asked Wingate to name a successor as Governor-General 
of the Sudan, and to take a brief rest in London before assuming the r e s ­
ponsibilities in Egypt01.
Wingate answered Grey immediately. He thanked the Secretary for the
62honour, accepted the position, and recommended Lee Stack as acting
63Governor-General . On October 30, Grey telegraphed that Wingate’s
appointment was final, and that the Foreign Office wished him to begin work
64before the end of the year . News of Wingate's appointment spread quickly. 
On November 5, Graham congratulated him and told him that he would back 
his requests to the Foreign Office.
The Times announced the appointment on November 6. After that, the 
official congratulations began to pour into Wingate’s m ail. These letters con­
tained best wishes and remarks that matters would improve with a new man in
60 Mervyn Herbert diary, PPC.
61 Grey to Wingate, October 11, 1916, SA160/4.
62 Lee Stack served in the Sudar from 1900 and became Governor-General
in 1919. He was murdered in Cairo in 1924.
63 Wingate to Grey, October 12, 1916, MP162.
64 Grey to-Wingate, October 30, 1916, repeated October 31, MP162.
Cairo. Clayton wrote that the appointment had been a blow to McMahon, but
that it would ’do away with a 1000 difficulties and inaugurate a very different 
65state of affairsT . That Wingate's appointment was a universally popular
one is evidenced by this multitude of congratulations, and the favourable
. 66 press-reports
There are, however, indications that McMahon resented being so
summarily dism issed. In a letter to Hardinge he remarked that the natives
’cannot but suspect that I have been intentionally misleading them and this is
67hardly fair to me* . He had earlier expressed personal doubts as to
63Wingate’s suitability for the position of High Commissioner . McMahon
seem s to have been the only individual who regretted the change, for The
Times correspondent noted on November 11 that Wingate’s appointment was
popular with ’all elements of the population, because he was well known and
69had great personal prestige*
On November 13, Clayton wrote that he was looking forward to Wingate's 
arrival. He hoped the Foreign Office would make Wingate Commander-in- 
Chief as well as High Commissioner, since he possessed the necessary
65 Clayton to Wingate, November 6, 1916, SA160/5/1.
66 Letters were received from Slatin Pasha, who worked with the Red
Cross and was able to correspond through that agency, the Bari of
Cromer, and many British officials. SA236.
67 McMahon to Hardinge, November 10, 1916, HP, Vol. VI (27), 1916,
Also see Herbert diary, PPC.
68 McMahon to Hardinge, October 13, 1916, HP, Vol. V (26), 1916;
Lloyd George Papers, E 3 /1 2 /1.
^  The Times, November 11, 1916.
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70qualifications for both positions , Wingate asked the Foreign Office if a , 
dual appointment was possible, but the officials in London rejected the idea. 
This rejection restricted Wingate’s exercise of full control over the Egyptian 
government, leaving him to deal with the army officers in much the same 
way as McMahon.
News of Wingate's appointment caused speculation in Cairo as to 
whether he would stress the civilian or military aspect of the government. It 
must be remembered that Wingate was a military officer on the active list, 
and so remained, even after he had assumed the position of High Com­
missioner . During this time, he was also Commander of Operations in the 
Hijaz. Consequently, there was every possibility that Wingate would 
emphasize the military side. The debate assumed the form of discussion 
over what type of dress Wingate would wear when arriving in Cairo, since 
this was considered a sign of the form of government he would adopt. Wingate 
recommended that he should arrive in military uniform. The question was
debated at the Foreign Office, where it was decided that Wingate wear the
71uniform of a British General when entering Cairo . In a private letter to
Graham, Wingate had already expressed his intention of wearing the British
72khaki uniform unless there was an objection .
No doubt Wingate gave some thought to what form his administration
70 Clayton to Wingate, November 13, 1916, SA160/5/1,
71 F0371/2667. The decision is undated,but appears to have been made 
between November 2 and November 28.
72 Wingate to Graham, November 12, 1916. Wingate telegraphed the 
same m essage to the Fcreigi: Office, F0371/1667.
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would take in Egypt. Initially, he was anxious that the entire Egyptian effort
should be directed towards winning the War. Desirous that all personal
intrigue in the Egyptian administration should halt at once, Wingate wrote
concerning the matter to Clayton and Cheetham.
After all our one and only preoccupation at the present 
time should be to try and win the war - individual 
interests and personal ambitions must go to the winds 
when it is a question of obtaining efficiency in order to 
achieve the main object in view - none of us can go far 
wrong if we adhere to this most important principle. 73
Our main efforts must be directed to adding our small 
gusto towards achieving a victory over our enemies - and 
till then, I support administrative reforms must neces­
sarily take a second place. 74
Wingate had cause to worry over the extent of the personal rivalries for he 
had been receiving letters on the subject since the summer of 1916. After his 
appointment became official, more letters warning of the schism between 
Edward Cecil, the Adviser to the Ministry of Finance, and other British 
officials in Egypt were written to Wingate, Unfortunately, these letters dwelt 
more upon the personal aspects of the problem than upon the actual administra­
tive difficulties in Egypt. When discussing the problems Aubrey Herbert 
wrote:
You will find (beginning at Residency) little or no discipline, 
most people doing what they liker and none of the keenness 
which was the feature of Anglo-Egyptian officials in former 
y ears. 75
73 Wingate to Clayton, November 24, 1916, SA160/5/1.
74 Wingate to Cheetham, November 27, 1916, SA236,
75 Aubrey Herbert to Wingate, November 16, 1916, SA153/7.
You are coming to a land fuller than ever of intrigue; 
and where individuals . . .  consider their own future of 
more importance than the state's. 'It is the race for 
honours and not for honour.' 76
Wingate replied that he thought it a pity that Cecil was trying to advance his
77own position rather than work towards winning the War
Thus Wingate, although aware of the currents of personal conflict in 
did not wish to make any far-reaching changes in the system until 
the War had been won; nor are there indications that Wingate was fully in­
formed concerning the problems confronting the Egyptian nation. He did, 
however, have close friends among the Egyptians, including the Sultan, with 
whom he had corresponded since the latter's accession. According to Major
W.D. Kenny, the British aide-de-camp to the Sultan, Husayn said, fThe day
78the Sirdar occupies the Residency, I shall consider m yself in Paradise. 1
In hopes of cementing this friendship more firmly, Wingate wrote to Husayn
on November 16 and expressed the desire to see the Sultan shortly to discuss
79with him the many problems facing Egypt
After agreeing to see Wingate, Husayn replied frankly to his enquiries 
about Egypt.
En nous dormant la main bien intimement, car je n ’aurai 
pas besoin d'avoir des intermediaires entre Vous et moi, 
j ’ai confiance dans l'avenir, le bonheur et la prosperity
76 Aubrey Herbert to Win gate, November 26, 1916, SA160/6.
77 Wingate to Clayton, November 30, 1916, SA160/5/1.
78 Kenny to Wingate, December 4, 1916, SA160/6.
79 Wingate to Sultan Husayn, November 16, 1916, SA153/7.
de I'Egypte. J'ai le sentiment que tirer les hauts 
fonctionnaires, par votre presence, connaitront bien 
leurs devoirs respectifs, et ne se meleront pas de 
questions dferangeres a leurs attributions. J'espere 
que cette "Camorra" cessera, avec votre presence 
ic i - qui remettra toutes choses a sa place. 80
This letter indicates the Sultan's dissatisfaction with the British administra­
tion. Wingate sent the letter to Graham, asking him what the Sultan meant 
by 'Camorra'.^1
The Sultan, in ill-health, was advised by his doctors to take a vacation
on his private yacht in Upper Egypt, where Wingate visited him on his way to
Cairo. During this meeting, the governor of Aswan, and the Egyptian
Minister of Finance, Yusuf Wahba Pasha, were present. In Wingate's private
notes on the interview with these men, he wrote that they were dissatisfied
with those relations presently existing between themselves and the British
advisers. They believed that the British did not pay enough attention to
Egyptian views, and that Egyptians were not receiving an adequate share of
82governmental responsibility .
83Following this interview, Wingate and Wahba travelled to Luxor .
80 Sultan Husayn to Wingate, November 23, 1916, SA153/7.
81 Wingate to Graham, December 3, 1916, SA160/6. 'Camorra' was a 
secret organisation in Naples. The Sultan used the term in referring 
to the Cecil clique.
82 Wingate's note on the interview which was held on December 21, 1916, 
SA227.
83 The Egyptian Gazette, December 22, 1916.
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84 85They were accompanied by Stewart Symes , Keown-Boyd , and
86Patterson , all trusted subordinates from the Sudan who would participate
in effecting a smooth administrative transition. However, by bringing them
along Wingate caused some consternation among the officials in Cairo, and,
to some extent, isolated himself from them. For example, Clayton feared
Wingate's appointment would eliminate his work in the Arab Bureau and as
87liaison between the Sudan and Egypt . Similarly, Storrs was largely deprived
of his duties by Symes and ICeown-Boyd, while Stack worried over the weak-
88nesses created in Khartoum by the departure of so many experienced men 
If Wingate was aware of these considerations, his correspondence and notes 
do not reveal i t .
McMahon left Egypt aboard the Khyber on December 23, in a departure 
carefully timed to m iss Wingate's arrival on December 27. Ahmad Dhu'l- 
Faqar, (Zulficar), Head of Ceremonies, greeted Wingate at the railway
84 Stewart Symes acted as A .D .C . to the Sirdar and had been Assistant 
director of Intelligence in the Sudan. He was Governor of the 
Northern district in Palestine from 1920-1925, and later became 
Governor-General of the Sudan.
85 Alexander Keown-Boyd served in the Sudan civil service from 1907 
and was Wingate's private secretary from 1917. He became Director- 
General for Foreign Affairs in Egypt in 1922 and served in Egypt until 
1937.
86 B, Patterson was Wingate's stenographer.
87 See Clayton-Stack correspondence, SA470/6.
88 Stack to Clayton, December 18, 1916. 'Symes as 1 told you I expected 
him always to take as he has become so dependent on him for all draft­
ing purposes but K-B he might have left. Patterson has been for so 
many years his stenographer and has typed his most private letters 
that he would never let him g o .' SA470/6.
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89station amid a crowd of cheering Egyptians . Although Wingate did not
formally receive the King's appointment as High Commissioner until January 
901, 1917, he promptly took control. He sent an official report of his
arrival, interview with the Sultan, and state of affairs in Egypt to the
Foreign Office soon after assuming his position. After receiving the report,
Hardinge showed it to A.J. Balfour, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and
91remarked at the end of it, ’Very satisfactory.1 Hardinge wrote to Wingate
92that with his long years of experience he would have little difficulty .
In passing, it is noteworthy that Wingate went directly to Cairo without 
first visiting London. This omission may have increased his difficulties in 
later years, for in December 1916 Asquith's government fell and was re ­
placed by a new Cabinet led by Lloyd George, Wingate was known personally 
to Asquith and Grey, but he had only a passing acquaintance with Lloyd 
George and other members of the new Coalition government. Had he gone to 
London before taking up his work in Cairo, he could have become acquainted 
with the views of the new Cabinet members, and, more important, informed 
them of his plans for Egypt,
89 For a description of Wingate's arrival see: The Egyptian Gazette,
December 28, 1916.
90 King's Proclamation, January 1, 1917, SA430/9/1.
91 Wingate to Foreign Office, January 24, 1917, F0371/2926.
92 Hardinge to Wingate, January 2, 1917, SA163.
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After arriving in Cairo, Wingate initiated a series of interviews with
Egyptian governors and other officials, all of whom greeted him favourably.
Storrs remarked that Wingate was agreeable and that the Egyptians and even
93the English are almost demonstrative in their satisfaction*. By the end of
January, Storrs had decided that Wingate knew a great deal about local
problems, but lacked sophistication and comprehension of the political scene 
94in London , In a note on the Egyptian administration sent to Graham,
Storrs noted that Wingate's popularity continued and was increased by his
95reception of local deputations , which Storrs felt would be reduced at a later 
96date without loss . Lauding Wingate, Storrs remarked that his reception
97
technique was *beyond praise*, Wingate left the morning until 10.30 free
for the British advisers, received outside visitors from 10.30 until noon, and
finished the Residency work from noon until 1.30. Storrs pointed out that
Wingate took quick decisions on his own authority when issues were clearly
presented, but he added a qualifying remark:
He is however I think, for all his knowledge somewhat 
staggered by the depth and complexity of the eddies and 
cross currents of the Lower Nile. 98
93 Storrs to Nina Oust, January 18, 1917, Storrs Papers, Vol. II/4.
94 Storrs to Nina Cust, January 31, 1917, Storrs Papers, Vol. II/4.
95 For a listing of these deputations see The Egyptian Gazette for the
month of January 1917.
96 Note by an English civil servant on the situation, January 31, 1917, 




Thus Wingate's arrival was initially greeted with an enthusiasm 
which continued for a short tim e. He made an auspicious beginning with 
the natives by listening to their opinions and with the British by working 
hard and giving a lead on definitely presented issues. Essentially, Wingate 
had a threefold responsibility as High Commissioner. First, he had to 
implement the War effort to the best of his ability; this, of course, entailed 
facilitating co-operation between civilian and military officials in Egypt, 
while maintaining the efficiency of the Egyptian government. Secondly, he 
had to ensure that the relations between officials in the Foreign Office and 
in Egypt remained friendly, and that the instructions of the Foreign Office 
were followed. At the same time, he had to make suggestions to and advise 
London on all Egyptian business. Thirdly, Wingate was largely accountable 
for the direction of the Arab revolt in the Hijaz, over which he had been 
appointed Military and Political Commander; this task and Wingate’s 
execution of it are the subject of the next chapter.
51.
CHAPTER III
WINGATE AS GENERAL OFFICER IN 
COMMAND OF OPERATIONS IN THE IJIJAZ
While Governor-General in the Sudan, Wingate supported Sharif 
Husayn's attempts to organise an Arab revolt against Ottoman suzerainty 
and to gain British encouragement and material aid for the revolt. Through­
out the long negotiations between Sharif Husayn and the British prior to the 
revolt, Wingate constantly reiterated the potential of such a movement^. He 
felt that an Arab revolt could contribute to the defeat of the Turkish forces 
and thereby lessen the amount of Turkish assistance on the more important 
Western fronts. Then, too, Wingate believed that the revolt could be an 
effective deterrent against Pan-Islamism. Through his correspondence with
Sultan Husayn in Egypt, Sayyid *Ali al-Mirghanf, a Sudanese notable and
ofaithful exponent of British policy, and the officials in the Arab Bureau ,
1 Wingate to Hardinge, January 9, 1915, SA469/8; Wingate to Grey, 
March 27, 1915, Grey Papers, F0800/48; Wingate to Clayton,
October 27, SA135/4.
2 Sultan Husayn to Wingate, July 8, July 23, and September 7, 1916, 
SA153/6, SA153/7; .al-Mirghanf to Wingate, May 6, 1915, SA134/6; 
al - Mir ghanx to Wingate, August 22, 1915, SA135/2. Wingate sent 
these to Hardinge, HP, Vol. 72(1915). The Arab Bureau was created 
in an interdepartmental conference held in London on January 7, 1916. 
It was to disseminate propaganda, gather intelligence, and to act as 
British agent in the Hijaz. D.G. Hogarth, a noted British Orientalist, 
directed the Bureau; Captain K. Cornwallis took over in his absence. 
They were assisted by Captains R.W. Graves, W.H. Deedes,
M.S. McDonnell, and Mr. A.B. FfordeandM r. Gerrard. At a later
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Wingate was kept informed of the tjusayn-Me Mahon negotiations.
The revolt began on June 9, 1916: Wingate gained military command
over it on October 3, L916. Earlier, Wingate's influence in regard to the
revolt had been limited to offering advice to McMahon in Cairo and to des~
patching limited numbers of material and Egyptian personnel to the Hijaz at 
3
the end of June . McMahon kept political control over the revolt, even after
Wingate had received military command. McMahon's control continued until
General Murray, at Wingate's behest, recommended that political control
4should be removed from McMahon's direction . McMahon objected 
v i g o r o u s l y  against giving Wingate political control, but the Foreign Office 
over-ruled these objections^. Titus, on November 9, McMahon wrote that 
he had withdrawn his objections, and that Wingate was to assume political 
control. McMahon, however, asked to be kept informed of all developments ^
date, T .E , Lawrence joined. For an account of the activities of the 
Bureau and its personnel see: Monthly reports, F0141/738, FO371/2670, 
and Arab Bureau Papers, F0882/1-24.
3 Wingate wrote to Sultan Husayn on August 5, 1916, that he had no 
military or political responsibility for the revolt. SA153/6. His 
activities are summarised in his letter to the War Office, June 25,
1917, F0141/668.
4 Murray to McMahon, October 5, 1916. 'To conduct political control
from Cairo and Military control from Sudan appears to me to be 
unworkable. Sirdar is undoubtedly best man for Military control.1 
F0141/738.
5 McMahon to Wingate, July 10, 1916, October 20, 1916; Foreign Office to
McMahon, October 9, 1916, F0141/738.
6 McMahon to Wingate, November 9, 1916, F0141/738.
Wingate's command over the operations in the Hijaz was formally recognised
in a telegram from the Foreign Office on February 3, 1917, a little over a
month after he had assumed office in Cairo.
The story of the Arab revolt and the negotiations which preceded it
are both well known and widely debated. For this reason, only a brief
examination of the political-military situation as it stood when Wingate
7arrived in Gai^o as High Commissioner will be given in this study . The 
Sharif unilaterally declared himself King of the Hijaz and of the Arab Nation 
on October 29, 1916, but the British, who were surprised by the declaration, 
only recognised the Sharif as King of the Hijaz . By December 1916, the 
Arab forces led by the Sharif’s sons, 'Abd Allah, Faysal, and ‘A ll, had 
captured Mecca, Yanbu‘, Rabegh, andTa^if, but Turkish forces remained 
in control of Medina and the Hijaz railway. British military authorities were 
faced with the problem of whether or not to deploy Arab troops in the north 
in order to harrass Turkish positions and to occupy its troops. In spite of
7 Narratives of the revolt are to be found in: The Arab Bulletin, published 
weekly in Cairo, SA206; T.E.  Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom 
(London, 1935); and Stoirs. For an account of the negotiations prior to 
the revolt see: George Antonius, The Arab awakening (London, 1938). 
The text of the Husayn-Me Mahon correspondence may be seen in: 
CAB21/154; Sulayman Musa (ed.), al-thawra al - ‘Arabiyya al-kubra, 
(Amman, 1966), and Amin Sa‘id, al-thawra al- Arabiyya (Cairo, n.d.) .
8 McMahon wrote to Hardinge, November 10, 1916, that the Sharif had 
been presumptuous to call himself King of the Hijaz, but that /'to call 
himself King of the Arab Nation, before he has even got the Hedjaz, 
is  absurd.' HP, Voj. VI (27), 1916. Although Wingate thought the 
assumption of the title was premature, he felt that it might help to 
allay rumours that Great Britain had designs on Arabia. Wingate to 
Grey, November 15, 1916, Grey Papers, F0800/48.
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9
opposition from the British agent in Jeddah, G.E. W ilson', and other officials, 
Wingate maintained that British troops ought to be sent into the Hijaz.
The dispatch of British or other European troops into the Hijaz was there­
fore Win gate's most immediate concern after he arrived in Cairo. Early in 
December, Turkish forces had intersected lines of communication between 
Rabegh and Yanbu£ and threatened to take Rabegh"^. Without reinforcements, 
Arab troops were not expected to withstand a full scale Turkish offensive. 
Acting on Wingate's advice, the War Cabinet decided not to send British troops 
unless an emergency arose. On December 15, this decision was reversed, 
and Wingate was informed that he could send a British brigade from Suez. On 
the same day, Balfour wrote to Wingate that if the revolt collapsed, owing to 
a lack of soldiers, the fault would be the Sharif's, since he refused aid which 
the British government had been willing to supply"^. On December 21, Wingate 
heard from Jeddah that the Sharif refused to permit Christian troops to land in
the Hijaz, because he feared Moslem reaction to the presence of the troops
12near the Holy Places . This report contradicted earlier ones in which the
9 Cyril Edward Wilson had been attached to the Egyptian army since 
1898 and had served in the Sudan since 1907. W7ingate had recom ­
mended a British agent to be dispatched to Jeddah to assist the Sharif. 
Wingate to McMahon, July 7, 1916. This request was granted, and 
Wilson was subsequently sent to Jeddah as the British agent. FO.1.41/738; 
SA138/4.
10 Arab Bulletin, December 11, 1916.
11 War Cabinet, December 9, 1916, December 16, 1916, CAB23/1.
Balfour to Wingate, December 15, 1916, SA144/5.
12 Major H.D. Pearson (British official in Jeddah) to Wingate, December 21, 
1916, F0141/825.
Sharif was said to have wanted European reinforcements in order to bolster 
the small Arab garrison at Rabegh. Wingate, who still advocated sending 
additional troops, told the Arab Bureau that he wished to be assured in 
writing that the Sharif did not want more troops. Wingate urged that the 
Sharif be told that the British brigade would not be permanently stationed in 
the Hijaz, that no Moslem troops were available, and, finally, that if the 
offer was refused pleas for reinforcement at a later date would not be con­
sidered. In conclusion, Wingate expressed hope that the Sharif had refused
the British offer on good grounds and not merely upon religious or pro-Turkish 
13considerations . On January 1, Wingate wired the Foreign Office that, 
although the Sharif still objected to Christian troops, it might be possible to 
accept the French offer to send Senegalese troops. V/ingate recommended 
that the French dispatch both the Senegalese troops and the French brigade
stationed in Suez to the Hijaz. In the interim, Wingate planned to strengthen
14the naval forces outside Rabegh .
The Foreign Office replied that it was impossible to send the Senegalese
troops, as there had been a tribal uprising near Jibouti, and the troops were
15occupied in subduing that revolt . Wingate's telegram of January 1 caused
13 Wingate to Arab Bureau, December 21, 1916, F0141/825.
14 Wingate to Foreign Office, January 1, 1917, F0141/825; Balfour Papers,
F0800/200,
15 Foreign Office to Wingate, January 5, 1917. The French offer of the
Senegalese battalion had been reported by the Foreign Office to 
McMahon and Wingate on November 11, 1916, F0141/825.
Robert Cecil to dispute the ability of the Foreign Office to decide purely 
military matters concerning operations in the Hijaz. He reasoned that the 
War Office ought to have been in charge of deciding matters of troop deploy­
ment and military operations. The dual control of the War Office and the 
Foreign Office in regard to the operations in the Hijaz created confusion. 
Although Wingate was on the active military list, he looked solely to the 
Foreign Office for his instructions. Relations between the War Office and the 
Foreign Office were sometimes strained, and it was difficult to co-ordinate 
their policies. Furthermore, as the War continued, duties increased in both 
offices, and neither could spare the time or personnel to develop the proper 
administration to direct the British officials who were involved with the Arab 
revolt. Thus Balfour, while agreeing with Cecil that the system was cumber­
some, remarked that its reform would have to be discussed between the two
16offices at a later date . In the meantime, officials in Cairo and the Hijaz
continued to report to the Foreign Office for instructions.
In Cairo, Wingate remained preoccupied with the pressing problem of
keeping the Sharif's forces from defeat. On January 4, news arrived that
after reconsidering the matter, the Sharif had decided to accept the British
17offer to send troops . Wingate reported that he was immediately dispatching
18the troops from Suez . The Foreign Office replied that the War Cabinet
16 These remarks are found on the note accompanying V/ingate’s d is­
patch of January 1, 1917. Balfour Papers,F0800/200.
17 Pearson to Wingate, January 4, 1917, F0141/825.
18 Wingate to Foreign Office, January 6, 1917, F0141/825.
could not authorise sending British troops unless the Sharif requested it in 
writing. Their acceptance was further qualified by the demand that the 
Sharif agree to be responsible for Christian troops in the Hijaz. Further­
more the Sharif was instructed to issue a proclamation explaining the
- 19reasons British troops were fighting in the Hijaz . These demands were 
duly relayed to the Sharif,
Foreign Office scepticism regarding the Sharif's sincerity in request­
ing British troops was shared by other British officials in the Hijaz and the 
Arab Bureau. Previous to Wingate's telegram of January 1, Wilson cabled 
the Arab Eureau that he foresaw difficulties arising from sending troops 
solely on the strength of one telegram from the Sharif's government - a 
telegram which the Sharif could easily repudiate in the future. Then, too, 
Wilson surmised that the Sharif needed time to prepare his population for the
arrival of Christian troops. Colonel Bremond of the French Mission to the
„ 20 ,Hijaz , agreed with Wilson. Bremond thought eight days of preparation were
21necessary, while Wilson estimated that at least a fortnight would be required .
* After receiving the Foreign Office demands for assurances of his
22sincerity, the Sharif refused the British troops . On January 19, another
19 Foreign Office to Wingate January 8* 1917, F0141/825
20 For an account of the French participation in the Arab revolt and of 
the French Mission see; Ed. Bremond, Le Hedjaz dans la Guerre 
Mondiale (Paris, 1931).
21 Wilson to Arab Bureau, January 7, 1917, F0141/825.
22 Wingate to Foreign Office/January 12, l9 l7 , F0141/825.
repudiation of the request was received. Owing to the Sharif’s final rejection
of the British troops, Wingate recommended that the troops stationed in Suez
23and ready for duty in the Hijaz be transferred to other battle stations
Fortunately for those committed to the furtherance of the Arab revolt, the
expected Turkish advance on Rabegh did not materialise, and British military
commanders realised that the Turkish forces were in no position to launch
offensives against Arab garrisons supported by the British Navy. With this
fact in mind, the British began to reconsider the possibilities of military
24operations in the north
Murray, the commander of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, advised
against attacking ‘Aqaba or the Hijaz railway, because he believed that any
25damage Inflicted at these points would merely be transitory . On the other
25hand, Wingate regarded a military movement in the north as necessary . On
January 15, Faysal’s column left Umm Lahaj for Wajh and captured it with
27British naval aid on January 25 . After the conquest of Wajh, forays into
the north seemed more feasible. Wingate was encouraged to such an extent 
that he wrote to William Robertson in the War Office;
23 Wingate to Foreign Office, January 19, 1917y F0141/825.
24 Lawrence, p .224-26.
25 Murray to Wingate, January 22, 1917, SA145/1.
26 Wingate to Foreign Office, January 29, 1917, F0141/825.
27 Arab Bulletin, January 19 and February 6, 1917.
The Arab leaders have always beautiful plans and describe 
them most plausibly, but - and this is a new and encourag­
ing feature - some of them of lace have actually matured. 28
However, the possibility of a military drive into the north raised the 
problem of French and Arab claims in Syria. Since August 1916, Bremond 
and his French Mission had been operating in the Hijaz in co-operation with 
the British. The Mission served primarily to protect French interests which 
were theoretically assured by the Anglo-French Treaty of May 16, 1916.
The contents of this treaty, more commonly known as the Sykes-PLcot agree­
ment, had not been officially communicated to the Sharif by either the British 
or the French. There are, however, indications that the Sharif was aware, 
at least after Jamal Pasha’s speech in Beirut on December 6, 1917, on the 
agreement, of the general context of the treaty, which divided the Arab
provinces of the Ottoman Empire into areas of interest between the French
29and the British . Wingate and his advisers were clearly aware of the treaty
30and its clauses . On several occasions, these officials had expressed
28 Wingate to Robertson, February 21, 1917, SA163/2.
29 Elie Kedourie, England and the Middle East: the destruction of the 
Ottoman Empire (1914-1920) London, 1956), p. 107. Newcombe 
note, May 20, 1917, noted that the Sharif had been told of the contents 
of the treaty. F0882/16.
30 Wingate’s papers contain a coloured map dividing the area along the 
lines contained in the Anglo-French agreement. Clayton referred
to this map as early as December 1915, five months before the treaty 
was actually signed. SA135/7.
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concern lest clauses in the agreement conflict with the arrangement reached
31with the Sharif in the Husayn-MeMahon correspondence . For the British, 
the French interests in Syria were matters of principal concern when attempt­
ing to formulate policy in regard to Arab military operations. The situation 
was further complicated by British interests in Palestine; these will not be 
recounted in this study albeit the question of the status of Palestine was a 
consideration whenever the War Cabinet discussed the Middle East or the 
Arab tevolt.
Both the French interests in Syria and the Zionist plans in Palestine
were discussed in the Cabinet meeting of April 3, 1917. At this time Lloyd
George and Lord Curzon stressed the fact that Great Britain should not be com
mitted to any agreement which would be prejudicial to her best interests after
the War, This meeting ended with Lloyd George's exhortation that caution be
32exercised and that the Cabinet be kept informed of all developments . This
31 Clayton to Wingate, January 14, 1916. 'The settlement of the Syrian 
question on the lines of the papers I enclose, however, has made 
things very difficult aid it is hard to see how we can go on negotiating 
much longer, without laying ourselves open to a charge of breach of 
faith, unless we honestly tell the Arabs that we have made Syria over 
to the French.1 SA136/1, Hogarth note, May 3, 1916, * I hope . . .  
this Agreement is regarded by our Gov't now as a purely opportunist 
measure, with the mental reservation that it cannot but need considerable 
revision sooner or later.* F0882/16. The key letters of the Husayn- 
McMahon correspondence are those which contain boundary delinea­
tions, Husayn to McMahon, July 14, 1915; McMahon to Husayn,
October 24, 1915; McMahon to Husayn, December 13, 19*15; Husayn to 
McMahon, January 1, 1916, CAB21/154.
32 Cabinet Meeting, April 3, 1917, The Prime Minister, Curzon, Hardinge, 
Hankey, and Mark Sykes were present. CAB24/9, GT. series 372.
meeting was indicative of Great Britain's inability to formulate a definite 
policy in regard to the Middle East. The British government did not pur­
posely enter into agreements textually at cross purposes with one another, 
in the three statements which relate to the Middle East: the Husayn-McMahon 
correspondence, Anglo-French agreement of May 1916, and the Balfour
Declaration. The conflict arises out of the general sense of the agreements
33and the interpretation of them by the parties involved . However, the 
British government did not take steps to clarify the misunderstandings over 
the agreements. Winning the War was the single most important factor 
involved. Officials continued to believe that disagreements over boundaries 
could be settled at the Peace Conference. Therefore, diplomats like Wingate 
had to function without clear instructions on policy. Because he believed that 
the Arab revolt would help to win the War, Wingate was willing to support it 
and to leave the intricate problems of boundary settlements until after the 
peace.
In a letter to Sultan Husayn in Egypt, Wingate touched upon this point,
but did not elucidate. As he wrote to Hardinge, it was difficult to
. . .  explain to him /the Sultan/ that our initiation and support 
of the Sherifian movement was mainly a war m easure, that 
we had no illusions as to the difficulty - if not impossibility - 
of the Sherif being able to weld together all these hetero­
geneous Arab units, that we were attempting to create some 
Islamic modus vivendi which would take the place of the Turk 
when expelled from the Holy Places of Islam, and that we
33 P.M.Holt,Egypt and the Fertile Crescent (1516-1922) (London, 1966) 
p .271, Kedourie, pp.29-66.
fully realised it was impossible that the Sherif would ever 
acquire such widespread authority in the Islamic world as
to secure his election as Khalif. . .  on the other hand I
pointed out to him that nothing succeeds like su ccess . 34
While Wingate was momentarily concerned with placating the Sultan's
fears about the growing power of the Sharif, Sykes resumed negotiations with
the Sharif to resolve the confusion which had arisen over the boundaries in
Syria. In a letter to Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the Cabinet, Sykes noted
that Great Britain's 'best card is that France cannot make good with the Arabs
35without Britain's a id .' For his part, Hardinge felt that Sykes under­
estimated the importance the French attached to their sphere of influence in 
« . 36 _ . .Syria . Regarding this matter, the Sharif wrote to Wingate that, because
he wished to preserve friendly relations with Great Britain, he wanted to post-
37pone further discussion of boundaries . In May 1917, Sykes and Picot
visited the Sharif in Jeddah. In Wingate's words they were 'to discuss how
38best to set on a firm foundation the independence of the Arab races. ’ This
34 Wingate to Hardinge, April 17, 1917, SA174/4; HP, Vol. Ill (31), 1917.
The Sultan persistently raised the issue of the successor to the Caliphate.
The Sultan viewed the Sharif and his followers with suspicion and des­
cribed them as a 'canaille.' A canaille is a mob or a rabble.
J.W .A. Young, 'A little to the East: experiences of an Anglo-Egyptian 
Official (1899-1925),' unpublished MS, PPC. According to Young, the 
administration in Mecca was run on regulated blackmail.
35 Sykes to Hankey, April 7, 1917, CAB21/96.
36 Hardinge to Wingate, April 19, 1917, HP, Vol. 111(31), 1917.
37 Sharif to Wingate, April 28, 1917, F0141/737.
38 Wingate to Sharif, May 14, 1917, F0141/757.
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meeting was probably precipitated by the Bolshevik publication of the terms 
of the Anglo-French treaty and Jamal's speech of December 6.
The meeting ended in a deadlock, as the Sharif refused to concede any 
territory. To reinforce his demands, he threatened to resign, unless all 
the lands agreed to in the Husayn-MeMahon correspondence were given to 
the Arabs,
He ^Sykes/lnust have made it clear to Your Excellency 
that the essence of my report - which is really evident 
and does not require any interpretation - is that if the 
frontiers of the Arab lands are not to be the same as has 
been agreed with Great Britain, I will be obliged by my 
good-will to both Great Britain and to my country and race 
finally and decidedly to withdraw. 39
Wingate answered that he sincerely hoped that 'before long the efforts of Your
Highness' Arms may result in the complete expulsion of the enemy from the
40Arabian lands, and the freedom of the Arab peoples' . However, in May, 
Wilson reported that Faysal had agreed to accept a position of the French 
in Syria identical to that which the British held in Mesopotamia. Wilson 
predicted that the agreement implied certain perils, because the Shailf's 
concept of the British position in Mesopotamia differed from British inter­
pretation of the same position. He reiterated that the French and the British 
had used the word 'Syria* vaguely, and that the disparity over the territory 
to which this term referred would persist until Great Britain frankly told the
39 Sharif to Wingate, June 19, 1917, F0141/757.
40 Wingate to the Sharif, June 29, 1917, F0141/757.
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41Sharif the terms of the agreement with the French . Stewart Newcombe,
in the Arab Bureau, agreed with Wilson, and added that the Sharif trusted
42Sykes, who did not always appear to give an accurate account of matters 
Wilson continued to plead that the British determine a policy, but nothing 
final was decided ^ .
Simultaneous with the negotiations over the boundary issue, Murray 
made a second attempt'to take Gaza and to move into Palestine. After the 
second offensive failed, General Allenby replaced Murray on June 27, 1917. 
Whereas Murray had declined to support Faysal's advance into the north, 
Allenby promptly realised the military potential of the Arab forces and gave
them every encouragement. Operations in the north began, and on July 4, 1917,
44the Arabs took ‘Aqaba , Under the direction of a few trained British 
officers, the Arabs began to launch a series of attacks against the Hijaz ra il­
way and, in general, to make Turkish transport as difficult as possible. After 
the fall of ‘Aqaba, Wingate wrote:
41 Wilson to Newcombe (forwarded to Wingate), May 17, 1917, SA145/7. 
In his letter of November 5, 1915, the Sharif had told McMahon that
he consented to a temporary British presence in Mesopotamia in return 
for a subsidy.
42 Newcombe note on Wilson letter, May 17, 1917, SA145/7.
43 Note by Wilson, July 10, 1917, F0141/813.
44 Wingate sent a report of this victory to William Robertson in the War 
Office, July 11, 1917, CAB24/21, G.T. series 1558; Lawrence,
pp .228-37. Arab Bulletin, August 12, 1917, SA206.
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I would suggest that Arab success in Hedjaz, the forth­
coming revolt in Syrian Hinterland are liable to bring 
Arabs elsewhere completely to our side and dispose them 
to more energetic action against Turks.
Our recent experience and history of Nile Campaign 
tend to show that an elementary organisation suitable to 
their irregular methods of warfare can very materially 
increase their capacity as auxiliaries and ra iders. 45
This was written to Sir Percy Cox, the Chief Political Officer in Mesopotamia,
who resisted  British support of the Sharif. Like most officials in Mesopotamia
and India, Cox thought that the Arab revolt damaged pro-’British Moslem
feeling in the East and endangered its status in Mesopotamia. Wingate tried
to encourage Cox and the other officials in Mesopotamia to view the Middle
East as a composite, not as unrelated political entities.
Following the victory at ‘Aqaba, Lawrence returned to Jeddah, where 
he talked with the Sharif on July 29, 1917. During the conversation, it became 
clear, if it had not been so before, that the Sharif would not countenance 
French annexation of Beirut or Lebanon. Lawrence and the Sharif repeated 
what had been discussed during the May meeting with Sykes and Picot. In 
Lawrence's report of this conversation, he pointed out that the Sharif had 
mentioned that there were no written records of the May meeting, and that, 
in general, written documents on the negotiations were scarce. While main­
taining that Syria was to be independent, the Sharif refused to discuss boundaries 
on the grounds that the War was still in progress and that any settlements 
would have to be modified according to the military state of affairs when peace
45 Wingate to Cox, July 24, 1917, F 0141 /668 .
was declared. Lawrence quoted the Sharif as spying that Syria was an Arab 
country.
1. . .  but I will neither take them myself nor permit anyone 
else to take them . They have deserved independence, and 
it is my duty to see they get it. *
. . .  He is extremely pleased to have trapped M. Picot 
into the admission that France will be satisfied in Syria 
with the position Great Britain desires in Iraq. That, he 
says, means a temporary occupation of the country for 
strategical and political reasons (with probably an annual 
grant to the Sherif in compensation and recognition) and 
concessions in the way of public works . .  . ’The Hedjaz and 
Syria are like the palm and fingers of one hand and I could 
not have consented to the amputation of any finger or part 
of a finger without leaving myself a cripple. ’ 46
Even after reading this report, and hearing from Wilson that the Sharif
was convinced he would control Syria and most of Mesopotamia, Wingate
could not believe that Husayn thought he could incorporate all this territory
under his government. This view, according to Wingate, was ’clearly un- 
47justifiable’
It is nevertheless evident that King Hussein is hopeful that 
whatever may be the immediate political futures of the Arab 
districts outside the independent area he is relying on the 
Entente declarations of adherence to the principles of 
nationality to prevent the formal annexation of Arab districts 
properly so-called, thereby impinging on the conception of 
Arab unity and preventing for all time the creation of a 
federal system comprising the whole of the (Asiatic) Arab 
race.
46 Lawrence note, July 30, 1917, copy sent to the Arab Bureau and to
Wingate. Enclosed with Wingate's letter to Balfour, August 16, 1917, 
F0141/825.
47 Wingate to Balfour, August 16, 1917, F 0 1 4 1 /8 2 5 .
It will probably be advisable to postpone further d is­
cussion with the King of these political issues at any rate 
until the result of the present negotiations with the French 
is known, but we must eventually take steps to correct any 
erroneous opinion he may have, or profess to have formed 
in regard to the future administration of the Syrian littoral 
and Palestine and the provinces of Baghdad and Basra. 48
Wingate was clearly amenable to postponing a final confrontation with the 
Sharif over territorial delimitation until the British were in a more ad­
vantageous bargaining position.
By this time, Wingate had lost command of the military aspects of the 
Arab revolt. With Allenby’s advance into Palestine, more and more of the 
Arab forces came under his control. Wingate remained in charge only of 
those few operations in the Hijaz. This clear-cut division of command was 
agreeable to Wingate, who had always maintained that military matters neces­
sitated one commander. With Arab support on his eastern flank, Allenby led 
his troops steadily northwards into Palestine. On December 25, Allenby entered
Jerusalem, and then continued northwards, where he finally took Damascus in 
49October 1918 . All the captured territory was placed under Allenby s
direction. This disturbed French officials, who wanted a joint Anglo-French
50administration in the area . To Wingate, the idea was unfeasible, and he
48 Ibid.
49 For a study of this advance see: Arab Bulletin, 1918; Cyril Falls,
Official history of the Great War: Military Operations - Egypt and 
Palestine, Parts I & II (London, 1930).
50 Graham to Wingate, January 11, 1918, SA167/1/4; Clayton to Wingate, 
January 29, 1918, SA167/1/4-5.
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supported Allenby's control . Since British troops far outnumbered
the French, and British officials were largely in command, the French were
not in a position to pursue their demands.
The areas of command were delineated between Allenby and Wingate
in June 1918, when Wingate wrote that no disagreements had arisen between
Allenby and himself, because Allenby commanded operations north of the
52*Aqaba~Tabuk line, and he commanded the area south of this line . Wingate's
frequent visits to Palestine, about which he wrote favourably, indicate the
53co-operation and good-will which existed between the two men . However, 
Allenby's arrival marked the demise of Wingate's control of the Arab revolt. 
After the summer of 1917, his work was limited to two objects. The first, 
and by far the more important, was concerned with providing the British 
subsidy for the Sharif, and the second with the rivalries among the Arab 
tribes in the Hijaz.
Briefly, four major Arab leaders operated within the Arabian Peninsula 
during World War I; Ibn Rashid, a pro-Turkish leader in the north east;
51 Wingate to Graham, November 3, 1917, SA236/7; November 29, 1917, 
SA166/2; January 13, 1918, SA167/1/3. In the last letter Wingate 
expressed his confidence that Picot could be persuaded to accept British 
administration.
52 WTngate to War Office, June 15, 1918, F0141/668; "Wingate to Hardinge, 
July 19, 1918, SA169/2/1.
53 Wingate visited the lines in November 1917, SA169/1/3. He travelled 
in Palestine in June and August 1918. After the June visit, Clayton 
intimated that Wingate was trying to pry out information, and added 
that he hoped the officials had been able to prevent him from doing any 
harm, Clayton to Mark Sykes, June 19, 1918, Sykes Papers, F0800/221. 
Wingate, however, was pleased with the visit and praised Allenby.
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Ibn Su'ud in Nejd; Imam Yehia in the Yemen; and Sharif Husayn in the Hijaz. 
From time to time, the Sharif and the Imam squabbled over boundaries, but 
these disagreements were usually settled after a short tim e. The most last­
ing and intense rivalry was the one between Ibn Su‘ud and the Sharff. While 
British officials in Egypt supported the Sharif, the officials in India and 
Mesopotamia favoured Ibn Su'ud, who, like the Sharif, had been receiving a 
monthly subsidy since 1916. Wingate realised that the competition between 
Ibn Su‘ud and the Sharif portended trouble.
I have had no illusions in regard to the difficulty of getting 
the Arab Chieftains to work together even in face of their 
common enemy the Turks - Indeed I think that their own 
internal jealousies take first place and the Turks second 
in their thoughts. 54
He expected that Ibn Su'ud and the Sharif would come to blows in the future,
but hoped to delay the confrontation until after the War. Until the outbreak
of hostilities over Khurma, a desert oasis over which both Ibn Su£ud and the
Sharif attempted to extend their power, British officials had been fairly
successful in preventing armed clashes, but in the summer of 1918, the
Sharif tried to reassert his authority over Khurma, and was repulsed by Ibn
Su'Qd's forces. The battles irked Wingate who resented the fact that Ibn Su‘ud
55had been receiving aid from the British government . The Foreign Office 
agreed that while the rivalry between the Sharif and Ibn Su'ud was a problem,
54 Wingate to Graham, January 25, 1918, SA167/1/4.
55 Wingate to Foreign O ffice, July 9, 1918, SA149/2; Wingate to Hardinge,
August 25, 1918, HP, V ol. 111(38), 1918.
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peace had to be kept between the two at all costs . As the rivalry intensi­
fied, the Sharif became more demanding; he requested more money and 
equipment, and adopted a more obdurate stand over the boundary issue in 
Syria.
Thus, by September 21, 1918, Wingate was advocating that the British
make a statement of policy in regard to the Arabs and the Sharif. He hoped
that this would solve the problems of the Syrian boundaries and the Sharif-
57Ibn-Su*ud rivalry . On October 5, he wrote that the Sharif ’evidently
58expects more than he is going to get.' Owing to the constant friction over
the boundary settlement, Sykes and Picot returned to the Middle East for d is­
cussions in November. Wingate believed that they would be able to devise a
more realistic agreement, since: ’their original agreement will need much
59alteration if not complete scrapping. ’ By the time these negotiations had
begun, the Arm istice had been signed. The War had ended, and the British 
had not issued a statement of policy. The rivalry between Ibn Su*ud and the
56 Hardinge to Wingate, August 28, 1918, HP, Vol. 111(39), 1918.
57 Wingate to Hardinge, September 21, 1918. Wingate was anxious for 
such a statement, because the Sharif continued to threaten to resign. 
SA170/1; HP, Vol. IV (39), 1918.
58 Wingate to Hardinge, Octobers, 1918, HP, Vol. IV (39), 1918. In his 
congratulatory telegram to Allenby on the fall of Damascus, Wingate 
wondered if the Sharif would agree to the 'half-loaf of Sykes-Picot 
agreem ent.’ Wingate to Allenby, October 3, 1918, SA170/2 /1 .
59 Wingate to Allenby, November 2, 1918, SA170 /3 /1 . Walrond, Milner’s 
former secretary, corroborated this opinion. Walrond to Milner, 
November 10, 1918, ’The Sykes-Picot agreement was an unfortunate 
one, and Sykes and Clayton were badly bluffed by Picot, but never mind, it 
has got to be supported if we find that it, is not hostile to British-French 
interests in the East. ’ MP.164.
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Sharif continued while both remained under British subsidy. For his part, 
Wingate thought that the Sharif was strong enough to repulse an attack from 
Ibn Su fud; this contention was later to be proven wrong.
Finally, Wingate was concerned with obtaining and delivering the monthly 
British subsidy to the Sharif. This subsidy was £125,000, until Wingate 
recommended, on April 23, 1917, that it be raised to £200,000, and be main­
tained at £225,000 for five months after the fall of Medina. It was hoped that 
this increase would provide incentive for the Arab forces to capture M edina^. 
The money bought supplies and paid for the tribesmen to fight. Because the 
Sharif only accepted payment in gold, the currency most widely used in the 
Hijaz, the British Treasury found it increasingly difficult to supply the 
subsidy.
Owing to the War, the Treasury was under severe strain. It therefore
attempted to control stringently the allowance to the Sharif. Wingate objected
to the Treasury's unwillingness to provide the subsidy, for he felt that the
61Arab revolt had saved Great Britain millions of pounds and lives . The
Treasury viewed the revolt as a minor and expensive military action. For
this reason, Graham informed Wingate that the Treasury had raised questions
62over the continuation of the subsidy . On October 5, 1917, the Foreign 
Office wired that Egypt could use its gold supply for the October subsidy, but
60 Wingate to'Foreign Office, April 23, 1917, SA445/4.
61 Wingate to Graham, August 18, 1917, SA165/3/2.
62 Graham to Wingate, October 4, 1917, SA166/1/1.
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that the subsidy for the following three months was forthcoming from
London^. This notice was followed by a personal letter from Graham,
which stated that the Treasury was to furnish the funds, but that it had been 
64a 'wrench' for them. Graham wondered if it had been wise to apply
pressure in order to convince them that the subsidy to the Sharif was a
meritous expenditure. Wingate regretted that the subsidy had been difficult
65to secure, but noted that without it the Arab revolt would collapse .
In November, Wingate repeated his request for additional funds and 
recommended that the £25,000 previously reserved for the Sharif after the
66capture of Medina be given to him immediately and continued for five months 
Later, Wingate wrote that the revolt had reached a critical stage which neces­
sitated the maintenance of Faysal's operations in the north and the forces 
in the Hijaz.
Moreover, it is desirable for political reasons that King 
Hussein should not bear the whole brunt of operations in 
the Maan area and North and thus secure a preponderating 
voice in regard to the future settlement of the Syrian 
problem.
I therefore strongly urge that the Commander in Chief 
be empowered by the War Office to exceed the sum of 
£200,000 already granted for Arab operations in the North 
and to increase it up to a total of at least £500,000 should 
it be found necessary to do s o .
When money is required, it is required urgently and 
it is not possible to await specific approval without the 
danger of losing opportunity. 67
63 Foreign Office to Wingate, October 5, 1917, SA145/6.
64 Graham to Wingate, October 12, 1917, SA166/1/1.
65 Wingate to Graham, October 21, 1917, SA166/1/1.
66 Wingate to Foreign Office, November 2, 1917, SA146/8.
67 Wingate to Foreign Office, November 13, 1917, SA146/9.
On the same day, Wingate asked Allenby to write to the Foreign Office con­
cerning the subsidy. He thought that the double-barrelled arrangement
68should melt the stony heart of the Treasury’ . The Treasury agreed to the
69increase, provided it did not entail further dispatch of gold from London
Eventually an agreement was evolved with the Government of India, whereby
Wilson in Jeddah could draw up to £12,000 a week covered in rupee drafts
70with a latitude for emergencies
After the Treasury had consented to the increase, Brunyate, on
December 29, submitted a note complaining that this increase was drawn
from the banks in Egypt. He pointed out that the funds in the National Bank
of Egypt had, by law, been held as security for the note-holders, but that
these had been drawn upon until the Bank’s gold reserve was reduced from
three and three-quarter millions to £E. 675,000. Brunyate concluded that
it was not equitable for the War Cabinet to authorise additional expenditure
71and then expect the funds to be found by the Egyptian banks . However, the 
matter remained unsettled until the summer of 1918.
In July 1918, the Foreign Office reviewed the amount of financial aid 
the British government had given the Sharif since 1916. To July 25, 1918,
68 Wingate to Allenby, November 13, 1917, SA146/8.
69 Foreign Office to Wingate, n .d . (Brunyate’s note on it gives the date
as November 17, 1917), SA149/7.
70 Wingate to Foreign Office, November 14, 1917, SA146/9.
71 Brunyate to Wingate, December 29, 1917, SA147/3.
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he had received £4, 500, 000 in gold. Of this amount, about £1,000,000 had
been recovered at Jeddah, £3,000,000 consigned from Egypt, and the balance
of £500,000 consigned from the Imperial government. After reviewing these
facts, the Foreign Office informed Wingate that the proportion payable in gold
would either have to be reduced or the amount recovered at Jeddah increased.
Supplying this large amount of gold from the Treasury grew increasing
difficult as wartime expenditures expanded. Then, too, once the gold went to
72Arabia, the depreciation on it was high
For payment of the August and September subsidy, Wingate used the 
£400, 000 sent from Australia. When funds were insufficient because of the
demands made by the troops in the north, the Egyptian Ministry of Finance
was forced to ask the banks in Egypt for aid. Credit Lyonnais gave £100, 000
73and the Banco di Roma £30,000-£35,000 in gold ; the French provided 875,000 
74francs in gold . In September, Wingate submitted a statement noting that the
payments to the northern troops from August 10, 1917, to September 30, 1918,
74had totalled £618, 859/5/3 .
When he was preparing to submit a report of the financial aid given by 
Egypt for the revolt, Wingate asked Allenby to offer any accounts he had. He
72 Foreign Office to V/ingate, July 25, 1918, SA149/2.
73 Wingate to Foreign Office, August 4, 1918, SA149/5, part 3.
74 Wingate to Foreign Office, August 6, 1018, SA149/4,part 3. The British 
were reluctant to accept French aid, but, owing to financial pressures, 
were forced to do so. Wingate to Foreign Office, July 12, 1918; Foreign 
Office to Wingate, July 20, 1918, SA149/2.
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informed Allenby that Brunyate had suggested that further assignments of gold
for Faysal's subsidy should be directly received by the military authorities.
So long as gold was being drawn from the Issue Department 
of the National Bank of Egypt the intervention of the Financial 
Adviser or of his office in withdrawing the money was desired 
by the Bank and was probably a real convenience. As soon as 
that source was depleted, it became obvious that any gold 
sent to Egypt for such purposes was the property of His 
Majesty's government . . .  any advantage theretofore attaching 
to the intervention of the Financial Adviser appeared to me to 
disappear. 75
Brunyate recommended that the gold should be deposited in the Anglo-Egyptian 
Bank, rather than the National Bank as in the past. He added that the small 
sums borro wed from the National Bank and the Egyptian Treasury should be 
repaid.
On September 26, Wingate submitted his report in which he stated that 
on July 3 the gold supply in Egypt had stood at £4, 175, but that following this 
date £75,000 had arrived from Malta and £400,000 from Australia. Total pay­
ments to the Hijaz amounted to £552, 300. Owing to the delayed arrival of 
the Australian shipment of gold, Wingate had been forced to borrow from the 
Egyptian banks. Even after this sum had been repaid, the gold reserve in 
Egypt remained unsatisfactory. The matter was further complicated by the
76continued demands for money from the Arab forces operating under Allenby .
75 Wingate to Allenby, September 11, 1918. SA147/7. This is a direct 
quotation from Brunyate's report. He made another report on the gold 
situation on September 8, 1918, SA149/8, part 2.
76 Wingate to Foreign Office, September 26, 1918, SA149/8, part 2.
Eventually, more payments from Britain and the Imperial government were 
forthcommg, and the subsidies owing to the Sharif and Faysal were met.
77By the end of December 1919, the subsidy to the Sharif totalled £2 ,521,335/2/2  .
Of this amount, the Egyptian government was estimated to have contributed 
£23,057 as a gift. This sum does not include that which was lost in interest
78during the time that large withdrawals had been made from Egyptian reserves .
Thus, the furtherance of the Arab revolt was of great importance to 
Wingate, its titular commander. Although there is a disparity between the role 
he assumed and the influence he exerted, Wingate's part in the revolt warrants 
discussion because of the time and energy he expended on its behalf. He 
sincerely believed in the revolt and British involvement in it; however, he 
did not formulate policy or military strategy concerning it. At most, Wingate 
was able to facilitate requests from the officers directly involved with the 
revolt, while keeping them informed of the directives from London.
77 Allenby to Foreign Office, December 22, 1919; .F0141/828.
78 Allenby to Foreign Office, June 3, 1919, F0371/3723.
CHAPTER IV
ANGLOEGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION 
DURING WORLD WAR I
Anglo-Egyptian officials faced two main sets of problems during the 
War: those related to the implementation of military demands which were to 
facilitate an Allied victory, and those of an internal political nature which 
dealt primarily with the Sultan and his m inisters. The first of these prob­
lems involved military demands for men, materials, and money from the 
Egyptians. British officials had the task of fulfilling these requests expediously 
and efficiently.
Before heavy troop movements began in the Middle East, the demands 
placed upon Egypt were minimal. The Labour Corps consisted of volunteers. 
Similarly, only a few buildings, which could be easily converted into hospitals 
and way-stations for soldiers going to the Balkan battlefields or for the wounded 
from Gallipoli, were requisitioned'*'. However, as the War continued, the 
demands placed upon Egypt increased. After his appointment, Wingate was 
confronted with the problem of meeting military requests, regardless of 
Egyptian opposition or reaction.
As obtaining recruits for the expanding Labour Corps grew more dif-
1 Requisitioning of materials, F0371/2365, F0141/486.
ficult, it became necessary to initiate a system of forced enlistment. At 
first, the Labour Corps consisted of volunteers, mostly §a‘ idis (men from 
Upper Egypt) who were easily recruited. They, however, refused to enlist 
for more than three months, and would not re-enlist until their savings had
2
been depleted. Upon enlistment the volunteers were given an advance of £3 . 
They were well fed and received four to five piastres a day, but were placed 
under strict supervision. The recruits worked on the Canal, in railway con­
struction, and at the evacuation of Gallipoli, where their manual labour
released soldiers for duty on the battlefront. By 1915, casualties among the
3
Labour Corps were by 'no means rare1. After the number of volunteers
from the Sa*idis had been utilized, British officials found it difficult to secure
further recruits, for the Egyptian population traditionally feared duty in the
4army which formerly had taken soldiers for an unlimited time . When the 
military, in 1917, kept some of these recruits over the agreed three-month 
limit, popular resistance to enlistment increased. As an incentive for re ­
enlistment, the army offered a bounty of 100 piastres, but this was only given 
after a. six-month tour, and to the more skilled labourers, Some others 
received 50 piastres, but the majority received nothing extra. "Wingate
2 A brief record of the advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force under 
the command of General Sir Edmund H.H. Allenby, July 1917 
October 1918 (London, 1919).
3 Young, PPC, p. 108. For a sketch of the harsh treatment occasionally 




questioned the value of rewards which were so sparingly awarded, and the
5
system gradually terminated .
After the bounty system proved inadequate, other methods for obtaining 
recruits were considered, since the military demands continued to increase.
In 1916 the Labour Corps numbered around 2, 973, while in 1917 it totalled 
89, 852. Of the latter figure, about 63, 500 men were stationed in Egypt and 
Palestine, and 16, 234 men in France, Mesopotamia, and Salonica . The 
administration of the Corps was divided between the Egyptian and Palestinian 
sectors, each of which had its own leadership, hi order to deal with the 
increased requirements in the most efficacious manner, Wingate organised 
a committee to study the problem and to report on methods which might be 
employed to obtain additional recruits. In the Foreign Office, Graham 
critici red this committee, believing that a direct appeal to the Sultan would 
produce the desired result. Robert Cecil disagreed since he doubted that
7
appeals to the Sultan's Imperial feelings would have much effect . Wingate 
advocated that the Egyptian m inisters should take the initiative, since it was 
awkward for British officials to ask continually for recruits. In August 1917, 
the committee reported that it would be unwise to repeal the proclamation of 19 H-
6 P.G. Elgood, Egypt and the Army (Oxford, 1924), p. 108, The figure
for 1917 is from a letter written by Wingate to Milner, December 11,
1919, SA173/3/1. Elgood’s figure for 1917 is 55, 592. Wingate's
figures for 1917 are broken down as follows: total native labourers,
47, 385; camel transport corps, 20,000; horse transport, 3, 200; 
remounts, 1,200; veterinary, 1, 100; medic, 1,000; Imperial Camel 
corps, 280; police E .E .F ., 935; Mesopotamia, 154-1,089; casual 
labour, 14,000.
7 Graham and Cecil minutes, June 1917, F0371/2932.
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which had declared that Great Britain would undertake to protect Egypt during
g
the War without Egyptian assistance . Nor did the committee feel there was 
an advantage in extending the period of enlistment or in lowering the pay 
sc a le . The low volunteer rate was caused by the general prosperity, lack of 
loyalty to the Protectorate, and a hereditary distrust of the army. To counter­
act these factors, the committee recommended that the Egyptian ministers and
9
notables launch a campaign to increase the volunteer rate .
The findings of the committee were telegraphed to the Foreign Office, 
which critic k: 2d them. Officials in London did not consider that Egypt was 
pulling its weight in the War; they expected more willingness on the part of 
Egyptians to aid the A llies . Graham telegraphed to W ingate that to mitigate the 
displeasures of the officials, a new campaign for volunteers should be promptly 
in itiated^. Wingate conferred with British officials and with Rushdi Pasha.
They decided to raise the pay of the labourers by three to four piasters, the 
cost of which was to be borne by the Egyptian government, and to exempt volun­
teers from military service and the ghafir tax which was levied on Egyptians 
to pay for police protection. A propaganda programme was to be introduced, 
while provincial officials were ordered to stimulate recruitment as best they
8 Above, Chapter II, p. 28.
9 Report of Committee on Recruitment, Wingate to Balfour, August 20, 1917, 
FO407/183. The committee was composed of: Brunyate, Haines,
G. Macauley, General manager of the Railroads; and several military 
officers.
10 Graham to Wingate, August 22, 1917, F0497/183.
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11could . After reconsideration, the pay increase was refused, as the army 
felt that the labourers received sufficient pay, and that if their pay were in­
creased it would be on the same scale as that of British soldiers, which was
12not considered fair Furthermore, increased pay would mean increased 
savings, with a subsequent decrease in re-enlistment. Thus, the officials 
had to work within the bounds of the proclamation of 1914 and without the in­
centive of higher pay to persuade the Egyptians to join the Labour Corps.
Mudfrs and notables continued to exert pressure in order to obtain volun­
teers, until May 1918, when Allenby requested additional labourers to help in 
the military offensive in Palestine. Recognising the difficulties these demands
created, Allenby wrote to Wingate that a revival of the corvee system was
13probably the only effective means of securing the necessary men . Reluctant 
to embark upon such a drastic method, Wingate called on Brunyate, Haines, 
Cheetham, and several other British officials to consider the question. At a 
meeting on May 5, these officials noted that Rushdi and the Sultan both opposed 
the institution of conscription, but that the number of recruits had decreased
11 Graham to Wingate, August 22, 1917, FO407/183.
12 Wingate to Foreign Office, September 19, 1917, SA165/3/1. Wingate
to Graham, August 26, 1917, F0371/2928. Wingate remarked in this 
letter that the Financial Adviser was against the pay increase and pre­
ferred that a lump sum be given to the Labour Corps.
13 Allenby to Wingate, May 1, 1918, SA175/3/1. ’We can’t get the men,
and we can’t go without them; and I am advised the only way to get them 
is compulsion or on the lines of the corvee, but paid of course at the 
present rate of wages. As you know, I am opposed to compulsion but we 
seem to be between the Devil and the Deep Sea, and I don't know how to- 
avoid i t . 1
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owing to the harvest and the number of casualties suffered among the
labourers. The proposal for a pay increase was again rejected, this time on
the grounds that the country was too prosperous for its inhabitants to be swayed
by such an inducement. The idea that Chinese might be imported for the work
was discarded because of the transportation problems and the likelihood of
racial difficulties. Although Brunyate suggested that the Egyptian ministers
assist in the effort, Wingate felt that it was impossible to persuade them to do
so, since they had refused to accept coercive m easures. In the absence of
another solution, the officials agreed to act upon Allenby's suggestion to
/ 14requisition the labour from the villages *on a sort of corvee system* through 
the mudlrs, ma*murs, and jamdas.
The Sultan and his ministers were informed of the plan and asked to 
agree. Wingate remarked that the system of a limited corvee was the best 
way to secure the additional recruits without recourse to new laws*^. After 
receiving the assent of the Sultan and the ministers (who had little choice but 
to agree), Wingate asked Haines to inform the Provincial Inspectors of the new 
system . Haines told the Inspectors that the village officials were to put the 
limited corvee into effect immediately and that the ‘umdas were to obtain the 
number of recruits each village could be expected to provide: these recruits
14 Note on the meeting, May 5, 1918, held at the Residency, SA175/3/1.
15 Wingate to Allenby, May 6, 1918, SA175/3/1.
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were brought to the markaz where they were collected and transported to the 
area of battle. In an attempt to limit injustices which were bound to occur
from this veiled conscription, the ‘ umdas were warned that any discrimina-
16 /  tion in gathering recruits would be duly punished . Although the corvee
17system increased the number of recruits, it affected Egyptians adversely .
As early as May 26, 1918, Admiral Calthorpe, Naval Commander in the (
Mediterranean, remarked that the new system of collecting recruits was
worse than the old corvee, and that matters were particularly serious in 
18harvest time , After hearing of the Sultan's objections, Hardinge wrote
19that if the complaints were publicised they would cause indignation . Balfour
* 20 wondered why the corvee had been reinstated . Graham justified it by saying:
The Military authorities insist on a constant supply of 
Egyptians to act as camel men, stevedores, carriers, 
labourers . . .  nor was the voluntary system encouraged 
by the return to their villages of early volunteers from 
Gallipoli or Sinai, minus legs and arms and the delays of 
the military authorities in awarding compensation. 21
Neither Hardinge nor Balfour was convinced by Graham's arguments until he
had spoken with them personally and explained the needs of the military for the
16 Wingate to Allenby, May 7, 1918, SA148/9. Haines note to Inspectors, 
n .d . (circa May 8, 1918), SA175/3/1.
17 The system gained immediate results as the following indicates. On 
May 5, the day of the meeting at the Residency, recruits numbered 105; 
on May 6, 164; May 7, 414; May 15, 1355; May 25, 1289. Daily re ­
cruiting returns, May 1918, SA148/9.
18 Note ByCalthorpe, May 26, 1918, SA171/1, FO371/3202.
19 Hardinge minute on Calthorpe report, FO371/3202.
20 Ibid., Balfour minute.
21 Ib id ., Graham m inute.
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2 2labourers
The S ultan continued to oppose the corvee and particularly the unfair
23methods utilised by the local officials . Rushdi, to whom Wingate had
spoken concerning the policy of recruitment, attempted to placate the Sultan,
but this had little effect, and complaints continued. Finally, Haines suggested
24that criminals and 'roughs' be employed in the Labour Corps, Allenby
firmly rejected this proposal, believing these elements to be both physically
25and mentally inferior, an unruly group that would be difficult to discipline
By August 1918, the recruitment of Compulsion by persuasion1 had increased
2bthe size of the Labour Corps to 123, 035 . Although complaints were
systematically investigated as grievances persisted, the increase did not
27occur without some abuses arising from over-zealous local officials .
When the War ended, Wingate quickly asked Allenby to release the men
in the Labour Corps and to cease recruiting. Allenby, however, under pressure 
to maintain railway construction and surveillance, was unable to grant the 
request. Indeed, he did not anticipate any decrease in the required numbers
22 Ibid.
23 Haines to Wingate, July 27, 1918, SA169/3/1.
24 Haines to Wingate, August 2, 1919, SA169/2/1.
25 Ibid.
26 Wingate to Milner, December 11, 1919, SA175/3/1. Harmsworth, in 
Parliament, on March 31, 1919, stated that the greatest number of
men in the Corps at one time was 95, 829. Great Britain, 5, Parliamentary 
Debates (Commons), CXIV (1918), 853.
27 Wingate to Balfour, September 15, 1918, F0371/3199.
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28of Egyptian labourers, nor did he advocate bonuses for those in the service
Wingate could do little about this development, although he recognised the
potential danger of prolonging a system which aggravated the Egyptians.
Haines, too, warned that trouble would result if conscription were to continue
until February 1919.
The time has come when I consider political reasons should 
over-ride military considerations, and I would beg most 
earnestly for your support . . .  My proposition, therefore, 
is that we should do our best to obtain as many real volunteers 
for the Egyptian Labour Corps as possible for the Army in 
February, giving the Mudirs instructions to cease all 
measures of compulsion. 29
Haines added that several mudirs had been injured while trying to obtain volun- 
30teers . The continued recruitment of men obviously caused dissatisfaction 
among the Egyptians. These grievances were multiplied by the shortage of 
foodstuffs caused by military requisitioning.
To feed the soldiers stationed in Egypt and Palestine, military officers 
were forced to collect grain and other essentials from Egyptian and Sudanese 
farm ers. The effect of these collections upon the Egyptian economy is closely  
related to the economic repercussions of the War. Egypt's main crop was 
cotton, a commodity in wide demand during wartime. Thus, Egyptian cotton 
growers and merchants were in a position to gain a considerable profit from 
the increased sa les. With the exception of a brief interlude directly after the
beginning of the War, when the cotton market experienced a moment of panic,
28 Allenby to Wingate, November 17, 1918, F0371/3199.
29 Haines to Wingate, January 11, 1919, FO!41/667.
30 Xoid.
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which was halted by the British guarantee of the 1914 cotton crop, the prices
/
31of cotton steadily rose throughout the War . Rising prices encouraged
cotton growers to extend their acreage of cotton which, of course, decreased
the amount of land devoted to the cultivation of cerea ls . As the army demanded
more and more cereals, the British officials in Egypt were forced to limit
by law the amount of land which could be planted in cotton. In 1914 a decree
was issued limiting the amount of cotton to be grown in basin-irrigated areas
and in Upper Egypt. In effect, this limited cotton cultivation to about one -
32third of the total crops grown in Egypt in 1915, in place of 77% in 1914
After the production of cotton rose in 1916, Wingate had to find a balance
between the rising cotton cultivation and army demands for more cerea ls .
Limiting the area devoted to cotton was difficult, since the buyers in
Lancashire wanted a ready supply of cotton at the lowest possible prices, and
once the area planted in cotton diminished, prices naturally rose. Although
crops of barley, wheat, and sugar-cane were reported to be above average 
33in 1917 , in August, British officials declared another reduction in the
amount of land to be cultivated in cotton. This decree prohibited landlords and
tenants from growing cotton ov'er more than one-third of their land .Owing to
this law, 1,315, 572 feddans were cultivated in cotton in 1918 as compared to 
-
31 In July 1964 prices were quoted at £9.10. per pound and on March 23, 1916, 
at £11. 13. Great Britain 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), LXXXI
(1916), 1526. In October l9l'4‘, " the cotton crop was guaranteed to
£E4, 875,000 to be covered in Egyptian Treasury bills; by December the 
cover provided was £E2.35 m illions. National Bank of Egypt 1898-1948 
(Cairo, 1948), p .40.
32 Wingate to Foreign Office, September 11, 1917, SA165/3/1.
33 The Times, JuneS, 1917.
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341, 755,000 feddans out of a cultivated area of 5,023,000 feddans in 1914 
To enforce this law, the Cotton Seed Control Board, consisting of five British 
members, was established. This Board set prices and arranged for the pur­
chase and shipping of the cotton for the British government. Although the idea
for creating the Board may not have been his own, Wingate received praise
35for promptly initiating this control .
Both the Sultan and Rushdi expressed concern over the effect that the
enforced prohibition of cotton cultivation would have upon the Egyptians. They
insisted on knowing why the army demands for cereals were so high and
warned that, if the price of cotton dropped, there was a possibility of a 
36revolt . Wingate replied that the decision to plant cereals instead of cotton
had been taken to eliminate the necessity of importing foodstuffs, which had
37occurred prior to the War .
The army estimated that it would need 37,000 tons of barley, 11, 500
38tons of wheat, and 500 tons of beans a month for 1918 . This meant that
34 Afeddan is 1.038 acres. Wingate to Foreign Office, August 7, 1918, 
SA169/3/1.
35 Wingate to Foreign Office, August 15, 1917; Foreign Office to Wingate, 
August 18, 1917, SA165/2/2.
36 Sultan Husayn to Wingate, August 25, 1917, SA154/1.
37 * Analysis of the import of commodities shows a general decline in 
articles of food and clothing, the main exception being cereals and 
flour, which have entered in greatly increased quantities to supplement 
a diminished local production/ Great Britain, Cd. 7358, (1914),
Reports by His Majesty's Agent and Consul General, on the finances, 
administration, and condition of Egypt and the Soudan in 1913, p. 14.
38 Allenby to Wingate, September 13, 1917, SA165/3/1.
Egypt would have a deficit of about 200,000 tons of cereal, since it could not
supply both the needs of the military and its local inhabitants. Wingate hoped
that cereal production would be above average, so that the deficit would not
be too great, as it was impossible - owing to political considerations - to
39lower cotton cultivation below one third of the total cultivated area . Egypt 
was able to provide the necessary cereals for the military, although rising  
prices and eventual shortages in native markets indicate an insufficient supply 
of foodstuffs.
To prevent unnecessary inflation of cotton prices, Wingate created the 
Cotton Control Commission in 1918. This Commission was ordered to buy all 
the cotton crop for 1918. There was no compulsion for the growers to sell to 
this Commission, but no other export licences were granted. Therefore, the 
Commissioner was able to set prices for buying and selling. The profit made 
by the Commission, after world prices exceeded the estimates, was eventually 
returned to the Egyptian government. Interestingly, no British civil servant 
sat on the Commission, which was administered by leading businessmen, 
bankers, and cotton-growers. Wingate's report on the Commission indicates
that the government kept a close watch on its activities, but preferred to re-
. . . 40mam inactive and not participate directly in its functions , The Commission
39 Wingate to Graham, August 30, 1917, SA165/2/2. Also see: Food supply 
report, September 8, 1917, SA165/3/1.
40 Wingate to Foreign Office, February 24, 1918, SA167/2/2, Elgood d is­
cusses the Commission, while noting that the government had little to do 
with it. However, Wingate's report does not entirely agree with 
Elgood's analysis. Also see: A.E. Crouchley, The Economic develop­
ment of modern Egypt (London, 1938).
is another example of the closer government control in commercial activity 
which was precipitated by the War,
Indeed, the government toolc steps to control or to regulate three aspects 
of Egyptian economic life during the War, Measures of control were exer­
cised in supply requisition, banking, and price maintenance. The government 
attempted, through the Supplies Control Board, to facilitate the collection of
cereals for the army and to control rising prices. This Board was created
41 42under the leadership of British officials in September 1917 . James Craig
became head of the Board, which controlled internal transport of goods and
43exports and imports . Owing to the traditional governmental hesitancy to 
become involved in controlling the economic structure of the country, the 
Supply Control Board was not created until the composition of imports and ex­
ports had already substantially changed. Because of the War, imports from 
the Central powers and Turkey, from whom Egypt had formerly received large 
quantities of goods, were stopped. In most cases, these goods were replaced 
by sim ilar products made in Great Britain or her colonies, but there is evidence 
that at least a few products ceased to be imported and were manufactured in
The Tim es, September 24, 1917; September 29, 1917.
42 James Craig was Controller, Statistical Department, from 1913-1917; 
he was Financial Secretary for the Egyptian Ministry of Finance from 
1928-1934.
43 Supplies Control Board report, James Craig, n ,d . (circa 1918),
SA244/3.
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Egypt . Census returns of 1917 reveal that native manufacture, especially
45of textiles, expanded during the War . This expansion took place without the 
encouragement of the British administration, which did not wish to rush indus­
trialisation in Egypt. In 1918, The Times quoted Brunyate's views on indus­
trial development for Egypt:
Whilst believing in the process of gradual industrial develop­
ment, which will eventually add materially to the available 
resources of taxation, none the less, he is convinced that 
progress must be slow and certain, and only the most careful 
scrutiny of all expenditures can bring even moderate progress 
within the limits of the resources available. 46
It is evident from this remark that the British officials were willing to partici­
pate in those facets of the economic system which directly affected Egypt's 
wartime contributions, but preferred Egyptians to import manufactured goods 
from Great Britain or her colonies.
The governmental slowness in adopting methods to deal with rising prices 
is another indication of British reluctance to participate actively in the economic 
processes. Then, too, British officials had little experience with the effects
44 The Import trade of Egypt (1912-1916) (Cairo, 1917). Egyptian im ­
ports in 1916 reached £E30,072, 213 with £E15,010, 231 coming from 
Great Britain. Goods from the British colonies made up the majority 
of the remainder. Mohammed Ali Rifaat, The Monetary system of 
Egypt: an inquiry into its history and present working (London, 1935). 
Rifaat states that in 1919, 46.0% of Egyptian imports came from the 
United Kingdom and 53.0% of its exports went to that country. Appendix II.
45 The census of Egypt taken in 1917 (Cairo Government Press, 1921).
46 The T im es, April 20, 1918.
of wartime demands upon prices, and were, therefore, uncertain of the most
efficient manner with which to deal with these problems. The presence of
numerous Allied troops in Eg ypt not only caused a change in the structure of
. . 47importation, but also increased demands for foodstuffs and other necessities .
With greater demand and scarcity, the prices of goods, especially of fuel
products and staple foods, rose alarmingly. Although the British press con-
48tended that price increases only affected Europeans living in Egypt , a glance
at the actual price rises gives a contrasting picture.
Using the price index of 100 as the level of prices in 1914, the price of
bread in 1915 was 97. This rose to 203 in 1917, Likewise, the price of
npetrol rose from 122 in 1915 to 209 in 1917. Even after prices on wheat and
other foodstuffs were fixed on April 1918, they were approximately double the 
49pre -war figures . The Supplies Control Board endeavoured to enforce
fixed prices, but with wartime demands, hoarding, and the black market, this
50proved to be difficult . By 1918, the cost of foodstuffs had become a serious 
m atter. Realising the problem, Craig appealed to Brunyate for co-operation
47 Import trade, 1916.
4% The Times, January 19, 1917, October 30, 1917, April 20, 1918.
49 Wingate to Foreign Office, December 1, 1917, F0369/926. Rifaat 
placed the overall price index of 1917 at 176, at 211 in 1918, at 231 
in 1919, and at 312 in 1920. Also see: The Tim es, April 8, 1918.
50 The Egyptian Gazette and Le Journal Officiel remarked upon the 
scarcity of goods and the rising prices from 1915 until 1919. The 
Egyptian Gazette, March 28, 1918, noted that the prosperity in 
Egypt was more apparent than real.
in regulating the prices through a national scheme of control. He wanted to
create wage-control boards in each town to adjust wages to the rising prices,
and to exercise the fullest possible control on price le v e ls . Craig warned that
unless these solutions were immediately realised British officials could expect
51an ’Insurrection in Egypt in the next twelve months'. These solutions were
given to Brunyate not to Wingate, who was obviously not regarded by officials
as the man to see that such laws were promulgated. Rather than override
Brunyate’s objections to Craig’s programme, Wingate allowed him to veto the
plan to control prices. Wingate, when permitting Brunyate to reject Craig’s
scheme, remarked that he trusted the Minister of Interior was prepared to
deal with any disturbances created in the towns because of the shortage of 
52
breadstuffs \  After his programme was refused, Craig resigned. He was
replaced by Morton (Ross) Taylor, who knew little about supply control, but
who also warned of the approaching cr is is . The press in Egypt complained
53persistently of the failure to control prices and of the scarcity of fuel . By 
allowing the more conservative British civil servants, particularly Brunyate, 
a free hand in dealing with the rising prices and scarcities, Wingate prevented 
the creation of organisations to deal with these problems. Nor did he ascertain
51 Craig report, 1919, SA244/3. The report is a history of Craig's con­
tinued difficulties in securing acceptance for his schem es.
52 Wingate to Brunyate, February 4, 1918, SA167/2/4. Brunyate termed
Craig’s scheme ’hare brained'.
53 al-Muqattam, March 23, 1917, November 16, 1917; al-Umma,
September 1, 1918; al-Watan, September 9, 1918.
that the Minister of Interior was prepared to deal with disturbances arising !
i
from these disruptive events. These factors played a large role in facilitating 
the Nationalists' task of gaining support in the countryside during 1918 and 
1919.
Although British control of prices and supplies in Egypt was half-hearted 
at best, the officials did take prompt action to ensure an adequate supply of 
bank notes for the purchase of cotton. Beginning in August 1914, the govern­
ment agreed to a bank note issue which allowed for an increase in the money 
in circulation without the movement of gold, the transfer of which was severely  
restricted as a consequence of the War. In 1916, when the notes could no 
longer be covered by gold reserves in London or Egypt, they were covered by 
British Treasury B ills. This tied the British and Egyptian monetary system s 
even more closely than previously. The note issue of 1919 totalled £E39,900,000,
with the bulk of the cover in British Treasury B ills. The total issue at the end
54of 1919 was £E67, 300,000 , while in 1920 the issue reached £B75,000,000 with
55£E3, 330,000 covered in gold ". The note issue established the exchange with 
Great Britain and made more economical use of the gold, which, by the end of 
the War, was scarce. However, the concomitant effect of the issue was to de­
flate the currency value, thus exposing it to an unlimited depreciation which
54 L.G. Roussin, 'The present monetary regime in Egypt', trans. from 
French in L'Egypte contemporaine (February, 1924), p .5, SA107/16.
55 Great Britain, Cmd. 957, (1920), Reports by His Majesty’s High Com­
missioner on the finances, administration, and condition of Egypt and 
the Sudan, 1914-1919, p .7. Crouchley, p .204. He rounds off the gold 
coverage to £E3,400,000.
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contributed to the r ise  in p r ic e s^ .
Owing to the exigencies of the War upon the monetary system and upon
Egyptian resources, Edward Cecil informed Wingate that expenditure would be
increased after the War, thereby forcing the administration to use some of
the Reserve Fund, then valued at seven million pounds. According to Cecil,
it was undesirable to allow the Fund to drop below five million pounds. He
therefore urged that the administration should not begin new projects which
57entailed large capital output until stability had been re-established . Cecil*s 
fear that Wingate planned to initiate costly projects was one of the main causes 
for the split between them. Throughout this period, and until Cecil's departure 
in 1917, a conservative financial policy was followed. After Cecil's departure, 
Brunyate, acting Financial Adviser, carried on Cecil's policies. It is not too 
surprising that these advisers acted in such a manner, for they wished to 
maintain steady economic progress for Egypt,, while avoiding unnecessary debts 
and expenditures. When the Wax intensified the monetary demands placed 
upon Egypt, the advisers became even more reluctant to accept expenditures 
which were not vital to the economy. The demands caused by the War were 
not only placed upon Egyptian resources, but also took the form of requests 
for monetary gifts from the government and private individuals.
The Red Cross campaigns were among the largest appeals for individual
56 Roussin, p. 6.
57 Cecil Reserve Fund and financial position report to Wingate, January 11, 
1917, SA164/8.
contributions for the war effort. The campaigns were initiated in 1915 and
continued until the Armistice. They were led by British officials and their
w ives. Wingate earnestly worked for these drives and was able to report at
58the end of the War that Egypt and the Sudan had given £400,000 . This
money had been collected among the native populace as well as among the
foreign communities in Egypt. There was evidence that, in their enthusiasm
to please British officials, the mudirs and *umdas misused their authority in
order to convince the Egyptians to give to the Red Cross, an organisation which
59benefited Allied soldiers, and was purely European in administration .
The Egyptian government also made monetary contributions towards the
War. Brunyate estimated in 1918 that Egypt had given £E3,000,000 in gifts,
lower railway rates, and decreased import taxes. This was in addition to the
£E548,928 which had been given to the Sudan during the War, and the
£E70,000 which had been earmarked for the expenditure of the Darfur 
60expedition . The War Office, which only took into account those amounts 
given in currency, not contributions like those given to the Arab revolt or in 
intangibles like lower railway fees, deprecated the smallness of the Egyptian
58 Wingate report on Egyptian work for the Red Cross to Arthur Stanley 
(Red Cross director in London), June 30, 1918, SA166/1. This report 
lists the membership in Cairo, all of which was European. For an 
account of the work done by Wingate for the Red Cross see: The Egyptian 
Gazette, 1917, which periodically noted WingateTs speeches on behalf of 
the Red C ross.
59 Lt. Col. C .F . Ryder intelligence report, April 23, 1919. This report 
told of an 'umda who had collected £E1, 500. When asked if all the 
donors had given willingly, he replied, 'Willing*.' Every Milleme was 
wrung from them by force. * FO141/780.
60 Memorandum on the suspense account, February 25^1918, F0371/3199.
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contribution. When the War Office contrasted Egypt's contribution with the «
£100, million given by India, it felt that Egypt was not doing her part. In
justification, Graham noted that India had 35 times the population of Egypt*
and, that owing to the Capitulations, Egypt could not levy new taxes in order
to secure a greater proportion of the wealth enjoyed by the landowners,
merchants, and businessmen^*.
The question of the Capitulations was considered by British officials
throughout the War, for they were eager to abolish the system . A committee,
with Brunyate as Chairman, was created in April 1917 and met 75 tim es to
62consider the matter before issuing its report in March 1918 . The British
desire to eliminate the Capitulations irritated foreign and religious communities
in Egypt, as they were the primary benefactors from the system , Wingate,
along with his colleagues, warmly supported the abolition of the Capitulations,
which limited British governmental freedom, and restricted a more equitable 
63taxation policy . Various foreign residents in Egypt wrote against the abolition
61 Wingate to Foreign Office, March 11, 1918; Graham minute of May 3,
1918, F0371/3199. Egypt's population was 12, 718, 255, Census, 1917.
62 For more on the Capitulations see: The law affecting foreigners in 
Egypt: as the results of the Capitulations with an account of their origin 
and development (Edinburgh, 1907); George Ambrose Lloyd, Egypt 
since Cromer (London, 1933). The work of the Commission is discussed  
in 'Commission des Capitulations: etat des travaux1, L'Egypte contem- 
poraine (1918); also, SA161.
63 Wingate to Graham, March 11, 1918. Wingate wanted the Capitulations 
to be abolished, but wished to maintain martial law until that time. 
SA168/1/2,
97 .
of the Capitulations, but their grievances were not seriously considered by 
the British. For this reason, the Egyptian hhtionalists were later to tem­
porise on the subject of Capitulations, while at various times they even 
stated their opposition to the abolition of the system . Since the matter was
rdeferred for final decision until after the War,! Wingate took no part in the
64actual abolition of the Capitulations
These economic and internal problems occurred simultaneously with
the change of the Sultanate and movements to modify Egypt's legal status v is-
a-vis Great Britain, It is impossible to speak of the changes regarding the
Sultanate envisaged by British officials without noting their views on the
65establishment of a Protectorate or annexation . Wingate favoured annexation
even after the declaration of the Protectorate in 1914; he did not change his
mind concerning this subject after becoming High Commissioner. Indeed, in
every dispatch concerning Sultan Husayn, Wingate spoke of annexation, Sultan
Husayn was well known for his pro-British inclinations, but as his health
declined, British officials were forced to consider a suitable successor. Prince
Kvdmal al-dln, Husayn*s son, and Prince Ahmad Fu’ ad, son of the late Khedive
Ismael, were the favourite choices. Graham expressed support for Fu»ad,
whom he knew was anxious to become Sultan, whereas Kamal never manifested
66any interest in politics* but preferred sports and hunting . At first, Wingate
64 The Capitulations were abolished by the Montreux Convention, May 8, 1937.
65 See cbov.a, Chapter IIj pp. 27-8.
66 Graham minute, January 25, 1917, FO371/2930.
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did not reveal his preference, but merely warned that Egyptians expected
more responsibility In the government after the War. For this reason,
Wingate urged that the Foreign Office consider what form the British govern-
67ment in Egypt was to take after the War .
The position of the military in Egypt added to the confusion, since it was
impossible to judge to what extent governmental duties had been relegated to
the m ilitary. Acting upon Wingate*s request, both General Murray and
Brunyate submitted memoranda on the extent of military government in Egypt 
68in February 1917 . Murray contended that the civil administration had become
relatively unimportant, as the military had talcen over most of the important
duties after the declaration of martial law. On the other hand, Brunyate
maintained that the military could not exist in Egypt without the aid of the
civilian administration. These memoranda were forwarded to the Foreign
69Office which supported Brunyate's opinion . Later, Graham submitted a note 
on the future status of Egypt in which he advised against annexation and 
recommended the continuation of the civilian administration. Graham believed
67 Wingate to Hardinge, March 24, 1917, SA175/4.
68 Murray and Brunyate memoranda, February 1917, FO371/2930.
Wingate to Balfour, February 22, 1917, Wingate had asked Murray 
to write the memorandum because he had expressed concern lest 
Wingate attempt to control both the civilian and military aspects of 
the Egyptian administration. Indeed, Wingate had suggested this, 
but his request had been refused. SA237/10.
69 Graham minute on Brunyate memorandum, March 21, 1917, F0371/
2930,
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that after the War the Sultan would come to England along with other 1 better
70class Egypts . . .  to pay their respects to the Protectorate* . By stressing
Egyptian support for the Protectorate, Graham was able to minimise the
military control in Egypt. At a later date, Wingate annotated Graham*s note
with a question asking why Graham, if he had upheld the Protectorate and the
Sultan*s support of it, had not permitted the Egyptians to come to London after 
71the Armistice , Obviously, when Graham wrote the note in 1917, he 
expected that the Egyptians would continue to support the Protectorate and 
function within its framework. As events evolved, precisely the opposite 
occurred,
The Foreign Office opposed annexation, because it desired to retain the 
Egyptian administration under its own direction. Therefore, it continually 
fought against the transfer of the Egyptian government to the direction of the 
Colonial Office. In.a round-robin argument, the officials in the Foreign Office 
asserted that to place Egypt under the Colonial Office implied annexation, and 
that annexation was impossible because it would be a breach of faith with the 
Egyptians72.
The contest between those in favour of annexation and those opposed to 
it continued through the spring of 1917. Wingate recommended that the Foreign 
Office consider the feasibility of annexation, and remarked that Sultan Husayn
70 Graham note on the future status of Egypt, March 2, 1917, SA137/10.
71 Wingate remark on Graham note, September 1, 1920, SA137/10.
72 Hardinge minute on Graham’s note, March 1917, F0371/2926.
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73felt that it was the most satisfactory solution . Robert Cecil wanted to
consult other officials in Egypt, but Graham declared that the opinions of
most of these officials were worthless. He maintained that Cheetham could
not disagree with Wingate, and that Brunyate was out of touch with native
aspirations. He reported that he had asked Murray and Edward Cecil for
74their opinions, which had supported the continuation of the Protectorate .
Therefore, Graham wrote to Wingate that it was impossible to annex Egypt or
abolish the Sultanate until some of the Egyptian princes had been given an oppor-
75tunity to act as Sultan . In the face of this strong opposition from, the Foreign
Office, Wingate abandoned his scheme for annexation.
It also seemed conceivable that, in the general re-allotment 
after the War, the Powers might consider Egypt to fall almost 
naturally to the British Empire. I must now, however, admit, 
after six months experience in my present position, and 
having regard to the constantly changing military and political 
situation, that I am no longer the ardent Annexationist I was. 76
After the scheme for annexation was rejected, the Foreign Office had,
once again, to choose a successor to Sultan Husayn, In the summer of 1917,
Graham again recommended Fu’ad. He knew Wingate opposed Fu’ad’s nomination,
but was convinced that Fu’ad could be persuaded to adopt British policy.
Furthermore, Graham asserted that it was better for Fu'ad to fail as Sultan
73 Wingate to Hardinge, May 6, 1917, HP, Vol. IV(32), 1917, FO371/2930;
Wingate to Hardinge, June 18, 1917, HP, Vol. V(33), 1917.
74 Graham minute on Wingate’s letter to Hardinge, May 6, 1917, FO371/2930.
75 Graham to Wingate, June 7, 1917, SA164/8.
76 Wingate to Hardinge, June 17, 1917, SA237/10? HP, Vol. V(33), 1917.
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77than for Britain to annex Egypt . According to Wingate, it was too early to 
judge whether the Protectorate would be a success or failure, but that its 
implementation had been greatly facilitated by the presence of a pro-British
Sultan. Wingate predicted that after Husayn died the British would find it
78more difficult to govern Egypt . The fear of a less  pro-British Sultan than
Husayn was undoubtedly one of Wingate's major reasons for desiring the
annexation of Egypt. He did not feel that any of the Egyptian princes were
suitable successors, whereas, if Egypt were annexed, the Sultanate would be
abolished, thereby eliminating the necessity of choosing a new Sultan.
After receiving a memorandum from Clayton in support of annexation,
79Wingate wrote again to Hardinge , This memorandum was written at Wingate's
request. Stack, for one, thought that Wingate ought to have written officially
to the Foreign Office on the subject; he wondered if Wingate had any opinions
80of his own or merely followed Clayton's advice . In the light of the evidence 
it appears that when Wingate was faced with the combined opposition of the 
officials in the Foreign Office and his own subordinates, he rejected annexation,
77 Graham to Wingate, June 25, 1917, SA237/10.
78 Wingate to Balfour, July 23, 1917, SA153/8.
79 Wingate to Hardinge, July 23, 1917, SA237/10; Clayton note on annexa­
tion, July 22, 1917, SA153/8.
80 Stack to Clayton, August 5, 1917. 'It is odd that with someone having 
30 years of experience of the country and holding the post of H. M.G. 's 
High Commissioner should ask anyone to write a dispatch on a matter
of such vital importance, indeed the biggest issue in the history of Egypt 
since its occupation.' SA49G/6.
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but, after receiving support from Clayton, whose advice he valued, he 
reverted to his original advocacy of annexation. This wavering back and 
forth or inability to stand by his original policy can hardly have strengthened 
his position v is-a -v is the Foreign Office.
Wingate repeated his appeal for annexation in a letter on July 27 to 
Balfour, but the idea was again rejected. After this rebuttal, Wingate re ­
ported that Kamal would make the best candidate for the Sultanate. He hoped
to persuade him to accept the position as he was a powerful landowner in the
81Delta, and was generally respected . In September, after Sultan Husayn's
condition worsened, IsmaTI Sirri Pasha, Minister of Public Works, suggested
- 82 that Kamal be selected as Husayn's successor . Sultan Husayn also chose
KamSl to succeed to the throne, a policy which was supported by Wingate and
the Egyptian m inisters. Realising that the Egyptians were not wholly loyal to
Great Britain, Wingate was particularly anxious for the selection of a pro-
British Sultan.
However much we may pride ourselves on having regenerated 
Egypt, we must not blind ourselves to the fact that we are 
not popular, and that although the Egyptians would rather have 
us than the Turks to rule them, the influence exercised by 
religious and racial affinity are such strong factors that nothing 
short of the practical blotting out of Turkey will ever make the 
Egyptians as a race really loyal to British ru le . 83
81 Wingate to Balfour, August 19, 1917, SA154/1, Montagu to Hankey,
November 4, 1917, CAB23/32, G.T. series 2857.
82 Wingate to Graham, September 12, 1917, SA165/2 /2 .
83 Wingate to Graham, August 26, 1917, SA165/2/2.
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Because the majority of British officials believed Prince ‘Umar Tusun 
was pro-Turkish, his candidacy for the throne was/refuted. In a similar
r
manner, Wingate feared that Fu’ad would not be easily managed. However, 
the Foreign Office continued to support Fu’ad. On September 22, Brunyate
!
drafted an invitation asking Kamal to become Sultan. *Adli Pasha Yakai,
Minister of Education, even talked personally with Kamal, but he refused to
accept the position. The rejection was received with relief in the Foreign 
84Office .
On October 8, Wingate had an interview with Fu* ad, who was asked at
this time to become Sultan According to such order of succession as shall be
established by agreement between His Majesty's Government and Your High- 
85ness* . Wingate stressed the importance of Fu'ad's adopting a V ait and see*
policy since immediate changes in the Cabinet or the Sultan's aides were un~
86desirable . Fu’ad accepted these conditions and the offer of the Sultanate.
Sultan Husayn died on October 9. His son's disclaimer, received at the 
Residency the previous day, was published in Le Journal Qfficiei on October 10, 
alcng with the announcement of-Fu’ad's accession to the throne. On the tenth, 
Husayn's funeral took place. After the ceremony, Wingate wrote heartfelt 
letters on Husayn's loyalty to Great Britain** .^ There is no doubt but that Wingate
84 Foreign Office to Wingate, September 21, 1917, SA154/1. Graham to 
Wingate, September 21, 1917, SA165/3/2.
85 Wingate note on the interview with Fu*ad, October 8, 1917, SA154/2.
86 Ibid.
87 Wingate to Graham, October 10, 1917; Wingate to Stamfordham,
October 10, 1917, SA154/2.
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had a sincere friendship with Husayn and felt his loss deeply. On October 16
Fu’ad was officially recognised as Sultan in a public ceremony at which he
88delivered a speech drafted by Brunyate and checked by Wingate . Since 
neither Wingate nor the ministers were complacent over Fu’ad's accession, 
they took every step to ascertain that Fu’ad would act loyally to Great Britain.
This apprehension over Fu’ad's loyalty arose after it was rumoured that 
he wished to bring his personal entourage into the palace to act as aides and 
advisers. The Egyptian ministers worried lest Fu’ad's followers should 
gain his complete support to the exclusion of the Cabinet. In the hope of pre­
venting such a development, Wingate tentatively suggested that one of Fund's
private secretaries be British, while urging Rushdi to prevent undesirable 
89appointments . After Fu’ad became Sultan, Wingate heard that he planned to
90 91appoint Ism ail Sfidqi Pasha and ‘Amin Yehia Pasha to the Sultanic house­
hold staff. Since both of these men were known to have nationalistic tendencies 
and Sidqi had been involved previously in a public scandal, Wingate opposed the
appointments. Upon Wingate's behest, Rushdi persuaded Fu’ad to forego
92making the appointments . This was the first indication that Fu’ad was neither
88 Brunyate draft of Fu’ad's speech, October 8, 1917, SA154/2.
89 Brunyate to Wingate, October 3, 1917, SA154/2. Wingate to Hardinge, 
October 6, 1917, FO141/620. For more on the relationship among 
Fu’ad, Rushdi, and the Nationalists see: Elie Kedourie, 'Sa'ad Zaghlftl 
and the British', St. Antony's Papers, No. 11, Middle Eastern Affairs,
N o .2, ed. Albert Hourani, p. 139.
90 Isma'll Sidqf had been Minister of Agriculture in 1913. He had a law
degree and had studied in France. He became Prime Minister in 1930.
91 ‘Amin Yehia Pasha was a wealthy notable from Alexandria.
92 Wingate to Balfour, October 18, 1917, SA154/1.
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as pliable,nor as amenable to British policies, as Husayn had been.
93When Edwin Montagu visited Egypt in late October , Fu’ad made his
future intentions quite clear. At a breakfast party for Montagu, Fu’ad said
that Egypt was England’s friend and she had only to grant their 'national 
94aspirations' . While Montagu pretended not to understand, Fu’ad repeated
this three tim es. Finally, Montagu asked what national aspirations the
Egyptians had. Fu’ad turned to Rushdf, and the two men replied:
95'We want autonomy.'
Following this answer, Rushdi indicated that they wished Montagu to inform
Wingate of this desire. Montagu duly reported the conversation to Wingate,
who replied that Fu’ad wanted to become Caliph. The conversation was also
reported to Lloyd George.
Soon after this revealing discussion, during which it became evident
that Rushdi and Fu’ad both desired more self-government, if not complete
independence, Fu’ad made another attempt to introduce more nationalists into
96the Egyptian government. He proposed the appointments of Sa* d Zaghlul
93 Montagu’s visit will be discussed at greater length in Chapter V, pp . 135-7.
94 Montagu diary, October 27, 1917, Lloyd George l&pers, FO 40/1/1.
95 Ibid.
96 Sa'd ZaghlQl was Minister of Education in 1906 and Vice President of 
the Legislative Assembly in 1913, He married the daughter of 
former Prime Minister, Mustafa. Fahmi. His ability had been praised 
by Cromer when he left Egypt. However, his nationalist inclinations 
were equally well known.
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97as Minister of Agriculture, and ‘Abd1 al- ‘Aziz Bey Fahmi as Minister of
Wftqfs (’YVuqui) in place of Ahmad Hilml and Ibrahim Fathl. Although British
officials realised that Fathi and Hilml were not well qualified for their
positions, they were inclined to support them because they were pro-British.
Fathl had survived an attempt on his life in 1915 and had been a personal
98appointee of Kitchener , while Hilmi had long supported British policies.
Zaghlul, on the other hand, was known to oppose many British policies and to
have nationalist sympathies. However, his abilities were recognised, as even
Sultan Husayn had recommended he replace Sidql after his resignation in
1915. At this time, McMahon pointed out that Zaghlul was powerful within
Egypt and had been passed over twice for a ministerial appointment. McMahon
cautioned that the time would soon arrive when it would be unwise to keep
99Zaghlul out of governmental circles . However, Kitchener refused to 
accept Zaghlul*s appointment, and had recommended that Fathi be given the 
position‘d .  Thus, when Fu*ad asked that Zaghlul be given a ministerial 
post, he acted upon precedent. In echo to Me Mahon *s warnings, Wingate 
wrote to Hardinge:
97 ‘Abd al- ‘Aziz Fahmi was a noted lawyer in Egypt,- he was a close friend 
of Ahmad Lutff al-Sayyid and Zaghlul, and had been a member of the 
Legislative Assembly.
98 Graham note, October 20, 1917, F0371/2926, F0371/2351.
99 McMahon to Foreign Office, May 14, 1916, F0141/629. McMahon to 
Kitchener, May 24, 1915, PRO30/57/47.
100 Foreign Office to McMahon, May 18, 1915, F0371/2351.
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. . . .  the older Ministers were chosen by K, (Kitchener) 
are pro-British but hardly worth retaining due to counts 
against them . . .  That the inclusion of Zaghlul and 
Fahmy will give the reconstituted Ministry a somewhat 
stronger Nationalistic tendency is undoubted, but on the 
other hand I am not altogether adverse to this. 101
Wingate pointed out that the two nominees were well qualified and honest. He
believed that it was better to have them in the government, and tacitly on the
British side, than working for the opposition outside the government.
This recommendation followed previous reports concerning the growing 
national sentiments among the Egyptians. Thus the inclusion of known national­
ists in the Cabinet was not likely to be accepted by the Foreign Office. For 
Montagu had also warned that Fu’ad was easily led and vould be vulnerable 
to nationalist intrigues. He reported that Wingate was cognizant of Fu'ad's 
weaknesses and had great influence with him, but that, at the same time, 
nationalist agitation within Egypt was a probability.
. . . .  it is quite clear to me that there are national a s­
pirations and desires for autonomy in Egypt as there are 
in India, fomented by extremists but existing to a greater 
or less degree, nascent or vigorous, in the minds of many, 
many people in Egypt. I am certain - and I think Sir 
Reginald Wingate would agree with me - that this problem 
will have to be faced in Egypt in the future . . .  But I must 
predict with confidence, nevertheless, that in the future, 
and in the no distant future, the spirit of nationalism, 
strengthened by the events of the War and based upon 
pride of country, will have to be considered in Egypt. The 
very separation of Egypt from Turkey, the very acknowledge­
ment of the Egyptian country and nation will make this less  
remote than it would otherwise have been. 102
101 Wingate to Hardinge, Novem ber 29, 1917, SA 166/2.
102 Montagu to Hankey, November 4, 1917, CAB24/34, G .T. series, 2837. 
Montagu wrote along the same lines to Lloyd George and Philip Kerr, 
Lothian Papers, GD40-17-35.
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In December, the question of the new ministerial appointments was
further complicated by Rushdi's advocacy of the dism issal of Hilmi and Fathi
and their replacement by Sa‘ d Zaghlul and ‘Abd al- ‘Aziz Fahmi. At the same
time, he urged a clear definition of British rights in Egypt and the dimunition
of 'abusive' British intervention. In a report submitted to Wingate, Rushdi
pleaded for a division of control of Egyptian foreign affairs, which would allow
103Egyptians a greater responsibility in their government . After receiving 
Rushdf’s report, Wingate reconsidered his advice on accepting the appoint­
ments of Zaghlul and Fahmi Whereas he had formerly supported their 
nomination, after studying Ruslidifs programme, V/ingate decided that the 
nationalist trend had become too prominent and had to be halted immediately.
Rushdi Pasha's programme involves a complete break with 
the past. The basis of our control of Egypt is the 'advice1 
of H. M.G, tendered when necessary through their local 
representatives and the British heads of Departments. He 
proposes to free the Egyptian Government from this control 
except in certain limited respects. The whole system of 
our Protectorate would in my view be endangered by any 
such change, To ensure our position and make good our 
pledges to Foreign Powers we should have to introduce safe­
guards in the shape of defined powers of veto and direct 
executive control. 104
The Foreign Office treated Wingate's warning lightly after Graham re ­
marked that Wingate overestimated the importance of Rushdi. A junior Foreign 
Office official suggested that Zaghlul be appointed to the Cabinet, while the
103 V/ingate to Foreign Office, December 9, 1917, F0141/629.
104 Wingate to Foreign Office, December 9, 1917, SA166/3/2, 
F0141/629.
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question of the relationship between Great Britain and Egypt be delayed until
after the Arm istice. Graham rejected Zaghlul's appointment since Great
Britain could not dism iss known pro-British ministers for two 'avowed 
105Nationalists' . In a telegram drafted by Graham, Wingate was ordered
to retain the Cabinet as it stood. On the matter of governmental reforms, the
Foreign Office wrote:
As regards the prcgramme of Reforms you may rest 
assured that H.M.G. do not contemplate any abrupt 
departure from policy of a steady and gradual develop­
ment of native institutions under British guidance and 
control, 106
By the time the Foreign Office directive was received, the proposed
appointments and RushcTi's report had become common knowledge among
Egyptian officia ls. Rushdi was then persuaded to apologise for his untimely
report which Wingate thought had been written in order to gauge how far the
107British would permit the Egyptians to control the government . In a letter 
to Hardinge, Wingate described Zaghlul as a mauvais coucheur, but noted that 
Rushdi had definitely repented. Although the personal enmity between Sultan 
Fu’ad and Fathi continued, the problem was solved by FathiTs acceptance of 
a leave of absence. Following this, Fathi resigned and was replaced by 
Ahmad Pasha Ziwar, a pro-British n o t a b l e . Wingate congratulated Brunyate
105 Graham minute to Wingate's letter of December 9, 1917, F0371/2926.
106 Foreign Office to Wingate, December 13, 1917, F0141/629.
107 Wingate to Hardinge, December 13, 1917, SA166/3/2, HP, Vol. VI(35), 
1917.
108 Ahmad Ziwar was Advocate-General of the Native Courts; he held a 
variety of Ministerial posts after 1917.
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and Cheetham, who had played no little role in securing a settlement accept­
able to all those concerned. After Ziwar's appointment, Wingate hoped that 
the matter was closed.
Let us hope that - for the moment at any rate - we shall 
have no more advanced political programmes, though we 
must expect a very franlc expose of National aspirations 
when the war is over and the settlement has to be made on 
several pending questions. By that time, however, I hope 
that the deliberations of the Capitulations Commission will 
have considerably cleared the atmosphere and that decisions 
on debatable points will be facilitated. 109
Thus Wingate came to believe that Rushdi's programme had been an 
attempt to conciliate the Nationalists who had been gaining adherents to 
're-open the Legislative Assembly on the return of p e a c e * W i n g a t e  felt 
that, since there were few qualified Egyptians for ministerial posts, those 
c apable Nationalist leaders were in favourable positions to gain support and 
power. Graham replied that there were more qualified Egyptians than during 
Cromer's regime***.
Ironically, at the very time Wingate was becoming more intransige ant 
against the Nationalists, the officials in the Foreign Office were having second 
thoughts regarding the wisdom of leaving Zaghlul in the political w ilderness. 
For this reason, the Foreign Office wired Wingate that it had no objection to 
the inclusion of Zaghlul in the Cabinet if he was recommended. The Foreign
109 Wingate to Hardinge, December 24, 1917, FO141/629, F0371/3199.
110 Wingate to Balfour, December 27, 1917, F0371/3199.
111 Graham minute on 'Wingate letter of December 27, 1917, F0371/3199,
Office did, however, maintain that the Sultan had no right to change ministers
112without the consent of the British government . Leading British officials 
in Cairo, particularly Cheetham and Brunyate, were not willing to 
recommend Zaghlul, nor was Wingate willing to accept the responsibility for 
Zaghlul*s appointment in the face of their opposition. While British officials 
worried lest Zaghlul, once in the Cabinet, oppose the ready acceptance of all 
British policies, they also recogni sed that he was potentially dangerous as long 
as he remained outside the governing c irc les .
During the spring of 1918, murmurings of nationalist discontent con­
tinued. Since the key -Mitionalist leaders were outside the government, it was 
hard for British officials to exercise pressure, other than arrest or exile, to
persuade them to desist. Even Fu’ad was suspected by British officials of
113listening to Lationalist grievances and of sympathising with them . Thus,
the embryo of nationalist support among Egyptian politicians had been apparent
a full year before the Armistice. The strength the nationalist movement
assumed in 1919 was largely depend cnt upon the amount of support it gained
114from the fallah (fallahm) and the educated classes , many of whom had been 
alienated or angered by wartime demands, These grievances made themselves 
known immediately following the A rm istice.
112 Foreign Office to Wingate, December 29, 1917, F0371/3199.
113 Wingate to Montagu, May 1, 1918, SA168/3.
114 Osmond Walrond to Milner, October 22, 1918, MP164.
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CHAPTER V
BRITISH CIVIL SERVANTS IN EGYPT 
AND THE FOREIGN OFFICE
After Kitchener, who had been the undisputed master of the government, 
left Egypt, Edward Cecil, Ronald Graham, and Milne Cheetham began to 
compete for the supremacy of their respective departments. When McMahon 
made no attemtp to reassert absolute control after his appointment as High 
Commissioner, the rivalry among these men continued*. McMahonfs self 
effacement was caused, at least partially, by his lack of experience in 
Egyptian affairs and his inability to speak either Arabic or French. Although 
Graham returned to London in September 1916, competition between Cecil and 
Cheetham persisted, while Brunyate was drawn gradually into the affair, When 
Wingate arrived in Cairo in December, his chief responsibility was to bring 
order to the somewhat confused British administration in Egypt, and to 
provide the type of leadership which would eliminate personal riva lries, This 
task was complicated by the demands placed upon Egyptian resources owing to 
the war and by the large number of British officials and military men in Egypt 
at the time.
Indeed, since the British occupation in 1882, the number of British 
officials in Egypt had steadily increased. In 1882, Cromer*s staff numbered
1 Above, Chapter II, p. 31.
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about 300 to 400, with Europeans holding about two percent of the positions
and receiving 16 percent of the sa laries. Owing to the extra work caused
by the 'V\hr, no records of the number of British officials in Egypt were kept
2
during Wingate’s tenure , but during the Milner Mission (December 1919 to 
March 1920), Egyptians only held about 23 to 28 percent of the higher administra­
tive positions. This meant that British officials in these positions had increased
3
to about 42 to 59 percent . In spite of the increase in British officials, there 
are corresponding evidences that the quality of the men - in terms of experience 
and knowledge - did not r ise  proportionately. During the Y&r, the younger 
and more capable men enlisted, leaving only those men who were thought to 
be incapable of wartime duty or those too valuable to be expended in Egypt
2 The Foreign Office received a question to be asked in Parliament con­
cerning the number of officials in Egypt, but no one could supply the 
answer. March 8, 1916. Grey reported that it was not necessary to 
count the officials until after the War. Grey to McMahon, August 2,
1916, F0371/2667. Figures on Cromer's staff are found in T .A . Spender, 
’The Egyptian Problem', Quarterly Review (April, 1922). They are also 
in Elgood, p .63.
3 Milner Mission Report, FO840/19. In 1920, there were 21,193 Egyptians 
working in the government. This was 86% of the total. Their salaries 
equalled £E 2, 740,245, or 71% of the total. There were 1, 546 British 
officials, comprising 6% of the officials, and receiving £E 732, 273, or 
19% of the salaries. Other nationalities held 1,812 jobs, or 8% of the 
total. They received £E 377,066, or 10% of the sa laries. In the salary 
range of £E 1, 500, -2,999 (the highest level) there were eight Egyptian 
and 34 British officia ls. These figures are exclusive of the seven 
Egyptian m inisters, the Sultan, and members of the Legislative Assembly. 
In the salary range of £E240 and below, there were 19,061 Egyptian and 
363 British officials. Also see Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and society  
in modem Egypt: a study of the higher civil servant (Princeton, 1957),
p .31.
to carry on the administrative work.
Clayton noted that the British civil service in Egypt was remarkable only
4for its lack of spirit and its inefficiency , while Milner remarked that 
officials in Egypt and London were often ’mediocre'^. These facts were 
repeated many times in the course of interviews given by members of the 
Milner Mission . British officials were criticised both for their ignorance of 
Egypt and for their isolation from Egyptian society. The officials tended to 
live clustered together in areas like Gizira where the inhabitants were pre­
dominantly European. Social life centred around the Sporting Club or the Turf
Club. Egyptians belonged to the Muhammad A li Club, and Coptic Egyptians
7gathered in the Ramses Club . Thus, British officials came into contact with 
Egyptians only on an official level; even then they most frequently met as 
superior officials to subordinates. British society was, therefore, practically 
a closed one. Although British authorities did not purposely seek to offend
4 Clayton to Wingate, August 3, 1916, SA139/1.
5 Milner Notes, 1917-1921, MP 2.46
6 See the Milner Papers and the ones on file at the PRO, FO840,
7 For descriptions of the life led by the British in Egypt see: Edward
Cecil, The leisure of an Egyptian official (London, 1921);
Priscilla Napier, (daughter of William Hayter in the Legal Department),
A late beginner (London, 1966); Murray Harris, Egypt under the 
Egyptians (London, 1925); Lord Vansittart, The m ist procession 
(London, 1958); Sydney Moseley, With Kitchener in Cairo (London, 1917). 
B.G. Gaulis, Le nationalisme Egyptien (Nancy, 1928) gives a good 
picture of the Egyptian social clubs. Storrs, p .93, mentions the isola­
tion of British officials and their lack of experience as contributing 
factors to the 1919 riots.
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Egyptians, the insular nature of their society remained visible evidence of a 
foreign occupying force. Wingate not only had to unify his own staff, but
i
also to act as a liaison between high ranking Egyptians and British officials, i
i
Nor did the officials in Cairo alleviate these problems for Wingate,
Before coming to Egypt, Wingate had depended upcn Clayton for informa-
8tion and analysis of the situation , but once in Cairo, Wingate preferred to
control matters himself with the aid of the officers who accompanied him from
the Sudan. According to the organisation of the Residency staff, the High
Commissioner was assisted by a private secretary, an assistant secretary,
an A .D .C ., three assistant A .D .C .'s , a counsellor, and the Chancery, which
was staffed with assorted clerk s. The Oriental Secretary and Arab Bureau
9
also furnished the High Commissioner with information and advice . Although 
the Counsellor and other Residency officials remained after Wingate's appoint­
ment, his officers from the Sudan, Symes, Keown-Boyd, and Patterson, took 
over the positions close to the High Commissioner. Haines remained as 
Adviser to the Ministry of Interior, although his capabilities were questioned. 
He was reportedly unable to reach a rapport with Egyptians with whom he came 
into constant contact‘d .  Brunyate, too, while possessing a tremendous capacity
8 Wingate to Clayton, February 29, 1916, SA470.
9 Recommendation of Sub “Committee for the Organisation of the Residency, 
Milner Mission, 1919-1920, MP164.
10 Storrs wrote about Haines; * Knowledge will not make up for absence of 
personality'. Civil Service Note, January 31, 1917, Storrs Papers,
TT/4 . Walrond reported that Haines used to interview mudlrs and other 
Egyptians, many of whom traditionally disliked dogs, with a fox terrier  
sitting on his armchair. Walrond to Milner, December 9, 1918, MP164,
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for work, as evidenced by the number of committees of which he was chairman,
frequently clashed with Egyptians because of his stubborn attitude and tact- 
11lessness . Because there were no alternatives to Brunyate or Haines,
Wingate was forced to rely upon their assistance and advice. While Wingate 
also came to depend upon Cheetham, he indicated his willingness to have him 
transferred^.
Soon after his appointment, Wingate had Storrs, the Oriental Secretary,
appointed Assistant Political Officer to the Anglo-French Political Mission
(A. P. O .) and replaced him with Symes. This appointment prompted Stack,
acting Governor General in the Sudan, to ask if Wingate wanted to make the
transfers of Symes and Keown-Boyd permanent ones in lieu of the temporary
13ones which they had been granted . That Wingate seemed to favour his
proteges frcm the Sudan caused Anglo-Egyptian officials to grumble. Wingate
had not been in office long before complaints about his treatment of other
officials began. He was also criticised for his slowness and inability to make 
14firm decisions .
11 Rennell Rodd, Note on Appointments in Egypt, March 14, 1920, wrote 
on Brunyate: fHis tact, however, in dealing with other men was con­
spicuously incommensurate with his ambition and he failed by attempt­
ing too much*. Walrond mentions the same characteristic in a letter 
to Milner, November 26, 1919, MP164. Stewart Symes, Tour of duty 
(London, 1946), p .26.
12 Wingate to Hardinge, December 27, 1917. Hardinge to Wingate,
January 23, 1918, HP, Vol. I (36), 1918.
13 Stack to Clayton, April 22, 1917, SA470/6.
14 Herbert diary, February 3, 1917, July 9j 1917, July 23, 1917-, August 29, 
1917-, PPC.
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While leaving most of the older British officials in their posts, Wingate 
did take steps to remove one official whose presence he considered detri­
mental to the smooth running organisation he hoped to build. This man was 
Edward Cecil, the Financial Adviser and brother of Robert Cecil, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1918) and Minister of the Blockade 
(1916-1918). Edward Cecil was perhaps the most powerful official in Egypt.
i
Being well aware of this fact, Wingate was determined to eliminate his influence.
Wingate realised that the most successful British administrators in Egypt had
ruled absolutely, but, in his attempt to remove Cecil, Wingate may have
clashed unnecessarily with politicians in Great pritain, many of whom were
15closely connected with the Cecil family .
Indeed, this factor becomes more crucial in the light of the government
changes in London in December 1916, Wingate was appointed by Grey with
Asquith's concurrence. When Asquith's government fell in December, it was
replaced by a smaller Cabinet led by Lloyd George as Prime Minister. Whereas
Wingate had been well known to members of Asquith's government, he had
only a passing acquaintance with Lloyd George or Lord Curzon who became
16President of Council . Lloyd George had had nothing to do with Wingate's
15 The Cecils were related to A. J. Balfour and were close friends of 
Milner who was later to marry Lord Edward Cecil's widow.
16 Wingate and Lloyd George met several times, once at Balmoral.
Following this meeting, Lloyd George used Wingate's analogy of two 
small rivers flowing together to make the Nile in a speech at Colwyn 
Bay in September 1910, North Wales World News, September 23, 1910, 
Lloyd George Papers, C 34/2-9. He referred to Wingate's good work 
in the Sudan in a speech at the Mansion House, July 1914, Daily 
Telegraph, July 18, 1914, Lloyd George Papers,C36/2/27.
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17appointment, and had only been cursorily informed of it by Grey . With
Lloyd George as Prime Minister, the War Cabinet became a more important
factor in determining policy. The change of government occurred, because
Lloyd George and his supporters were convinced Asquith could not win the
War quickly. Lloyd George promised to place the entire resources of the
nation on a war footing, and to win the War as quickly as possible. To
accomplish these aims, he made it clear that most governmental power would
18be vested in the War Cabinet and himself . Although the Foreign Office 
remained in charge of the execution of policy, decisions of consequence were 
made by Lloyd George and the War Cabinet. Such decisions were frequently 
reached beforehand in the Prime Minister’s private conversations. Thus those 
individuals close to Lloyd George were in excellent positions to gain his atten­
tion and support. If Wingate was aware of the changing political structure, 
v is-a -v is  the importance of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister, he did not 
attempt to augment his influence with Lloyd George or Curzon, but continued 
to report solely to Hardinge and Graham. Since these men were not close to
17 Grey to Lloyd George, November 2, 1916, Lloyd George Papers,
2/13/12.
18 The "War Cabinet was composed of: Lloyd George, Prime Minister;
Lord Curzon, President of Council; Mr. Henderson and Lord Milner, 
Ministers without Portfolio; Bonar Law, Chancellor of the Exchequer; 
and A.J. Balfour as Secretary for Foreign Affairs. For more on the 
increased power of this Cabinet see: Thornton diary (Thornton was 
Milner’s private secretary at this time), MP299; and John P. Mackintosh, 
The British Cabinet (London, 1962), pp.350-375.
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the focus of power around Lloyd George, and Graham had been demonstrated
19to have had ambitions of his own in Egypt , Wingate might have done well to
make his views personally known to Lloyd George or to those men close to
him. That Wingate was ultimately unable to obtain Cecil's dism issal from
Egypt was in some measure caused by his remoteness from politics and lack
of influence in prominent circles within London.
Wingate was encouraged by Hardinge and Graham to ask for Cecil's
removal from Egypt. Indeed, Wingate had barely established himself in the
Residency before he received letters from Graham telling him that the entire
Egyptian administration, particularly the Financial Department, badly needed 
20reform . In complete agreement with Graham, Wingate told Hardinge that
Cecil possessed too much power among the other administrators, and that
his influence overshadowed that of the High Commissioner, who should have
21been the predominant figure . To support his contention, Wingate referred
to Cheetham's memorandum to the Residency which outlined the proper roles
for each Egyptian department. In this memorandum Cheetham emphasised the
importance of the Chancery which was to act as a clearing house for all
information being relayed to the High Commissioner from Egyptian administrative 
22departments ..Owing to the power he could exercise as Financial Adviser, Cecil
19 Above, Chapter II, p. 37
20 Graham to Wingate, January 3, 1917, No. 162, Wingate Dossier to the 
Milner Mission, MP 162.
21 Wingate to Hardinge, January 21, 1917, SA175/4.
22 Cheetham oBmorandum to the Residency, n .d . (circa December 1916) , 
SA151/11. Above, Chapter II, p. 22.
had been able to encourage Egyptian and British officials to report directly to 
him . He thereby assumed authority which had formerly rested with the High 
Commissioner. Wingate was quick to see that as long as Cecil remained it 
would be difficult for the High Commissioner to assume full authority. There­
fore, only a month after becoming High Commissioner, Wingate recommended 
the removal of Cecil from his position because he was blocking the effective 
reorganisation of the Egyptian administration.
I am very hopeful that the changes here and Cheetham's 
re-instatement in the position from which my predecessor 
moved him and to which he has now returned will lead to 
a great improvement in many directions, though it must 
necessarily take some time for the effect to be fully felt . . . .
I am simply astonished at the extent to which Cecil 
has not only established a sort of ascendency over the other 
Advisers but used his position at the head of the finances to 
make the rank and file of officials, British and Egyptian, 
look to him . . .  I am convinced that the strings must be 
drawn together again into the hands of the High Commissioner. 23
To enable the High Commissioner to integrate the administration, Wingate
asked that the Foreign Office accept Cecil's request to enlist. Cecil first
requested such permission after the War began, but he was consistently refused
24on the grounds that he could not be spared from Cairo . Thus, Wingate’s re­
commendation incited considerable discussion among Foreign Office officials. 
Opinion was divided between the Balfour-Cecil contingent and the Hardinge-
23 Wingate to Hardinge, January 31, 1917, SA163/1.
24 Cecil to Wingate, January 16, 1917. Cecil applied for a transfer in 
January 1915, September 1915, and in the fall of 1916. McMahon to 
Cecil, September 19, 1916, wrote that Cecil could not be spared. 
SA160/2.
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25Graham group over whether Wingate's request would be accepted . In this
case, the decision appears to have been made not so much upon Wingate’s
2danalysis as upon personal interests . After receiving Wingate's recom­
mendation, Hardinge showed it to Balfour. Hardinge was convinced that Balfour
27would act impartially and not consider family interests . Other officials
were not so certain. Mervyn Herbert, for one, feared that Wingate had m is-
28calculated, and that his request would not weigh heavily with Balfour . While 
the matter was being considered, Cecil returned to London.
With Cecil's departure, Wingate attempted to take over full control of 
the government, but was not completely successful in this endeavour. In Cecil's 
absence, Ronald Lindsje}y, former Assistant Adviser to the Financial Depart­
ment, became acting Adviser. As a close personal friend of Cecil, he con­
tinued his financial policies and also informed him of all activities in Egypt.
Other British officials who were uncertain whether Cecil would return or not 
were reluctant to look solely to Wingate for direction, Nor was Wingate strong 
enough to force the British or Egyptian officials to accept his leadership. Con­
sequently, they soon began to doubt Wingate's wisdom in acting so hastily against 
Cecil. Stack wrote:
25 Graham to Wingate, February 7, 1917, SA163/2.
26 Ibid. Graham believed Balfour and Robert Cecil were primarily worried
over Edward Cecil's future.
27 Hardinge to Wingate, February 14, 1917, SA167/2/2; HP, Vol. 1(29), 1917.
28 Herbert diary, n . d , PPC.
29 Cecil to Wingate, May 16, 1917, SA164/5. Herbert diary, August, 1917,
PPC.
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It seem s to me in view of the growing power of the 
Ministers that Master /Stack's name for Wingate/was 
very ill judged to get rid of C ecil. I fancy he was the 
only adviser who could stand up to them, 30
Meanwhile, Cecil was not altogether idle in London. He visited Hardinge 
on March 7 to stress that he intended to return to Egypt. Hardinge told him 
that his leave had been granted for unspecified military duties lasting four to 
five months, but after that time the matter would have to be settled. Hardinge re ­
ported this encounter to V/ingate, who had received sim ilar information from 
31Cecil himself . In his letter to Wingate, Cecil warned him that there was a
movement among some leading British officials in London to reorganise the
administration of all Middle East departments in the Foreign Office under a
single heading. Cecil wrote that he had been consulted concerning the proposal,
but had not expressed an opinion, because he did not know Wingate's views. In
addition, Cecil reported that his brother thought that the Foreign Office should
not direct Middle East affairs, but that, as part of a general imperial change,
32these affairs should be placed under a separate department
Robert Cecil's programme placed the administration of Egypt under the 
direction of the Colonial Office. Hardinge opposed the suggestion on the grounds 
that it implied the annexation of Egypt, which had been rejected lest it should 
cause untoward trouble in Egypt. Although Hardinge did not think that the
30 Stack to Clayton, July 15, 1917, SA470/6.
31 Hardinge to Wingate, March 8, 1917, SA153/8.
32 Cecil to Wingate, March 19, 1917, SA164/3.
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Protectorate would end after the War, he believed that Egypt was further
advanced towards constitutional government than India. Therefore, according
to Hardinge, it was not suitable for Egyptian administration to be directed
by the Colonial Office. As further justification of his position, Hardinge
pointed out that after an independent Arabia was established the Foreign
Office could work through the Egyptian administration in order to mediate
33between the Arabs and the French in Syria , In other words, Hardinge fore­
saw Egypt becoming the centre from which information on the Middle East 
would be received and transmitted.
On the other hand, Cecil maintained that the duties of the Foreign
Office were diplomatic in nature while the government of -Egypt was essentially 
34
administrative . Cecil refuted Graham who contended that the basic adminis­
trative structure in Egypt was good, although certain departments needed to
be changed. He seized upon Graham’s admission that some reform was
35needed as evidence that the entire system was faulty . According to Cecil,
placing Egyptian administration under the Colonial Office would not raise the
annexation issue, but would, rather, regularte Great Britain’s control over 
35Egypt . In his rebuttal, Hardinge wrote that placing Egyptian administration
33 Hardinge minute to Balfour, March 16, 1917, FO407/183.
34 Robert Cecil minute, March 17, 1917, FO407/183.
35 Graham memorandum on Egypt, March 2, 1917, FO407/183,
36 Cecil minute, n .d . FO407/183.
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under the Colonial Office or the India Office would be a definite change for
^  37 the worse .
Wingate did not submit a memorandum on the subject, nor was he 
officially consulted. He did write privately to Graham, on April 6, 1917, 
that if the Foreign Office were to continue to administer the Egyptian govern­
ment, it needed to create an adequate department staffed by qualified 
38personnel . Along the same lines, Wingate agreed with Hardinge concern­
ing the development of Cairo as the British focal point of control for outside 
39the Nile Valley . Wingate told Hardinge that he hoped he had the confidence 
of the government, and that the discussion of administrative changes had not 
arisen because of any actions he might or might not have taken. Hardinge 
replied that the problems of Egyptian administration could wait for solution 
until the Arm istice. He reported to Wingate that the government placed every 
confidence in his abilities as High Commissioner^^.
Wingate evidently accepted Hardinge's reassurance, because he did not 
attempt to inform other Cabinet members of his views concerning Egyptian 
administration. He did, however, aslc to be informed as to what policies they 
intended to pursue in Egypt. Wingate bluntly asked:
37 Hardinge minute, n .d . FO407/183.
38 Wingate to Graham, April 6, 1917, SA164/4.
39 Wingate to Hardinge, April 17, 1917, SA164/4.
40 Hardinge to Wingate, April 19, 1917, SA237/10.
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. . . .  what the views of H. M.G. are with regard to the 
surrender to the native administration of some of the 
higher posts now held by British. The matter is a 
vitally important one for the future of this country and 
it would be very helpful to me to know in greater detail 
the views of H.M.G. on the policy to be pursued in this 
respect when the war is over. 41
Wingate*s query had been prompted by a memorandum written by Rushdi
Pasha, Rushdi complained that Great Britain had taken control of the foreign
affairs of Egypt after declaring the Protectorate and had left merely the
ineffectual shell of the Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs under Negib
Pasha Ghali. Rushdi complained of this development and asked for more
Egyptian participation in their own foreign affairs. Rushdi*s memorandum
was obviously an attempt to secure more self-government for Egyptians after 
42the War , Wingate favoured giving the Egyptians a greater semblance of
autonomy, but advised against letting them have any part in foreign affairs,
43even those in which Egypt was vitally concerned . Although Wingate did not 
expect the Foreign Office to begin changes during the War, he wanted to know 
what the policies were, so that he could deal effectively with Egyptian attempts
41 Wingate to Graham, May 28, 1917, SA237/10.
42 Rushdi memorandum. Sent by Wingate to Hardinge, May 29, 1917,
HP, Vol. IV(32), 1917. It was seen by Cecil and Graham. Robert 
Hyde Greg, formerly in the British Agency, Cairo, was in charge of 
the Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1917-1921.
43 Wingate to Hardinge, May 29, 1917, HP, Vol. 1V(32), 1917. Edward 
Cecil advocated giving the Egyptians more self -government. He wrote 
concerning the matter after hearing the exiled Egyptian nationalists
in Switzerland planned to present similar cla im s. Cecil to Wingate, 
May 16, 1917, SA164/5.
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like RushdiTs memorandum, to gain more autonomy. Unfortunately, the 
question was not considered by the Foreign Office during the summer. All 
programmes concerning Egyptian administration and policy were deferred 
until autumn.
In the interim, the demands upon Egypt increased,and the relationships
among Anglo-Egyptian officials worsened. Clayton, whose opinions Wingate
valued, became Chief Political Officer for the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
This position took him out of Cairo and placed him in closer contact with
General Allenby, who in the future was to appoint Clayton as Adviser to the
Ministry of Interior in Egypt. In Clayton's absence, Wingate depended more
and more upon his proteges from the Sudan and a few of the older British
offic ia ls. He did not, however, desist from attempting to remove Cecil from
Egypt. On May 16, Wingate wrote Hardinge that he thought Cecil should
44remain in England for the duration of the War . Balfour considered the
suggestion at length. Finally, on July IS, 1917, Balfour replied that he
regretted there had been difficulties between Wingate and Cecil, but that Egypt
required the best men available. For this reason, Balfour decided that
45Cecil should return to Cairo . Wingate accepted the dictum gracefully, a l­
though he continued to affirm that adjustments would be necessary after the War.
He noted that until the time came he would attempt to avoid direct clashes 
46
with Cecil . Where Wingate had lost his battle to remove Cecil from Egypt,
44 Wingate to Hardinge, May 16, 1917, SA164/5.
45 Balfour to Wingate, July 18, 1917, Wingate Dossier to Milner, MP162.
46 Wingate to Balfour, August 15, 1917, Wingate Dossier to Milner, MP162.
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Cecil not only thwarted Wingate, but had had the opportunity to present his 
complaints and ideas in person to the officials in London. In doing what he 
thought best, Wingate actually gave Cecil an opportunity to strengthen his 
own position.
Wingate's attempt to have Cecil dismissed caused hard feelings among
his colleagues in Egypt. Instead of healing old rivalries, the attempt to remove
47Cecil m erely accentuated them . Lindsey's resignation from the department
of Finance is one example of the type of disagreement which arose in Cecil's
absence, Thinking Wingate meant to introduce programmes necessitating heavy
capital output, Lindsey handed in his resignation. Like Cecil, Lindsey opposed
such projects lest they place undue strain upon the Egyptian budget which was
committed to expensive programmes after the War: these included road
construction, irrigation improvements, and public buildings. After Lindsey
48told Cecil of the proposals, Cecil complained to Wingate . Wingate replied
49that he had no intentions of initiating new projects until after the War . Not 
placated by this announcement, Lindsey persisted in resigning, even though the 
Foreign Office, Cecil, and Wingate urged him to reconsider. Lindsey replied
47 Stack to Clayton, July 15, 1917. 'I hear the H.C. has a tough job in 
front of him in Egypt unless he changes considerably; his methods are 
not the ones likely to succeed in getting it straightened out', SA470/6.
48 Cecil to Wingate, May 16, 1917, SA164/5.
49 Wingate to Cecil, June 16, 1917, SA164/8. Lindsey file, HP, Vol. VI(34),
1917; SA 165 /1 .
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50he was leaving owing to a conflict on financial policy . Wingate immediately
asked Lindsey to explain his statement. In a letter to Hardinge, Wingate
wrote that he favoured appointing a committee which vo uld create limits on
spending for each governmental department. Such a committee would eliminate
the necessity for the High Commissioner to decide whether or not a given
51department would receive the funds it requested . Cecil and Lindsey both
disagreed with Wingate, because they wanted the Financial Department to
52have complete independence in deciding such matters . After an interchange
of letters between Wingate and Lindsey, and a private interview in which
Wingate tactfully apologised for any remarks which Lindsey might have taken
53personally, Lindsey was persuaded to remain until Cecil returned ° . This 
incident indicates the type of disagreements which arose among the British 
officials. It also typifies the problems which arose when Wingate attempted 
to outline programmes or changes for the future.
While Wingate tried to cope with the administrative difficulties in Cairo, 
Robert Cecil submitted a memorandum, 'Future Egyptian Administration ', 
written by his brother, to the Cabinet on September 14, 1917. As the title 
indicates, this memorandum formulated a new organisation for Egyptian 
administration. It advocated the creation of a department which would com­
bine the work of the existing Egyptian departments and the Arab Bureau. Cecil
50 Lindsey to Wingate, August 26, 1917, HP, Vol. VI(34), 1917.
51 Wingate to Hardinge, August 29, 1917, HP, Vol. VI(34), 1917.
52 Lindsey File, 3A165/3/1.
53 Ibid.
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54urged that a special committee be formed to consider the memorandum
The Cabinet acquiesced, and the committee was created. Members of this
committee included: A.J. Balfour as chairman, Curzon, Milner, and Ronald
55
Storrs as secretary . The Special Committee to study the Egyptian administra­
tion met on September 24, 26, 27, and October 1 to hear the evidence given by 
Edward Cecil, Ronald Graham, McMahon, and Cheetham. In brief, the com­
mittee was to decide if the Egyptian administration was to remain under the 
direction of the Foreign Office or was to be transferred to the Colonial Office
or another governmental department. Cecil urged this decision be made before
5 6the situation in Egypt became 'acute* and rendered change impossible.
As on previous occasions, officials in the Foreign Office were alarmed 
by the idea that the Egyptian administration should be removed from their 
tutelage. Before Cecil had even submitted the memorandum recommending 
changes, Hardinge wrote to Wingate that the Cecil brothers were intriguing 
against the Foreign Office. To halt the Cecil manoeuvres, Graham, with 
Hardinge's support, began a campaign against any proposal to eliminate Foreign 
Office control over Egypt. Hardinge felt that if officials would concentrate on 
winning the War,
54 War Cabinet, CAB23/4, N o .233, September 14, 1917.
55 CAB27/12. Report by Lord Curzon, G.162. Storrs was invited to 
become secretary by A.J. Balfour, September 20, 1917, Storrs Papers,
11/4.
56 Cecil to Curzon, September 28, 1917, CAB27/12.
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instead of starting these hare-brain schemes, it would 
save a lot of time and trouble and probably be more to 
the advantage of their own interests, but unfortunately 
there are people who love to undermine situations that 
are progressing satisfactorily. 57
58Hardinge termed Cecil's memorandum as 'pernicious' . Aiming to  prevent
the acceptance of the memorandum, Graham wrote a rebuttal in which he
argued that to create a new department would involve duplicating records, and,
59in short, make unnecessary work . He thought splitting the Egyptian
administration from the Foreign Office would place the High Commissioner in
an anomalous position vis-ayvis the advisers and the Egyptian officials. Although
he was willing to admit the system was far from perfect, Graham wanted to
delay changes until the War ended.
Our future relations with the native population of Egype 
will, in my belief, depend very greatly on the manner 
in which the inevitable problems are tackled at the end of 
the war and the personal relations which can be established 
with the Sultan, Ministers and leading Egyptian notables. 60
Cecil did not disagree with Graham on the point that there would be tur­
bulence in Egypt after the War. Indeed, he fully expected it to develop.
This was the reason he felt it incumbent that the means for dealing with 
Egyptian unrest should be provided before it occurred. Milner, too, upheld 
Cecil on this point. He wrote:
57 Hardinge to Wingate September 7, 1917, SA236/7.
58 Hardinge to Wingate, September 26, 1917, SA165/3/2.




. . . .  the internal problems of Eg ypt are bound in the near 
future to force themselves upon the attention of the Govern­
ment and Parliament of this country, in a degree of which 
we have had no experience in the past . . .  Unless we lose 
the wax, Egypt will in the future be as much a part of the 
British Empire as India or Nigeria. 61
Both Curzon and Graham disputed Milner's prophecy. They were supported by 
Cheetham whose primary objective was to assure that the power of the High 
Commissioner was not weakened. When Cheetham raised the issue of the 
Residency, Curzon asked about Wingate's opinions. Since he had not been con­
sulted, no one at the committee meetings could answer. Nor had Wingate sent 
the Foreign Office or the Cabinet any communications outlining his ideas. 
Reverting to the problem of future trouble in Egypt, Balfour asked for
Graham's opinion. Graham replied that trouble was unlikely as long as Turkey 
62remained weak , Balfour was anxious that the government be prepared to deal 
with any Egyptian demands for further autonomy, but accepted Graham's 
contention that separating the Foreign Office from the Egyptian administration 
would not solve the problem. In the end, the committee failed to adopt a 
resolution. By delaying a decision over what form the administration of Egypt 
was to take, Hardinge and Graham believed they had defeated Cecil's proposals.
61 Milner memorandum on Egyptian administration, October 31, 1917, 
CAB27/12. The minutes of the meeting at which these memoranda were 
discussed are found in CAB27/12. The following summary of the major 
points raised at these meetings is taken from those minutes.
62 Minutes, September 27, 1917, CAB27/12.
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Both of them reported to Wingate concerning the meetings and their 
success, but warned him that Edward Cecil was likely to raise the subject 
after he returned to Cairo, They expected Cecil to advise Wingate to re ­
commend that a High Commissioner for Egypt be stationed in London acting
63like the High Commissioners for New Zealand or Australia . Cheetham
told Wingate that he was combatting all the Cecil proposals, but that there was
an ignorance of Egyptian affairs which is disconcerting 
and . . ,  offers great opportunities for intrigue. 64
Hardinge wrote that Wingate need have no fear concerning Cecil*s report for the
Foreign Office remained loyal to their own men. He emphasised that if the
matter were reopened there was a Strong prima facie ground in support of the
63contentions of the Foreign Office* , These letters indicated that Hardinge 
and Graham expected Lord Edward to raise the question when he arrived in 
Egypt. Nor did they believe that the matter was finally closed in London. Yet 
Wingate accepted Hardinge's pledge of good will, and made no effort to present 
his views personally to the Cabinet.
Edward Cecil returned to his position as Adviser to the Ministry of 
Finance in early October. Immediately after his return, he had an interview 
with Wingate. Wingate asked Cecil, who had not consulted him before writing 
the memorandum on the Egyptian administration, if the reports of the committee
63 Graham to Wingate, October 14, 1917; October 12, 1917, SA166/1/1.
64 Cheetham to Wingate, September 29, 1917, SA165/3 /2 .
65 Hardinge to Wingate, November 9, 1917, SA166/2.
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meetings had been submitted for the High Commissioner to see . Cecil 
doubted that any dossier on the subject would be sent to Egypt. Wingate inter­
preted this as a sign that the scheme had been finally rejected, Wingate 
appears to have objected, not so much to Cecil's reorganisation scheme, as 
to the manner in which Cecil had chosen to present the idea to the Cabinet. 
Wingate wrote to Hardinge:
I need hardly say that I entirely share your views as to 
the impropriety of a subordinate in an Administration 
starting these hares over the head of his Chief, and this 
alone should condemn the scheme, apart from any possible 
intrinsic value it may have but, on the other hand, I fully 
realise the exceptional difficulties of the existing situation. 66
That Cecil submitted the programme without previous consultation indicates
the extent of the division between the High Commissioner and the advisers,
and, further, how ineffectual Wingate had been in repairing the split.
Following this ’preliminary sk irm ish '^  between Wingate and Cecil, it
became obvious that Cecil was too ill to continue his work. Cecil's condition
rapidly deteriorated, and he left Egypt for Switzerland in December 1917. He
died of tuberculosis only a year later. After Cecil's departure, the Foreign
Office was forced to find a suitable replacement. Lindsey had taken his leave;
in the absence of qualified personnel, Brunyate was appointed temporary
66 Wingate to Hardinge, October 20, 1917, SA166/3/1.
67 Wingate to Hardinge, November 29, 1917, HP, Vol. VII(35), 1917. 
Wingate regretted Cecil's illness, but was glad to be relieved of the 
burden of keeping him as a subordinate. Hardinge showed this 
letter to Graham.
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Financial Adviser. The Foreign Office was well aware of Brunyate's short­
comings and was not satisfied with the arrangement, but could think of no 
68alternative . By 1918, Brunyate was asking to be appointed as permanent
Financial Adviser, Wingate suggested that the permanent appointment should
be delayed until the Armistice, when a commission could come to Egypt in
order to review the entire Egyptian system and make recommendations based
upon their firsthand study. This was the first suggestion that a formal survey
of the Egyptian administration be made following the War. Although the idea
was not implemented at the time it was suggested, it was to be raised again
at a later date. 'Wingate did not want Brunyate's appointment finalised, because
he considered that new appointments would depend largely upon the policy for
Egypt adopted by Great Britain.
If the tendency is towards greater powers of self- 
government for the Egyptians and a gradual relaxation 
of the purely British grip, then probably the best policy 
will be to make the financial government stronger than 
ever - to endeavour to maintain British prestige and 
authority by such means - in that event, a man of 
BRUNYATE's calibre, training and experience would 
probably best serve the purpose.
ff . , .  the after-war policy is to maintain the status 
quo and to gradually acquire a firmer, but at the same 
time sympathetic attitude towards native aspirations and 
introduce into the country a more normal form of govern­
ment and Administration than exists at present, then the
68 Wingate to Foreign Office, No. 1235, Jsfovember 20, 1917. Clark 
minute: 'this ^runyate's appointment/is unfortunate, but no doubt 
is the only thing to d o .' Graham supported Brunyate's claims. 
F 0371/2926. Edward Cecil to Milner, January 24, 1918, wrote 
that Brunyate was capable. MP145.
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adoption of the second alternative Appointment of a 
purely financial expert 7would, I think, lead more 
quickly to the desired result. 69
As he was ignorant of the policy to be accepted, Wingate did not express
his opinions further. He granted Brunyate’s claims to the position, but noted
70that in important matters personal considerations had to be overlooked7 . In
71the Foreign Office, Eyre Crowe opposed Brunyate, because the position
demanded a man with more technical economic knowledge than Brunyate 
72possessed . The appointment was not settled until February 1919, when Sir
72Richard Crawford was appointed Financial Adviser on Wingate’s recommendation .
74Before Cecil left Egypt, Montagu , who had never been to Egypt but who
was familiar with India, paid a short visit to 'Wingate and other high officials
in Cairo. Reports of this visit were sent back to Lloyd George and were
officially submitted to the Cabinet in the form of an extensive memorandum on
75the Egyptian situation . It is noteworthy that Montagu’s visit directly followed
69 Wingate to Hardinge, June 30, 1918, SA237/10.
70 Wingate to Hardinge, September 29, 1918, SA237/10.
71 Sir Eyre CroVve was assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
1912-1919, Minister Plenipotentiary 1919.
72 Crowe minute on Wingate letter to Hardinge, September 29, 1918, HP,
Vol. IV(39), 1918.
73 Foreign Office to Cheetham, February 20, 1919, SA237/10; F0371/3723. 
Sir Richard Crawford had been adviser to Turkish Ministry of Finance 
1911-1914. He was subsequently taken ill and replaced by Paul Harvey,
74 Rt. Hon. Edwin Samuel Montagu, Secretary of State for India 1917;
Financial Secretary to the Treasury, 1914-1916; Minister of Munitions 
and Member of the War Committee, 1916.
75 Montagu to Lloyd George, October 27, 1917, Lloyd George Papers,
F 40 /1 /1 . Montagu to War Cabinet, November 4, 1917, CAB24/34, G.T.
series 2837.
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the accession of Ahmad Fu'ad as Sultan and the debates on Egyptian administra­
tion. Doubtless, Montagu's timely tour was in some measure aimed at gauging 
the effectiveness of the Egyptian government under Wingate. Montagu was 
favourably impressed by what he saw in Egypt and with Wingate.
Let me say that I formed a good opinion of Reginald 
Wingate, I hope not prejudiced by the most considerate 
hospitality and patient discussicn of the matters I asked 
him about. He is not perhaps a very clever man. His 
great knowledge of this part of the world and his character 
and manner have given him, so far as I can judge, a strik­
ing hold over the respect and affections, so far as they 
have any, of the Egyptians. This is a tremendous asset, 
and in these critical times of very great value. 76
In his memorandum, Montagu remarked upon Wingate's linguistic abilities,
but noted that British and Egyptian officials were not on the best terms, owing
to the increased influence the former had been permitted while McMahon was
High Commissioner. After reviewing the existing system, Montagu outlined
the form of organisation most suitable for Egypt. Montagu advocated that the
Foreign Office (with the aid of a permanent Under-Secretary), continue to
direct Egyptian administration. He urged consolidation and co-ordination of
all Middle Eastern administrations under a single department which was to be
77loosely connected with the India Office , Wingate thought Montagu's scheme 
was superior to C ecil's. There is, however, evidence that Hardinge and Graham
76 Montagu to War Cabinet, November 4, 1917, CAB24/34, GT series 2837.
77 Ibid.
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78knew nothing of Montagu's proposals . It is possible that Montagu's report
never reached the Foreign Office, nor was brought to the attention of officials
outside the Cabinet,
Lest Robert Cecil or another official initiate an attempt to remove the
Foreign Office control of Egypt, Hardinge set about to create a new Middle
79East department within the Foreign Office . Applauding Hardinge’s scheme,
V/ingate wrote that he was favourably disposed to beginning with a small nucleus
80and gradually enlarging the department . Before the programme could be 
inaugurated, personnel had to be selected. The major obstacle to Hardinge's 
project was the strength with which Cecil's idea of a separate Middle East 
department was supported by other officials and politicians. Thus Hardinge 
was never able to implement his project.
On February 20, 1918, Curzon submitted the final report of the Egyptian 
Administration Committee. In this report, Curzon emphasised that the com­
mittee had been formed to consider the merits of combining the direction of 
Middle Eastern affairs under one department. This idea was supported by 
Cecil, Milner, and McMahon, but had been opposed by Hardinge, Graham, and
78 Wingate to Hardinge, November 1, 1917. Hardinge replied that he and 
Graham had searched for Montagu's report, but could not find it.
Novembdr 30, 1917, HP, Vol. VII(35), 1917.
79 Hardinge to Wingate, November 30, 1917, SA166/2. Hardinge also 
mentioned the idea in earlier letters.
80 Wingate to Hardinge, November 29, 1917, SA166/2; Wingate to Hardinge 
December 27, 1917, SA166/3/2. Hardinge's plan closely paralleled the 
one submitted by Capt. C. A.G. Mackintosh in January, 1918. He recom­
mended that departments dealing with independent or semi-independent
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Cheetham. Curzon also'referred to Montagu’s memorandum which had 
offered a compromise solution. The committee had five recommendations 
to make. They were: (1) it was premature to make definite commitments 
while the War continued, (2) an alteration in Egyptian control of Aden and the 
Arabian Peninsula would be necessary if the Arab Kingdom, under Sherlf 
Husayn's family, survived, (3) Palestine was outside the realm of discussion, 
(4) the administration of Egypt could not be removed from the Foreign Office 
during the War, (5) the department on Egyptian affairs, headed by Graham,
Q 1
was to be strengthened . Curzon concluded:
. . . .  in this way would be constituted a separate depart­
ment of the Foreign Office capable of expansion, when 
circumstances required, either into a larger and better 
equipped body still under the Secretary of State, into the 
more independent organisation which was the ideal of some 
of the w itnesses. 82
Wingate agreed with Curzon's analysis, and even suggested A .T . Loyd
83as a suitable head of the proposed department . But, in fact, the administra­
tion of Middle Eastern affairs was not combined during the War. The
Arabian states, Moslem Africa, and Turkey be combined within the 
Foreign Office. This department was to have a Director-General 
whose time would be divided between London and Cairo. Under- 
directors would be relegated to other posts within the area. The 
department was to have direct communication with the India Office. 
SA248/15.
81 Report of the Egyptian Administrative Council, by Curzon, and 




Egyptian administration continued to be directed by Graham, while the Middle 
East Committee, Russian Committee, and Persian Committee met jointly,
84under Curzon's direction, to formulate policies for the rest of the Middle East
/
Lord Robert Cecil had earlier attempted to eliminate the Middle East Committee,
85but had been thwarted by Curzon . Nonetheless, Cecil remained determined
to establish a more efficient method for dealing with the Middle East. After
86hearing from Edward Cecil that matters in Egypt were not running smoothly ,
Milner spoke to Lloyd George. According to Milner, Lloyd George realised
that the Foreign Office direction needed changing, but hesitated to initiate
innovations, owing to personal aspects of the situation. Milner recommended
that Uoyd George personally control the department and leave the routine work 
87to Robert Cecil
Following this encounter, Robert Cecil wrote to Balfour that the Middle 
East Committee, although valuable, was not practicable. He wanted the Foreign
83 A .T . Loyd of Egyptian Civil Service.
84 These committees were combined on March 11, 1918, CAB27/23. For 
further information of their functions see: Curzon to Balfour, March 14, 
1918, Balfour Papers, BM, 49734.
85 Curzon to Cecil, January 6, 1918, FO800/198. Cecil to Balfour,
January 8, 1918. Cecil wrote that the main purpose of the joint com­
mittee seemed to be to enable Curzon and Mark Sykes ’to explain
to each other how very little they know about the subject.' Balfour 
Papers, BM 49738.
86 Edward Cecil to Milner, January 24, 1918, MP 145.
87 Milner to Cecil, June 13, 1918, Cecil Papers, BM 51093.
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88and the War Office to create a special department for Middle East affairs
This was another attempt to diminish Foreign Office domination of the Middle
East p olicies. Cecil asked Hankey, Secretary to the Cabinet, to inform him
of all War Cabinet meetings at which Middle East questions, including those on
89Egypt, were discussed . By attending these meetings, Cecil hoped to 
circumvent the Middle East Committee led by Curzon. Having failed to secure 
a new department to direct Middle East affairs, Cecil decided to try and 
create his own department within the Foreign Office. This, of course, 
counteracted Hardinge's sim ilar plan which had never materialised. Cecil 
chose Eyre Crowe,assistant Under-Secretary of State, to direct this depart­
ment. Hardinge objected to this choice and contended that Graham was the 
best qualified candidate.
I have no hesitation in saying by far the best appointment 
as Assistant Under-Secretary for the new Department 
would be Ronald Graham . . .  He knows thoroughly Egypt 
. . .  (and) Arab and Red Sea Questions. 90
Cecil gave both suggestions to Balfour, but told Hardinge that Crowe- was
91the better choice; he also informed Balfour of his opinion . Actually, in his
letter to Balfour, Cecil said he would abandon the entire scheme rather than
92work with Graham . Balfour was aware of the continual disagreements between
88 Cecil to Balfour, July 20, 1918, Ibid.
89 Cecil to Hankey, July 20, 1918, Cecil Papers, BM 51088.
90 Hardinge to Cecil, August 20, 1918, Balfour Papers, BM9748.
91 Cecil to Hardinge, August 21, 1918, Cecil Papers, F0800/198.
92 Cecil to Balfour, August 21, 1918, Balfour Papers, BM 49738.
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Cecil and Hardinge, consequently, he took care not to act precipitately .
He enquired whether Graham was not the best suited for the position, since
he was the only man in the Foreign Office with any knowledge of Egyptian 
94affairs . C ecil’s reply was adamant.
When I first spoke to him (Graham) he was against the 
whole proposal and he still is almost passionately anxious 
to retain Egypt as part of the ordinary Foreign Office 
organisation, partly I think because he hopes some day or 
another to be appointed High Commissioner there. For 
the same reason or some other, he is anxious to maintain 
in Egypt diplomats doing what is in truth administrative 
work . . .  He further thinks that Egypt has little or no 
connection with Arabia. I can find no one else with this 
view. 95
On the strength of these arguments, Balfour agreed to Crowe fs appoint­
ment as head of the new department. To soothe Hardinge, Balfour wrote that
96Graham was needed in his current capacity as assistant to Hardinge . Cecil
acted immediately to initiate the new department; he also wrote to tell
Balfour that everyone in the Foreign Office seemed pleased with Crowe'd 
97appointment . Hardinge was fc :ced to acquiesce to C ecil’s plan to incorporate 
the direction of Palestine, Syria, Arabia, Mesopotamia, Persia, and Egypt 
under one department headed by Crowe, whom Hardinge thought was incapable
93 Ian. Malcolm to Balfour, August 21, 1918. T believe there is another 
Bob /GeeiY/~Hardinge rumpus going on about the famous Middle East 
Department.’ Malcolm recommended Crowe over Graham. Balfour 
Papers, BM 49748
94 Balfour to Cecil, August 22, 1918, Balfour Papers BM 49748.
95 Cecil to Balfour, August 23, 1918, Balfour Papers BM 49748.
96 Balfour to Hardinge, August 28, 1918, Balfour Papers, BM 49748.
97 Cecil to Balfour, August 31, 1918, Balfour Papers, BM 49748.
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of the work, although he did not think the department would survive. He was
positive that its creation was merely another attempt by Cecil to exclude Graham
98from control of the Egyptian administration .
Cecil ignored Hardinge's complaints, while continuing to gather per­
sonnel for the new department. His aim was to move Egypt from the direction of
a diplomatic to an administrative department, and to end the dual control
99over Arabian affairs . He sincerely believed that the dichotomy of control 
had to end immediately, not after the War ended. In this matter, Cecil had 
the support of Clayton who warned that Great Britain had to forumulate a 
policy for the Middle East before the War terminated, or a great deal of trouble 
would ensue in the area
Curzon, however, was not discouraged by Cecil's complaints, or by the 
creation of the new department: he continued to hold meetings of the Middle 
East Committee. His only concession to Cecil was to admit that if the idea of a 
department which encompassed the administration of all the Middle East was 
pursued, Allenby would have to be retained in an official capacity within the 
department*^*. This suggestion, made on September 29, 1918, was the first 
clue that Allenby would play an active role in the Middle East after the War.
98 Hardinge to Wingate, September 6, 1918; Graham to Wingate,
September 9, 1918, SA170/1.
99 Cecil to Montagu, September 13, 1918, Cecil Papers, BM 51094.
100 Clayton to Ormsby-Gore, September 13, 1918, Sykes Papers, F0800/221.
101 Curzon to Cecil, September 29, 1918, Cecil Papers, BM 51077.
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Cecil was the next official to suggest that Allenby be given a permanent position 
in the Middle East.
Meanwhile, other civil servants heard of C ecilfs proposals, and sub­
mitted their own ideas for consideration. Frank Balfour, of the Sudan civil 
service, spoke with Wingate concerning Egypt's future. They agreed that to 
deal with the Middle East from Cairo presented great difficulties for the High 
Commissioner. Frank Balfour thought it was more feasible to have two High 
Commissioners, one stationed in Cairo and the other in Baghdad. He warned 
Cecil:
The administrative side of Egypt badly wants strengthening 
to cope with the difficulties which whatever approach to 
self government is to be given will bring in its train, The 
sooner we decide how far self government there is to go 
and tell the people what we intend, the better. The 
Nationalists are getting very restive already and no doubt 
vail claim to be included under the category of ’liberated 
countries’mentioned in the recent pronouncement. 102
This letter was written on November 10, 1918, one day before the Armistice
was declared and three days before the delegation led by Zaghlul presented its
demands before Wingate at the Residency. That letters urging the formation
of policy were written at such late dates indicates the total want of definite
policy with regard to Egyptian administration. The British had been warned
that the Nationalists would make demands for self-government after the War,
but the government hoped to delay commitments until the more pressing problems
102 Frank Balfour to Cecil, November 10, 1918, Cecil Papers, BM51094.
Cecil made this letter an official one. Balfour was referring to the 
Anglo-French Declaration of October 8. Above, Chapter VI, p. 157.
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caused by the War and the Armistice had been solved. Re-establishing a 
peace time economy and preparing for the Peace Conference were the primary 
considerations of the British government during the latter part of 1918.
In the months preceding the opening of the Peace Conference on January 
18, 1918, politicians and diplomats were busy with preliminaries. Lloyd 
George and most of the Cabinet went to Paris in early January 1919; they 
had been occupied with the details of winning a general election in December. 
Balfour, Hardinge, Crowe, Tyrrell, and Drummond - all from the Foreign 
Office - accompanied the Prime Minister and his entourage to Paris. Curzon 
was given the job of Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Balfourfs 
absence. Cecil also went to Paris. His departure pleased Hardinge, for it 
rendered impossible Graham's exclusion from the direction of Middle Eastern 
problems. While most of the leading politicians and officials were in Paris, 
Curzon and Graham remained in London to deal with foreign affairs. Their 
tenure of office was to extend through the crucial months of the Egyptian 
cr is is . These two men made the policy decisions.
Curzon's belief in the imperial system and his stubborn attitudes were
well known among British officia ls. Montagu described Curzon in a letter to
Balfour on December 20, 1918, only a short time before Curzon took command
of the Foreign Office.
. . . .  there is , . . .  Lord Curzon who for historical reasons 
of which he alone is master, geographical considerations 
which he has peculiarly studied, finds, reluctantly, much 
against his will, with very grave doubts, that it would be
dangerous if any country in the world was left to itself, 
if any country in the world was left to the control of any 
other country but ourselves, and we must go there, as I 
have heard him say, 'for diplomatic, economic, strategic 
and telegraphic reasons *. 103
Wingate's inclination to offer concessions to the Nationalists in Egypt was
hardly likely to be treated with favour from such a man,
Thus Wingate's main support within the Foreign Office remained with
Graham and with Hardinge, who was absent during the crucial months, Both
of these men seem to have displayed more loyalty for one another than for
Wingate. Then, too, Graham's own aspirations towards the position of High
104Commissioner should be borne in mind Graham doubtlessly felt that he was
better qualified to be High Commissioner than most men and could rule Egypt
without trouble arising from quarrels among Egyptian or British officia ls.
Wingate, on the other hand, clearly had trouble in dealing with his subordinates,
especially the British staff. He had clashed with Cecil, and to a large degree
had failed to secure the confidence of Brunyate or Cheetham, the other two
105leading British officials in Egypt . Nor did Wingate have the support of other 
politicians in London. He lacked the personal connections or prestige which
103 Montagu to Balfour, December 20, 1918, Balfour Papers, BM 49748.
104 In 1916 and in 1920 Graham wrote to Hardinge concerning the position. 
Graham to Hardinge, July 20, 1916, 'Speaking quite frankly, I believe 
that sooner or later I could run this place with fair su ccess .' HP,
Vol. 11(23), 1916. Graham to Hardinge, August 11, 1920, *1 really 
believe I could run that country. * HP, Vol. 11(43), 1920. Also see  
Graham to Storrs, May 27, 1920, Storrs Papers, III/2.
105 Walrond to Milner, October 13, 1918; November 10, 1918; December 
9, 1918, MP 164. Walrond memo to Milner on Egypt, Autumn 1919,
MP165. Note on Appointments in Egypt, Rennell Rodd, March 14, 1920, 
MP164.
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could have been of. paramount importance to an official who advocated an 
unpopular policy. Nor had he been able to impress upon officials in London 
his qualifications as High Commissioner by presenting to them carefully 
detailed programmes on reforms, expansion, or administration. Wingage 
was to be left largely to his own resources, a factor which made him 




EMERGENT NATIONALISM AND BRITISH 
OFFICIAL REACTION
Believing that the effects of the War had been insufficient to give impetus 
to a large-scale national movement, most British officials were not apprehen­
sive concerning their ability to maintain British supremacy in Egypt1. These 
feelings of confidence were reinforced by the lack of Egyptian agitation or 
consolidated opposition against the Protectorate or British policies during 
the War. Nonetheless, from rather meagre natural resources, Egypt had 
given an equitable amount to aid the Allies to win a War in which she was 
theoretically uninvolved. These ’voluntary* contributions, in addition to the 
economic repercussions of the War, served to increase Egyptian grievances 
against British domination. Then, too, Allied pronouncements in support of 
self-determination for small nations and President Wilson's Fourteen Points 
caught the imagination of Egyptian leaders who wished to participate in the 
growing calls for national independence.
X There were exceptions to this attitude. As early as April 19, 1918, 
Ormsby-Gore wrote to Hankey: *1 don’t much like what I learn of the 
prospective political situation in Egypt. We shall have trouble there 
with self-determination if we don’t look out. ’ CAB21/58. On May 1, 
1918, Wingate wrote to Montagu: ’Here local aspirations in this 
direction J_ self-determination_/ have not diminished since you were 
here in Egypt and I wish I could feel that the new Ruler were less  
amenable to the somewhat extreme influences which prevail in certain 
quarters.’ SA168/3.
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These two factors - namely emergent Egyptian nationalism and the
maintenance of British supremacy - were Wingate's main considerations
when he wrote to Balfour on August 31, 1918, complaining of the rift between
Sultan Fu’ad and his m inisters. By 1918, this schism, which had been
repaired in 1917, appeared ready to split open and cause a breakdown of
communications between Fifad and his ministers who had the confidence of the 
2British officials . Wingate foresaw that Fu’ad could use the ministerial hiatus
3
to introduce Nationalists into the government, and thereby increase his
2 With the exception of Ahmad Ziwar, the Ministry was the same as it had 
been in 1917. By 1918 Fu’ad was on poor terms with fAdli Yakan,
Minister of Education, whom Fu’ad feared felt he was equal to the Sultan: 
‘Abd al-Khaliq Tharwat (Sarwat), Minister of Justice, whom Fu>ad had 
attempted to influence in several court cases; Husayn Rushdi, Prime 
Minister, who had supported KamSl al-Dih for the Sultanate; and Ism ail 
Sirrl, Minister of Public Works, who felt he had been slighted by Fu’ad. 
Wingate to Balfour, August 31, 1918, F0141/629.
Adli Yakan was a wealthy lawyer who became Prime Minister in 1921.
He participated in negotiations with Lord Curzon in London during 1920 
and 1921 and led the Constitutional Liberal party which rivalled the Wafd,
‘Abd al-Khaliq Tharwat had been secretary to Sir Malcolm Mcllwraith 
when he was Adviser to the Ministry of Justice; he became Prime Minister 
in 1927 and negotiated with Sir Austin Chamberlain.
3 The term 'Nationalists' in this context refers to those Egyptians, par­
ticularly Sa'd Zaghlul, ‘Abd al- 'Aziz Fahml, PJamad al-Basil, Muhammad 
Mahmud, ‘All Sha'rawi, and Ahmad Lutff al-Sayyid, who led the campaign 
for Egyptian independence in 1918-1919. British officials referred to 
these men as Extrem ists. Owing to the negative connotations of this term, 
it has not been employed in this study.
Hamad al-Basil was a badu from Fayrus who had been a member of the 
Legislative Assembly.
Muhammad Mahmud was an ex-governor of Behara Province, had studied 
at Oxford, and was a wealthy landowner.
Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, former editor of al-Jarlda. had attended the School 
of Law in Cairo, had been influenced by Jamal al-Dfii al-Afghani, and 
became director of the Sultaniyya Library in 1915.
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somewhat ephemeral popularity. In a conversation with Haines, the Adviser 
to the Ministry of the Interior, Fu’ad indicated his displeasure with several 
aspects of the British government, particularly the inclusion of British 
advisers in departments, like the Police Department, which dealt primarily 
with internal Egyptian problems. This opinion, Wingate noted, was one con­
tinually advanced by the Nationalists, who believed British advisers 'Should
have purely technical functions and not take part in administration in its
4executive aspects. ’ Fu’ad was encouraged to adopt this stand by his old
friend Isma*!! Sidqi. Fu’ad also heeded the advice of what Wingate termed
5
the 'officine nocturne' , composed of Amin Yehia, Isma*Il Sidqi, Sa'd 
Zaghlul, and *Abd al-*AzIz Fahml. By placing his confidence in these men, 
Fu’ad further alienated the Egyptian ministers, who, to the distress of the 
British officials, could neither influence nor gain access to him.
Wingate expected Fu’ad, exhorted by the Nationalists, to 'encourage 
the opposition of a more or less Nationalist character with which the Govern- 
ment in all probability will have to deal.' However, Wingate hoped to control 
Fu’ad, while reducing the influence of the Nationalists. According to reports
For a short article on each of these personalities see: al-Ahalf, 
April 15 - June 19, 1919.
4 Wingate to Balfour, August 31, 1918, F0141/629.
5 Wingate to Graham, June 9, 1918, SA169/1/1.
6 Wingate to Balfour, August 31, 1918, F0141/629.
later received by the Foreign Office, Wingate attempted this through personal
interviews held between his aides, Symes and Keown-Boyd, and the active 
7
Nationalists , These allegations derive largely from officials who objected 
to Wingate's methods of administration. Wingate*s papers contain no reference 
to such interviews or any notes of preparation for conversations with Egyptian 
Nationalists during the summer of 1918. Reports of these conversations may 
have been verbal, but to some extent it is strange that if the conversations 
took place there are no papers to that effect. The matter becomes more su s­
pect when it is considered that Wingate kept the notes given to him by his 
advisers and the personal notes he made before interviewing Egyptians, 
Therefore, later criticism  of Wingate*s methods of acting through private 
channels and not through British advisers must be carefully weighed and not 
over-estimated. Since Egyptian sources never mention the interviews, it 
must be held that, if the interviews occurred, they were not considered of 
great importance by either Egyptian or British officia ls.
Sources date the beginning of attempts to organise Egyptian support for 
independence in September 1918, when three groups of prominent Egyptians 
began reflecting upon the question. During this month, Zaghlul met with
7 Graham to Hardinge, January 22, 1919, HP, Vol. 11(40), 1919.
Graham reported that Burnett-Stuart had verbally told about Wingate's 
method, which Graham felt was highly irregular. No mention of these 
interviews is found in Wingate's papers. If Wingate ordered the inter­
views, it is incongruous that he failed to mention them to Hardinge or 
Graham, to whom he wrote frequently and at length.
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Muhammad Mahmud and Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid to discuss the future of
Egypt. ‘Abd a l-‘Aziz Fahmi had been invited to this meeting, but had been too 
8ill to attend . After this meeting, Mahmud raised the issue of forming a
delegation to send to the Peace Conference, Zaghlul put a cold shower
(dush barid) to the idea, by saying that the time had not arrived for such 
9
action . However, Mahmud was not the first to suggest the idea, for Zaghlul 
himself had proposed that Egypt be represented at the Peace Conference 
during an interview with Mark Sykes in 1915^. After talking with Mahmud, 
Zaghlul discussed the scheme with Rushdi, who had been considering the idea 
in co-operation with his friend ‘Adll Yakan. ‘Umar Tusun was also thinking 
about the idea, and he approached both Zaghlul and Rushdi concerning the plan
at a tea-party at Ra’s al-Tin Palace on October 9, When Tusun suggested
11 -  12 forming a delegation (wafd ), Zaghlul replied that the idea was beautiful ,
8 ‘Abbas Mahmud a l-‘Aqqad, Sa‘d Zaghlul (Cairo, 1936), p. 192.
9 ‘Abd a l - ‘Aziz Fahmi, Hadhihi hiyati (Cairo, n .d .), p .72.
10 Sykes report, August 10, 1915, CAB 17/176.
11 The term V afd* in this study refers to the delegation, led by Zaghlul,
which presented Egyptian demands to the Peace Conference and to British 
officials. In 1918 the wafd was not a political party; it evolved as such 
at a later date. Louis Cantori discusses the evolution of the wafd from
a group of Egyptians into an elite political party (The Wafd)in his un­
published Ph.D. dissertation, The Wafd: a political party in Egypt 
(Chicago, 1966).
12 *Umar TusOn, Mudhakkarat bima sadara ‘anna mundhu fajr al-haraka
al-wataniyya al-Misriyya min sanat 1918 ila sanat 1928 (Cairo, 1942), 
p .6. a l- ‘Aqqad, p. 192. Sources all agree that the idea of forming a 
wafd was discussed at this party. The interpretations given of these 
events in Arabic sources have been noted in Chapter I. Accounts in 
English of these events may be found in Jacob M. Landau, Parliaments 
and parties in Egypt (New York, 1954), and Cantori. A German account 
is found in Ernst Klingmuller, Geshicte der Wafd partei (Berlin, 1937).
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and that he would discuss it with his close friends.
Fu’ad was also concerned about the future of Egypt, and debated the 
problem with Wingate on October 12. At this time, Fu’ad remarked that 
Wingate did not understand him: consequently, he looked forward to going to 
London after the War to discuss Egyptian matters with officials there. Wi ngate 
suggested that Fu’ad put his views on paper, as the status of Egypt was to be 
considered after the War. Fu’ad retorted that he wanted a Parliament with a 
Senate and a Ministry which would relieve him of the onus of personal r e s­
ponsibility. Wingate told Fu’ad that the Legislative Assembly in the past had 
proved futile and generally w orthless. Owing to the backward nature of Egypt,
Wingate did not believe the country was ready for the institution of democratic 
13government . This interview revealed that Fu’ad shared the aspirations of 
other Egyptians and expected to voice his complaints in London directly after 
the War.
On October 23, at a Residency garden party in Alexandria, Zaghlul, 
Rushdi, and Tusun once again met and discussed their plans. At this party, 
Zaghlul and Tusun arranged to travel together the following day on the morning 
train to Cairo, During this trip, Tusun spoke to Zaghlul about the formation 
of a wafd . Zaghlul, while accepting the idea in principle, doubted that the 
Egyptians could provide enough money to finance the venture, but thought
Sha'rawl could be persuaded to give £10,000. The two men parted in Cairo
        ■ ■    — ■ ■ -........
13 Wingate note on conversation with Fu’ad, October 12, 1918, SA 170/3 /3 .
153.
14after agreeing to meet again , As events unravelled, Zaghlul and Tusun 
were not to converse until November 12. In the interim, Zaghlul met with 
'Abd al-A ziz Fahmi, Muhammad Mahmud, Lutff al-Sayyid, and Alf Sha'rawl. 
These five friends, as Lutfi al-Sayyid called them, were determined to fight 
for Egyptian independence. As Zaghlul had predicted, Sha^rawf consented to 
give £10,000 to further this aim1^.
In Hawllyat Misr, Ahmad Shafiq reports that Rushdi was fully aware of 
ZaghltU’s discussions concerning independence with members of the Legis­
lative Assembly and former members of the People’s Party. According to
Shaffq, Rushdi did not report these meetings to the British Commander-in-
16Chief, who under martial law could have deported the men . Fu’ad was also
17reputed to have known and approved of Zaghlul’s activities
While Zaghlul and his friends attempted to form a delegation and 
devise a programme for it, with TusGn working independently in the same 
direction, Wingate continually warned the Foreign Office to expect some form 
of Nationalist agitation after the War. Wingate was worried by Fu’ad’s
14 Tusun, p .7. Malcram ‘Ubayd speech in al-Ahram, January 10, 1935.
15 Lutff al-Sayyid p. 178. Ahmad Shaffq, Hawliyat Misr al-slyasiyya
( n. p.  1926), p p .147-48.' ~ ! :
16 Shafiq, p. 146.
17 Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hamid, Fu’ad al-awwal (Cairo, 1939), 
p .98. Elie Kedourie, 'Sa’ad Zaghlul and the British, ’ p. 143.
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acceptance of the Nationalist elements and by his adherence to their demands,
From non-official sources 111 Cairo, there were reports that Wingate seemed
to have lost control over Fu’ad, but no suggestions for improving the situation 
18were made . In the Foreign Office, Graham was inclined to discount
Wingate's worries, because he believed Fu’ad should be handled more firmly.
He contended that Fu’ad’s entourage was superior to any in the past, and that
its presence did not foreshadow trouble. Graham even said that Wingate had
been accustomed to having his own way in Khartoum for so long that he found
19it difficult to accept the usual opposition in Cairo , On the other hand, Robert
Cecil remarked that it was disquieting to hear of friction between the Residency 
20and the Sultan
In Egypt, where he was closer to the growing nationalist sentiment, 
Wingate was not as confident as the officials in London. On October 19, 1918, 
after an interview with Fu’ad, Wingate wrote to Hardinge to predict a
18 Herbert diary, September 28, 1918, PPC. Herbert wrote that Lee Stack 
had remarked, when visiting Cairo, that Wingate looked ill and unable 
to cope with Egyptian problems. Osmond Walrond to Milner, 
September 22, 1918, wrote that Wingate did not stand up to Fu'ad, but 
that the British could obtain the support of the leading Egyptian shaykhs. 
MP164.
19 Graham minutes, October 7, 1918, numbers 163509-163510, On 
Wingate's dispatch of August 31, 1918, to Balfour, Graham wrote that 
Wingate so rarely sent official dispatches that it was noteworthy when 
he did so. He added: ’Indeed these dispatches show that the calm sea of 
Egyptian politics is scarcely ruffled by puffs of breeze which may be 
variable but do not presage any kind of storm. ’ F0371/3199.
20 C ecil minute, October 7, 1918, number 163510, F 0 3 71 /3199 .
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21’troublous winter’ . To placate the Sultan, Wingate recommended some
small concessions like the approval of new palace furniture and assurances
< -  22concerning ex-Khedive ‘Abbas , The latter was of particular importance,
because Fu’ad worried lest ‘Abbas should wish to return to Egypt after the
War, or attempt to claim his considerable property there. Fu’ad, especially
sensitive to rumours that ‘Abbas was still popular among the Egyptians, wanted
to ascertain that there was no danger of his return. Eventually, all of ‘Abbas’s
estates were taken under government control, and he was forbidden entry.
Wingate informed Hardinge of a rumour that a peace deputation of
Egyptians would present a petition for President Wilson’s support as soon as
the War ended. The rumour was given substance after a crowd, thinking peace
23had been declared, gathered at the United States Consulate in Alexandria . 
Wingate did not count heavily upon this rumour, while Hardinge ignored it 
altogether.
On October 24, 1918, Isma’il Kamil, head of the exiled Nationalists in 
Berne, sent Balfour a petition from the Committee of the Nationalist Party 
of Egypt which supported President Wilson's programme. In a plea for 
independence, the letter ended:
21 Wingate to Hardinge, October 19, 1918, SA170/2/2.
22 Ibid. The Sultan requested new furniture, but owing to the War, 
the British hesitated to agree. Wingate later asked Cheetham to 
urge approval of the matter. Wingate note to Cheetham, October 
21, 1918, F0141/629.
23 Ibid. , private and personal addendum.
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The occupation of the Nile Valley by a Foreign Power 
must always be a continual menace to free navigation 
and to the different interests of all peoples, and the 
peace so much desired by all, will be but a deception 
if Egypt is not restored to her peaceful children, and her 
independence as a Nation guaranteed by the Society of 
Nations.
The Committee firmly hopes that Mr. Wilson will 
never permit the ancient land of the Pharoahs to remain 
in the chains of Britain, but that she will rise  from this 
war free and m istress of her own destiny. 24
Since this statement originated from Nationalists in exile, British officials
felt it was safe to ignore the warning. They did not consider that a similar
desire was developing within Egypt.
Although he did not know what course to adopt in order to stop nationalist
unrest, Wingate recognised the dangers inherent in the movement. He asked
Cheetham to confer with Rushdf and Fu’ad, in hopes that they would have 
25alternative plans . However, Wingate was not so naive as to presume that
Fu’ad and Rushdi were detached from the movement for self-determination.
For this reason, Wingate remarked to Allenby that he was constantly plagued
with 'Sultanic w o r r i e s O n  October 20, Brunyate submitted a note in which
he discussed at length the divisions between the ministers and Fu’ad. He
concluded that Fu’ad had not learned the lesson in 1917 that ’Cabinets in the
27last resort are decided on in London. *
24 IsmaTL Kamil to Balfour, October 24, 1918, F0141/773.
25 Wingate to Cheetham, October 21, 1918, F0141/629.
26 Wingate to Allenby, October 19, 1918, SA170/2/2.
27 Brunyate to Wingate, October 20, 1918, F0141/629.
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The growing nationalist fervour was further encouraged by the Anglo-
French declaration in favour of self-determination for Syria, Mesopotamia
and other nations. This declaration was published in Egypt on November 9,
281918, without press comment, owing to wartime censorship . The
declaration had been drawn up by the French and the British at a War Cabinet
meeting on September 20. The object of the declaration was to allay Arab
fears concerning the intentions of Great Britain and France in the Middle
East, and to reassure the Arabs until the matter could be settled at the Peace 
29Conference . However, it had more far-reaching effects than the British
had anticipated. Concerning the declaration, Wingate wrote:
I think it is not unlikely that self-determination policy . .  . 
may have its repercussion among Egyptian nationalists ■> 
who will, no doubt, desire similar treatment for Egypt.
I have no definite indication that active agitation in 
this sense is at present probable, but there are rumours 
which I cannot altogether ignore that natives have approached 
American representatives here with a view to their aspira­
tions being made known to President Wilson. If it is possible 
for you to give me some indication of views of His Majesty’s 
Government in the event of press discussion arising regarding 
future of Egypt it would be very helpful to m e. 30
28 al-Ahram, November 9, 1918; al-Muqattam, November 9, 1918.
In the latter, the declaration was placed on an inside page. Wingate 
asked if press restrictions might be relieved for a controlled press 
discussion and explanation of the declaration, but he was refused. 
Wingate to Foreign Office, November 6, 1918, SA170/3/3; FO407/183.
29 Balfour to Civil Commissioner in Baghdad, November 28, 1918,
F 0371/5227. Louis Mallet, February 7, 1919, g e n e s is  of Anglo- 
French declaration’, Lothian Papers, GD40-17-37,
30 Wingate to Balfour, Novem bers, 1918, FO407/183,
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Wingate wrote privately to Graham that the declaration would affect Egypt 
and ended:
I have no doubt that H.M.G. has a ready answer for 
all such criticism  /c a l ls  for self-determination/^but 
it would help me greatly to know, as soon as possible, 
the line I should adopt when they come, as they 
undoubtedly w ill, 31.
Thus, Wingate expected the Nationalists to make a formal complaint, but r e ­
mained ignorant of the policy which the Foreign Office wished him to pursue.
It appears that the officials in London had not only failed to develop a coherent 
policy with regard to Egypt, but preferred to delay deciding upon one as long 
as possible.
To Wingate*s official and personal requests for an explanation of British
policy, Graham replied that the Foreign Office had no *indication of such
32native aspirations nor of form they are likely to take* . He concluded that
reforms would not be undertaken without consultation with leading Egyptians.
Graham drafted this reply to Wingate even after he had been informed, through
his personal correspondence, of Zaghlul1 s visit to the Residency on November 5.
This meeting was obviously a preliminary one, in which Zaghlul attempted to
gauge the official British opinion regarding the future status of Egypt. At this
meeting, Zaghlul requested that the Legislative Assembly be reconvened. To
33this request, Wingate replied, 1 Allah ma es Sabairin, izza sabiru', or God
31 Wingate to Graham, November 6, 1918, SA170/2/1.
32 Foreign Office to Wingate, November 13, 1918, SA170/3/3; F0371/364.
33 Wingate to Graham, November 6, 1918, SA170/2/1.
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helps those who are patient. After this interview, V/ingate was condemned 
by certain British officials for encouraging the Nationalists by granting inter­
views and recommending concessions.
Cheetham and Brunyate, upon whom Wingate relied heavily, both 
wanted Fu’ad’s pretensions to power halted, but Wingate believed that 
alienating the Sultan would aggravate the situation.
. . . .  in adopting what I believe to be the policy of H, M, G. 
as regards the Sultan, I run the risk of making a cleavage 
between them /  British official/7 and the High Commissioner; 
but this fact does not particularly disturb me as long as I 
am quite sure I am carrying out the policy of the British 
Government. 34
hi short, the British wanted Fu’ad to remain under their domination, while 
retaining a guise of authority for the benefit of the Egyptians. Wingate, on 
the other hand, realised that a split with Fu’ad would render the situation 
impossible, and that concessions, however unpleasant, had to be granted to 
assure Fu’ad's support.
On November 11, 1918, the Armistice was declared, and nationalist 
feelings began to gather momentum. On the same day as the Armistice, 
Zaghlul, with ‘All Sha'rawi, and Abd a l-‘Aziz Fahmi, met Ulrich Alexander, 
Wingatefs aide-de-camp, in the reading room at the Muhammad ‘All Club. 
Zaghlul asked for an interview with Wingate. When Alexander asked the 
reason for the interview, Zaghlul replied that he wished to introduce Sha ‘raw! 
and Fahmi to Wingate. Realising that these men were Nationalists, and
34 Ibid.
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would probably put forth their views during the interview, Alexander asked
Keown-Boyd, W in gate's private secretary, for his assent before agreeing
to Zaghlul's request. After conferring with Cheetham and Wingate, Keown-Boyd
35made an appointment for Zaghlul to see Wingate on November 13
Alexander was correct to surmise that ZaghlQl intended to discuss 
Egyptian independence with Wingate. According to Makram ‘Ubayd, Zaghlul 
decided directly after his conversation with Tusun on October 24 to work for
t
the dispatch of a delegation to Great Britain. After this meeting, he made
every effort to gather supporters, first from his closest friends, Abd al-A ziz
36Fahmi, Sha‘rawi, Lutff al-Sayyid, and Muhammad Mahmud . While awaiting
news from Zaghlul, Tusun in Alexandria was also gathering follow ers. Tusun
reports that after hearing on November 11 that Zaghlul had accepted the idea
of sending a delegation, he went to Cairo, where he stayed in Shephenrd's
Hotel. On the following day, Muhammad Mahmud telephoned him to report
the recent developments. After a telephone call from Zaghlul, Tusun,
37accompanied by Muhammad Sa* id , met with Zaghlul and his four friends to
35 Alexander to V/ingate, March 25, 1919, SA237/10. Wingate did not 
remark upon Alexander's interpretation of the arrangements for the 
meeting, nor do Arabic sources refer to the details, but it is likely 
that Alexander's account is correct.
36. Makram‘Ubayd speech, al-Ahram, January 10, 1935.
37 Muhammad Sa'ld had been Prime Minister prior to World War I; he
acted as Prime Minister from May 1919 until November 1919.
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38argue over the plans for sending a delegation . At this time, Zaghlul 
feared that two separate delegations, each demanding a hearing in London, 
would be formed: one led by Tusun or Sa‘id, and the other led by Zaghlul. 
Zaghlul told Tusun of the impending meeting at the Residency, and said that 
Tusun was free to act as he wished, although he hoped Tusun would agree to 
join with him. By this time, ZaghlQl had probably received the written per­
mission for the interview on November 13. This was, however, a mere 
formality, since Wingate had always made a point of being available for inter­
views with leading Egyptians. Shafiq noted that Zaghlul conferred with Fahmi
and Sha'rawi immediately after hearing of the acceptance in order to plan
39what was to be said to Wingate .
At eleven o’clock on the morning of November 13, Wingate received
Zaghlul, Fahmi, and Sha‘rawl at the Residency. This interview, which
marked the beginning of the post-War struggle between the Egyptian Nationalists
and the British, began with Wingate telling Zaghlul and his friends that Egypt
was more prosperous than it had ever been, and that it owed this prosperity 
40to Great Britain . While agreeing with Wingate, Zaghlul advocated the
38 Tusun, pp. 8-9. According to Fahmi, Tusun was angry that he had not 
been included in the original plans. p. 75. * Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi*l, 
Thawrat sanat 1919 (Cairo, 1946), p .76.
39 Shaffq, pp. 148-49.
40 The account of the interview is taken from Wingate’s Arabic version, 
which he received privately from an unidentified Egyptian friend, who 
was in the Wafd during 1920. Wingate’s translation in English closely  
parallels the original. The Arabic version found in Wingate’s papers
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immediate abolition of martial law, censorship, and other wartime m easures. 
Wingate advised them to be patient. In a polite disagreement, Zaghlul replied 
that he did not understand what Wingate was trying to say, whereupon Wingate 
told him that the Egyptians lacked foresight. This remark offended Zaghlill, 
who considered himself an elected representative of the Egyptian people.
Wingate stressed that Egyptian Nationalists had not been moderate in their 
demands prior to the War, and had therefore caused a great deal of un­
necessary trouble. At this point, Sha’rawi remarked that Egyptians wished
to be true friends to England, as free men to free men, not as slaves to free 
41men . Wingate asked if they were demanding independence. Zaghlul answered
42in the affirmative, while Fahmi rejoined that they wanted 'complete independence' .
In support of their demands, the men pointed out that Egyptians had worked hard
for the War, had a long glorious history, and an elite of educated and able
people. In comparison to countries like Serbia or Montenegro, which had
43been promised independence, Egypt was more advanced . To counteract
is almost identical to that reproduced in Shafiq, although the two 
differ slightly in ascribing certain passages to different speakers. 
Another version is found in al-Rafi‘ i, p .70-72. Shorter accounts are 
given in Fahmi, p .76; a l- ‘Aqqad, pp. 194-200; Muhammad ‘Abd'i Fath, 
al-m as’ ala al-Misriyya w a ’l-Wafd (n .p ., n .d .) .
Wingate's Arabic version, SA170/3/2. The English version is found 
in his notes on the political cr isis  in Egypt 1918-1920, SA151/8.
41 Wingate Arabic version of November 13, 1918 meeting, SA170/3/2.
Inna narfd an nakun asdiqa* li-Inkliterra sadaqatan al-burr l'il-hurr 
11. al - ‘abd l'il hurr.
42 Istiqlal tamm.
43 Shafiq ascribes this speech to Fahmi, Wingate’s version reports Zaghlul 
was the speaker. Cantori feels Shafiq is correct. It is possible that at a 
later date the author of Wingate’s account gave more importance to 
Zaghlul's role.
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these arguments, Wingate emphasised that there were many uneducated 
people in Egypt, and that its strategic geographic position made it vulnerable 
to foreign encroachment. Zaghlul replied that the Egyptians wished to remain 
friendly with Great Britain and were willing to guarantee the safety of the 
Suez Canal, the road to India. Sha'rawi added that the Egyptians might con­
sent to the retention of the British Financial Adviser, In closing, Zaghlul 
told Wingate that the Egyptian leaders considered Great Britain the greatest 
liberal power in the world, and were willing to present their demands solely  
to officials in London. Wingate ended the interview by saying that he had 
listened carefully to the debate, but had no idea of the British Government’s 
intentions with regard to their demands. He reaffirmed that the meeting had 
been an unofficial one. Since Wingate undoubtedly knew approximately what 
Zaghlul and his friends were going to say, he was prepared to counter most of 
their arguments for independence, although he could not refute the fact that 
Egypt had aided the War effort and that lesser countries were gaining in­
dependence. Lacking instructions from the Foreign Office, Wingate dealt 
with the Nationalists astutely, without alienating them, but promising nothing.
Afterwards, Wingate saw Rushdi, who had already seen Zaghlul, follow­
ing the interview, which ended at noon. Rushdi presented Wingate with a 
letter requesting permission for himself and fAdlI to travel to London to confer 
with officials there. Wingate was under the impression that Fu? ad was aware 
of the demands made by Rushdi and Zaghlul; this is corroborated by most
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Arabic sources. ‘Abd al-Hamid states that Fu* ad wanted both Rushdi and
44Zaghlul to go to London . Even though they were not on the best of terms, 
Rushdi doubtless kept Fu’ad informed about the Nationalists and their activi­
ties , In describing the meetings with Zaghlul and Rushdi, Wingate, in a 
letter to Hardinge, remarked that Zaghlul represented a not inconsiderable 
sector of Egyptian public opinion. While recognising that ZaghlQl’s argu­
ments were well founded, he simultaneously demeaned the real motives of 
the Nationalists.
I must admit their attitude was generally correct, and 
to anyone less conversant than I am with Egyptian methods, 
their contentions would appear to have been dictated by pure 
patriotism and would give the impression that at long last 
Lord Dufferin's inarticulate m asses had become articulate 
and that we were about to reap the results of our patient 
labours of the past 40 years, in seeing a complete Egyptian 
regeneration on political lines dear to the British democracy, 45
Wingate informed Hardinge that Zaghlul and his friends wished to travel to
London whenever transport became available, and that he had no objections to
their departure. It is noteworthy that V/ingate expressed this opinion in a
private letter, not officially or in the course of the interview with Zaghlul;
Hardinge was subsequently to make the letter official. However, during the
interview Wingate had not objected vigorously when the Nationalists stated
their intentions. Wingate could hardly have done so on November 13, because
44 * Abd al-Hamid, p .98.
45 Wingate to Hardinge, November 14, 1918, F0141/773; HP, Vol. IV (39), 
1918.
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at that time he had no indication that the Foreign Office officials would refuse 
to see the Nationalists. He believed that the Nationalists would be welcome 
in London to discuss their view s. In this case, Wingate - far from the 
pressures and additional work caused by the Peace Conference - miscalculated 
the effect news that Nationalist leaders from Egypt were coming to London 
would have upon officials. These officials felt that they were too busy with 
details for the Conference to be concerned with Egyptian Nationalists, whose 
demands they considered extreme and totally unacceptable.
In accord with Rushdi, Wingate knew that the question of the form that
the Egyptian government was to take had to be settled quickly.
If these burning questions are not settled now, we are likely 
to have considerable difficulty in the future. The general 
spirit of self-determination to which the war has given birth, 
had taken a firm hold in Egypt and I think it is  only just that 
the Sultan, his ministers and the Egyptians generally should 
be told how they stand, but presumably such conversations as 
are now suggested would be conducted entirely through His 
Majesty’s Government and Egypt (being a British Protectorate) 
would in no sense come within the scope of the International 
Peace Conference, though the fact that India, the Dominions 
e tc . are to be consulted, has naturally given our Egyptian 
friends hopes of sim ilar consideration. 46
In his official dispatch of November 17, covering the events of November 13,
Wingate reiterated this position. He commented that Rushdi was aware of
Nationalist claim s and felt it prudent for both himself and Adlf to accompany
46 Wingate to Foreign Office, November 17, 1 9 18, FO141/773. He v:rote to 
Allenby, November 15, 1918, that his suspicions that the Nationalists 
were influenced by Allied declarations' favouring self-determination 
had been well founded. ’The matter is giving me no little concern. ’ 
SA170/3/1.
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the Nationalists to London. Wingate concluded:
I am aware that the three Nationalist leaders visited the 
Sultan before approaching me and there is little doubt 
that neither the Sultan nor Ministers feel strong enough 
to oppose the Nationalist demands however unacceptable 
they may appear to b e .
It is probable the new movement will soon take a 
more pronounced form and meetings to discuss the 
question axe, I hear, contemplated by prominent Egyptians.
I would be glad to have any instructions His Majesty's Govern­
ment may consider desirable to give m e. Should the 
Ministers be permitted to proceed to London, I would propose 
to send Sir William Brunyate and Sir Milne Cheetham at the 
same time - the former would be especially valuable in con­
nection with Capitulations questions and the latter is fully 
conversant with all current Egyptian m atters. 47
As Wingate predicted, the Nationalists, after the interview, took steps
to consolidate their position and to formulate their programme. On November
15, Zaghlul conferred with Tusun, Muhammad Mahmud, 5ha‘rawf, and Fahmi.
- - 48According to Tusun, no delegation had been formally organised at this time
However, 'Ubayd related that Zaghlul met with Ism ail Sidqi on the fifteenth
when Sidqi, who had staunchly supported Tusun, came and offered to help • *
- 49Zaghlul . Zaghlul was reluctant to accept Sidqi's offer, since his proclivity
for Tu sun's group was well known; Zaghlul's followers were also hesitant
to agree to SidqTs inclusion, but he refused to be rejected. He convinced «
Zaghlul of his sincerity in wanting to help them to obtain Egyptian rights.
At this tim e, Zaghlul was still concerned that Tusun was to form another
47 Wingate to Foreign Office, November 17, 1918, F0141/773.
48 Tusun, p .22,
49 ‘Ubayd, al-Ahram, January 10, 1935,
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- 50delegation tinder the leadership of Muhammad Sa‘ id . Zaghlul was anxious 
to avoid divisions which would weaken the Egyptian case when it was pre­
sented to the British. To prevent this situation, he sent Mahmud to TUsun and 
Sa*id in order to convince them not to form another delegation. Mahmud and 
Fahmi both resolutely refused to consider anyone but Zaghlul as president of 
the delegation. His leadership was recongised by the time Hamad al-Basil began, 
on November 18, to circulate petitions urging the dispatch of a delegation, led 
by Zaghlul, to present Egyptian grievances to the Peace Conference. On 
November 20, Zaghlul, as Vice President of the Legislative .Assembly, asked 
for passports for himself and the Committee of 14. This request was re ­
peated on November 23. The Committee included Zaghlul, his four friends, 
and prominent Egyptians who had been enlisted after Tusun and his supporters 
agreed not to form another delegation. These men included former members 
of the al-Hizb al-Watanf Mustafa al-Natihas who became Zaghlul’s ’right hand 
man’, and Dr. Hafiz *Afi£i. Slnut Hanna became the first Coptic member, 
followed by George Khayyat^.
By the middle of November, Tusun’s opposition to Zaghlul had disappeared. 
A major reason for his acceptance of a lesser role was the Sultan’s antagonism. 
Since Tusun had a claim to the throne, Fu’ad was sensitive to any attempts he 
made to become prominent in political circles. For this reason, Fu’ad himself
50 Ibid., Fahmi, pp. 72-84; Shafiq, p. 150.
51 'Ubayd, al-Ahram, January 19, 1935; Keown-Boyd note on interview with 
Hamad al-Basil on November 18, 1918. Zaghlul to High Commissioner, 
November 20, 1918; November 23, 1918, FO141/810; F0141/773.
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ordered Rushdi to cancel Tusun's proposed meeting of Egyptian princes
52and notables which had been scheduled for November 16 . After this
meeting was cancelled, Tusun held a smaller one of princes only on 
November 19. At this time, Tusun told his guests that Zaghlul should be 
left free to act, since the majority of the people supported him. He suggested
that the princes aid Zaghlul from a distance, and noted that the ex-Khedive
t - 53Abbas was working along the same lines
While their requests for passports were under consideration,
Zaghlul and the Committee of 14 began a campaign to legitim ise their 
movement by gaining the support of the members of the Legislative 
Assembly and provincial leaders. They circulated a pledge to the members 
of the Legislative Assembly, which stated that the signatories appointed 
Zaghlul, Shafrawi, 5Vbd al-Latif al-Makabbati, Muhammad Mahmud, and 
Lutfi al-Sayyid to act on behalf of the Assembly in seeking Egyptian indepen­
dence. The authorised delegation was given permission in the pledge to pro­
ceed to the Peace Conference, while noting that £10,000 had already been
52 Tusun, p. 17. Haines note to Wingate, November 16, 1918. Wingate 
note, November 10, 1918, pointed out that Fmad was displeased with 
Tusun's political activity, and was anxious to diminish his influence. 
SA170/2.
53 Note on meeting of princes, November 19, 1918, SA170/3/2.
British officials were interested in the references to 'Abbas. In 
his memoirs, Tusun remarked that Zaghlul later came to talk with 
him; in the course of this meeting, Zaghlul became convinced that 
Tusun had sincerely advocated a nationalist programme, p. 27.
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given to subsidise the delegation . A similar pledge was circulated among
the Provincial Councils, and members of the Municipal and Local Councils;
this pledge contained the names of *Abd al-'Aziz Fahmi and-Muhammad‘All 
55Bey . The Zaghlulists were forced to resort to this method of gaining mass 
support, because under martial law it was impossible to hold elections, nor 
were there any indications that the Legislative Assembly would be recalled. 
That the delegation was able to circulate these petitions among a large section 
of the Egyptian population indicated that they were fairly well organised prior 
to November 21 when Haines first forbade their distribution.
Interestingly, when these authorisations were first circulated, the 
delegation had not yet formulated a definite programme. A l-RafiTstates that
this programme was officially signed on November 23, the same day that the
56 *committee of 14 asked permission to travel . The programme was composed
of 26 paragraphs the first of which defined the primary aim of the wafd as
gaining independence for Egypt. For the most part, the programme delineated
54 The Hedge signed by the members of the Legislative Assembly, F0141/773.
55 Petition in Arabic with translation, SA170/3/4. This petition has a large 
hole in it where a leading ‘umda, after hearing that the British opposed 
those who signed the document, put his thumb through his signature. To 
the British, this indicated that the Egyptians were not sincere in their 
demands for independence. R.M. Graves (Inspector) to Keown-Boyd, 
December 1, 1918. For more on the distribution of the petitions see: 
‘Ubayd, al-Ahram, January 10, 1935.
56 al-Rafi*!, p .75; Shafiq, pp. 154-56; a l-‘Aqqad, pp. 195-96; Landau, p. 154;
Klingmfllltr, p. 147-51. The members were: Zaghlul, Sha^rawi, Fahmi,
Muhammad 'All Bey, Ismael'Sidqi, Mahmud ‘AbuTl-Nasr, Ahmad Lutff
al-Sayyid, Dr. Hafiz Afifi, Sihik Hanna, Muhammad Mahmud, Abd
al-Latif al-Makabbatf, Hamad al-Basil, George Khayyat, and Mustafa
al-Nahhas.» *
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the terms of membership and structure of the organisation in which the
president was empowered with broad executive duties. Under this programme
the wafd was to urge Egyptian independence within a constitutional framework.
After Wingate heard of the rapid spread of talk concerning independence
and ending the Protectorate, he ordered the Inspectors to stop gossip on the 
57subject . In such a way, he hoped to be able to halt the mounting influence
of the Nationalists. Haines subsequently spoke with Sha'rawl, Lutfx al-Sayyid,
Hamad al-Basil, and Fahmi, in an attempt to persuade them to stop the
58authorisations (tawkils) . Keown-Boyd then attempted to persuade Hamad
al-Basil to desist from his nationalist activities, but Basil, like his friends,
59refused to do so . It was clear that the Nationalists were going to campaign 
for independence among members of the Legislative Assembly, and private 
individuals, and through the Egyptian press. During the later part of November 
and early December, the press began a series of articles on independence, the 
forthcoming Peace Conference, and the weakness of the Egyptian educational 
and industrial spheres*^. While the Nationalists became more determined to 
use every available method to gain their demands, the Foreign Office became 
more resolved to reject them.
After receiving Wingate's official dispatch of November 17, in which the
interview with Zaghlul was described, Graham wrote that it was regrettable
■ 1 -
37 Wingate to all Inspectors, Noyember 19, 1913,* FO141/810.
58 Haines to Wingate, November 21, 1919/ F0141/773.
59 Residency note, November 18, 1918, SA170/3/2 ,
^  al"Ahram, al-Ahalf. Even al-Muqattam wrote of the need for reforms.
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that Wingate had not refused the Nationalist demands .more firm ly. According 
to Graham, Great Britain did not consider that Zaghlul represented the r e s ­
ponsible elements within Egypt, nor did the government have time to negotiate 
with the Egyptians. Moreover, Britain had no intention of giving the National­
ists an opportunity to present their demands before the Peace Conference, as
6 Xthis could prove to be an embarrassment . These views, so strongly stated 
in Foreign Office minutes, were not relayed to Wingate, nor was he promptly 
informed that the Foreign Office wished him to adopt a more obdurate position 
vis-a -v is the Nationalists.
Thus Wingate was caught between the growing Nationalist movement in 
Egypt and the increasing opposition to it in the Foreign Qffice. He had to 
operate between these two poles, trying to placate each side and bring them 
closer together. In hopes of gaining support for his difficult task, Wingate 
asked British officials in Cairo for their opinions on Egyptian nationalism 
and for suggestions on the best methods with which to deal with it. On 
November 18, Brunyate submitted a full report, in which he noted that 
nationalism was not a recent development in Egypt, but that it had always 
been effectively channelled by British officials. He maintained that the best 
defence against the Nationalists was a constructive British policy of reform. 
He belittled the nationalism professed by the Egyptian m inisters, and 
remarked that Zaghlul had lost a great deal of support from the members of
61 Graham minute, November 25, 1918, on Wingate's dispatch of 
November 17, 1918, FO371/2304.
the Legislative Assembly. Believing that the ministers were open to 
reason concerning constitutional reform, Brunyate su ggested  that his proposed 
constitution, allowing for the creation of a bicameral legislature with 
European representation in the Upper Chamber, be considered. Before sub­
mitting this proposed constitution, Brunyate told Rushdi about it. Rushdf made
62no comment, and Brunyate took this silence as assent for the plan . Actually,
nothing could have been further from the truth, for Brunyate's proposals were
eventually to become a key factor in precipitating Rushdi1 s resignation as Prime
Minister. At the time Brunyate submitted the draft plan, he was convinced that
the Egyptians would accept it. Wingate relayed Brunyate’s letter on nationalism
and his proposals to Hardinge without comment, except to remark that Brunyate
did not attach as much importance to Egyptian nationalism as he might
Graham fully agreed with Brunyate’s estimate of Egyptian nationalism, but
64doubted that the proposed constitution was feasible
Wingate, who was convinced that the current outbreak of nationalism could 
not be as easily repressed as previous ones during Graham’s sojourn in Cairo, 
continued to report that the Foreign Office had to recognise the inherent danger 
of the ZaghLulist movement.
62 Brunyate to Wingate, November 18, 1918, SA170/3/2; F0141/773. 
Brunyate reported that he had discussed the matter with Rushdi on a 
train travelling from Alexandria to Cairo.
63 Wingate to Hardinge, November 19, 1918, SA170/3/4; FO371/3204.
64 Graham minute on Wingate letter of November 19, 1918, FO371/3204.
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It should be recognised that they are now voicing the 
sentimental aspirations of a majority of the small native 
educated class, aspirations which (however disastrous or 
ill-advised might be their practical realisation) appeal to 
the susceptibilities of a considerable section of the Moslem 
population. On the other hand it should be noted that 
their views have been expressed with remarkable frank­
ness: and that there has been no apparent disposition to 
engage in secret agitation or revolutionary propaganda. 65
Because Wingate considered that the Nationalists had been honestly stating their
intentions, and were unlikely to engage in revolutionary activities, he was
inclined to believe that negotiations could be fruitful.
Officials in the Foreign Office adopted the opposing view. Graham wrote
of the Nationalists:
The whole movement in Egypt need not be taken too 
seriously; it represents the vague aspirations aroused 
by President Wilson's statements and by the Declaration 
regarding the Arabs, also a vague hope that Egypt might 
obtain something out of the Peace Conference and a feel­
ing that the chance must not be allowed to slip . Among 
thinking Egyptians, there is no seditious spirit and few of 
them would contemplate our leaving the country without 
dismay. This, however, in no wise prevents them from 
joining in a popular agitation for our departure. It must 
also be admitted that there is, as yet, in Egypt no fee l­
ing of gratification or pride in belonging to the British 
Empire. 66
The former was initialled by Balfour, the King, and the Cabinet. Obviously, 
the group of politicians responsible for Egyptian policy were aware that d is­
content existed within Egypt, but were willing to accept Graham 's analysis 
rather than negotiate, as Wingate urged, with the Nationalists whose popularity
65 Wingate to Balfour, November 20, 1918, F0141/772.
6 6  Graham minute on Wingate letter of November 10, 1918, written on
December 1 1 , 1918, FO371/3204.
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steadily increased.
The Nationalists refused to wait until the conclusion of the Peace Con­
ference for their demands to be considered, and did not delay In augmenting 
their support. When the petitions authorising Zaghlul and his followers to 
proceed to Europe were stopped and confiscated by British authorities, the 
Nationalists, led by Zaghlul, who signed himself Vice-President of the Legis- 
lative Assembly and President of the Egyptian Deputation, wrote to complain 
Following this, the Nationalists sent a series of telegrams to President Wilson 
and Lloyd George protesting against their treatment and presenting their demands 
for independence. Since all mail passed through British censorship, the British 
were aware of these telegram s. Although the Foreign Office took steps to 
assure that the United States did not answer the Nationalists, they allowed the 
m essages to be s e n t^ . Wingate, too, received numerous letters and statements 
concerning the Nationalists. With few exceptions this correspondence, even 
when written by Copts, upon whom the British had traditionally relied, was
67 Zaghlul to Minister of Interior and President of the Council of Ministers, 
November 23, 1918, F0141/773.
68 National petition to Wilson, October 24, 1918, FO371/3202; Members of 
National Committee to Lloyd George, November 20, 1918, SA170/3/3. 
Zaghlul to Wilson, December 17, 1918, FO371/3204, forwarded to the 
Foreign Office with a question as to whether the telegrams were to be 
sent. Graham and Hardinge decided they should be relayed to Colonel 
House. On January 17, 1919, Graham wrote that the telegrams were 
becoming repetitious and should cease, Thus Zaghlul's telegram to 
the United States Delegation in Paris, February 1 6 , 1919, was stopped. 
F0371/3714, A similar procedure was followed concerning the tele­
grams to Clemenceau, F0371/3711; F0371/3714.
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69favourable to the Nationalist cause .
Acting upon this information and upon past experience, Wingate wired 
the Foreign Office on November 25, 1918, to report again on Nationalist move­
ments and the attempts to popularise their cause. After reiterating the various 
Nationalist supporters, ranging from ZaghlGl to Tusun, Wingate recommended 
that they be given permission to leave Egypt.
I still think it advisable that as soon as restrictions on 
travel are removed a hearing should be given in London 
to any Egyptian politicians who wish to address themselves 
directly to the Foreign Office. 70.
In concluding, Wingate described the growing nationalist sentiment in the schools, 
but reassured the Foreign Office that no public demonstrations were permitted. 
Rushdl had been warned by Wingate that demonstrations were considered 
seditious, and would be treated as such if they occurred. However, there is 
no indication that Zaghlul or his followers considered employing force to secure 
their demands. Rather, they desired to work through peaceful channels and to 
negotiate openly with the British.
In a personal letter to Hardinge, written on November 24, Wingate re ­
peated the request that the Nationalists be given travel perm its. He explained 
that the Nationalists appeared to be split into three parties around ZaghlQl, TQsun, 
and Muhhammad Sa‘ld . The latter group, headed by Muhammad Sa‘ld, was
69 National Society in Egypt, November 22, 1918, SA170/3/4; an observer 
to Wingate, November 22, 1918, noted the growing unrest in Tanta.
Unsigned note to the Residency, November 20, 1918* *Abd Allah 
Abaza, remarked in a conversation on November 20 that he opposed 
Zaghlul, but supported the idea of negotiations. SA170/3/2.
70 Wingate to Foreign Office, November 25, 1918, SA170/3/4; F0141/773.
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satisfied with the status quo. Actually, SaTd was closely involved with 
Tusun and, as previously noted, had been persuaded for a time to allow 
Zaghlul to lead the fight against the British. Wingate did not attach enough 
importance to the fact, which he may not have realised, that Tusun had 
pledged himself to Zaghlul, while SafId was not strong enough to pose a 
serious threat to ZaghluHs leadership. However, Wingate did realise that 
any delegation which went to London would have to be composed of members 
from all groups and could not exclude Zaghlul; although, alternatively, he 
suggested that Rushdi and ‘Adli might be able to provide the necessary base 
of support among the Egyptians for the British to reach an enduring agree-
J lment
The long-awaited reply concerning permission for the Nationalists to
leave Egypt was sent from the Foreign Office on November 27, 1918, and arrived
72in Cairo the next day . This telegram informed Wingate that the British
government was anxious to grant an increasing share of self-government to
Egypt, but that the time for Egyptian autonomy had not yet arrived.
H.M .G. desire to act on principle which they have always 
followed of giving Egyptians an ever increasing share in 
the government of the Country.. ,  As you are well aware 
stage has not been reached at which self-government is 
possible. H.M.G. have not the intention of abandoning 
their responsibilities for . . .  good government in Egypt 
and for protecting rights and interests of both native and
71 Ibid. Wingate to Hardinge, November 24, 1918, F 0371/3204.
72 Foreign Office to Wingate, November 27, 1918, FO141/773.
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73of (sic: and other?) (? populations) of the country.
No useful purpose would be served by allowing 
Nationalist leaders to come to London and advance im­
moderate demands . . .  H.M.G. would always be ready 
to listen . . .  to any reasonable proposals on the part of 
Ministers or other Egyptians and would welcome a visit 
from Ruchdi Pachaand Adly Pacha.. .  although it may well 
be desirable to adopt an earlier suggestion of yours . .  , / th a t /  
Commission should visit Egypt and report before any 
reforms are decided. 74
Rushcfi andfAdll were to be informed that they were welcome at a later date,
but that the time was not opportune for a visit during the Conference. Wingate
and Cheetham drafted the letter to Rushdi which stressed the eagerness of the
officials to meet with him at a more distant date. In reply to Zaghlul, Wingate
wrote that his request to leave Egypt had been refused, although he was w el-
75come to address his complaints to the Residency . When Zaghlul received
this reply, he wrote asking the reasons for the refusal. Symes answered on
December 1 that Wingate could not consider the matter further, but that.
76ZaghlUl was still allowed to submit suggestions
In the Foreign Office, the officials were less concerned over the 
effect their refusal to negotiate would have in Egypt than over Wingate's
73 Text appears as such in original after being decyphered. The sentence
should probably read as follows: 'and for protecting rights and interests 
of both native and of other populations of the country'.
74 Ibid.
75 Wingate notes, November 29, 1918, SA170/3/3.
76 Wingate to Balfour, November 29, 1918, F0141/773. These letters
are enclosed in this dispatch. Shaflq gives an account of this exchange 
as does Fahml . Arabic sources stress the fact that Symes, a 
subordinate, wrote the second reply to Zaghlul.
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supposed weakness in dealing with the Nationalists. Graham wrote:
I confess that the only feature of this movement that 
causes me the least misgivings is the half-hearted atti­
tude adopted by the Residency towards it. The Extremist 
leaders ought never to have been received by Sir 
R. Wingate, except for the purpose of being told not to 
make fools of them selves. 77
Crowe concurred, while adding that 'Sir R. Wingate seem s deplorably weak
at a moment when such weakness is calculated to create serious embarrass -
78ment for us at the Peace Conference. 1
In an attempt to correct Wingate's previous actions, Graham drafted
a strongly worded telegram to the effect that he was to adopt a firmer attitude
towards the Nationalists, Hardinge thought that this telegram would set
79Wingate back on the right line . Graham's draft read:
I note extremist leaders are exploiting fact of your 
having received them at Residency. 80
81To this sentence, Crowe added the words, 'which was unfortunate' . This 
addendum remained in the copy sent to Wingate on December 2. In the telegram, 
Wingate was told that he was to inform the Egyptians that their agitation was 
viewed with disfavour, and to ascertain that Fu'ad and his ministers agreed 
with the British authorities. At a later date, Wingate was to take umbrage with 
the rebuke, but when the telegram was first received he was too busy attempting
77 Graham minute on Wingate dispatch of November 29, 1918, FO371/3204.
78 Ibid. , Crowe minute,
79 Ibid., Hardinge minute.
80 Draft telegram to Wingate, number 1463, FO371/3204.
81 Foreign Office to Wingate, December 2, 1918, F 0371/3204.
to lessen the reaction caused by the refusal of the Foreign Office to talk with
Zaghlul or Rushdf to take notice.
After his request to travel to London was rejected, Rushdf submitted
a note on Brunyate's constitution, in which he objected to the plan, because, in
his view, it allowed for the annexation of Egypt, not for its independence.
Simultaneously with his submission of the note, Rushdf resigned from the
Ministry. In his letter of resignation, Rushdf explained that the refusal to
permit Egyptians to discuss their status in London had forced him to conclude
that he could no longer act as Prime Minister. *Adlf followed Rushdf and
submitted his resignation. When the two ministers resigned on December 2 ,
Wingate met with Fu# ad to explain the seriousness of the situation. Fu'ad
reported that the nationalistic effervescence would increase, while Wingate
82maintained it had been artificially engineered . On December 4, Wingate 
saw Fu*‘ad and Rushdf, who reaffirmed his determination to resign in spite of 
pleas from Wingate. Wingate advised Fu'ad to delay his acceptance of Rushdf's
resignation in hopes that Rushdf could be persuaded to remain as Prime
• * 83  Minister .
Rushdf*s resignation precipitated a series of interviews between leading 
pro-British Egyptians and British officials. These interviews had one goal - 
to persuade Rushdf to withdraw his resignation. In the course of these interviews
82 Wingate to Balfour, D ecem bers, 1918, F0141/773, Enclosures include 
Rushdl's resignation and his note on Brunyate's proposals.
83 Wingate to Foreign Office, December 4, 1918, SA171/1; F0141/773.
1 80 ,
complaints concerning lax Inspectors, untrustworthy mudirs, and abuses
84caused by the military demands during the War were expressed . These
factors contributed to the eagerness with which all classes of Egyptians lent
their support to the Nationalist programme. When talking with ‘Adll, Wingate
was informed that Zaghlul did not expect to receive all of his demands, but
85felt he had to ask for the maximum . However, the interviews did not 
succeed in changing the situation. After Rushdf persisted in resigning, Haines
remarked that the British had 'lost a really good Prime Minister for just -
. . ,86 nothing at a ll .
Meanwhile, Wingate had wired the Foreign Office for further instructions.
Graham stated that the resignations were not significant, since the problem
87was actually Wingate's inability to manage Fuad . At this juncture, Graham 
was attempting to place the blame for the Nationalist fervour upon Wingate. 
Actually, there is no evidence that Fu’ad wanted Rushdf to resign, or that he 
would have adopted a stronger position against the Nationalists had he been on 
better terms with Wingate or the m inisters.
84 Note on Wingate interview with Tulba Sa'udf, December 5, 1918,
SA171/1. Note on Douglas Dunlop (Adviser to the Ministry of Educa­
tion) conversation with *Adli, December 4, 1918; enclosed in Wingate 
dispatch to Foreign Office on December 5, 1918, F0141/773.
85 Note on Wingate’s conversation with ‘Adli, December 9, 1918,
F0141/773,
8 6  Note on Haines conversation with Rushdf, December 8 , 1918,
F0141/773.
87 Graham minute, number 1810, FO371/3204. Later Graham wrote to 
Storrs, May 27, 1920, that Fu’ad could have been managed, but for 
Wingate who ’could not make up his own mind on any subject and was 
therefore unlikely to be able to make up Fuad's for him. * Storrs 
Papers, I I 1/2.
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While Graham, within the Foreign Office, minimised the troubles in
Egypt, he suggested privately to Hardinge that some concession could be made 
88to the hfinisters . He wrote on this point to Wingate on December 5.
The authorities here were filled with horror at the idea of 
having to tackle the question of Egyptian reforms at this 
moment. In fact they utterly refused to contemplate the 
idea at all and even Ruchdi and Adly will have to possess 
their souls in patience, although there is every intention to 
give them a hearing when the proper moment arrives. 89
Although British officials were tremendously busy with the details of the Con­
ference, they might have been more willing to listen to Wingate's warnings had 
Graham not repeatedly stated that trouble in Egypt was unlikely.
In Cairo, Wingate and his staff continued their attempts to persuade Rushdf
and *Adlir to reconsider. Other members of the Ministry, Sirri Pasha and Wahba,
90tried to convince them to change their minds, but to no avail . Rushdi was con­
vinced that the British government had lost faith in him, nor could he remain 
Prime Minister when the majority of the politicians were demanding independence, 
a question which the British refused to d iscuss. Wingate was certain that this
situation had developed during the War when no attempts had been made to initiate 
91reforms .
8 8  Hardinge minute, number 1810, FO371/3204.
89 Graham to Wingate, December 5, 1918, SA171/1.
90 Wingate to Foreign Office, December 5, 1918,. Wingate note on interview
with Sirri Pasha, F0141/773. Wingate to Hardinge, December 7, 1918, 
enclosed note on interview with Tulba on December 5. HP, Vol. IV (30), 
1918.
91 Wingate to Hardinge, December 7, 1918, HP, Vol. IV (30), 1918;
SA237/10.
In his letter to Hardinge on December 7, Wingate complained about the
Foreign Office reprimand in the telegram of December 2. Wingate felt it
had been unfair, since he had always made a policy of seeing Egyptian leaders
when they requested an interview.
Apart from the fact that I had no precise information as to 
the object of their visit until we actually got down to 
business, I hold, in the strongest maimer, the view that 
the High Commissioner should be accessible to all and 
sundry . . .  If it is really the view of H. M.G. that I should 
not see representatives of all shades and opinions at the 
Residency, I feel that I ought not to be here, for my conception 
of how best to serve my country in my present position is to 
act as I have done hitherto. 92
To explain Crowed addition, Graham wrote that the rebuke did not imply that
Wingate should not see native deputations, but that the authorities in London
were primarily concerned over the apparent collusion of Fu’ad and his ministers
93against the British . He added that he was certain that Wingate, owing to
faulty staff-work, had been unaware of Zaghlul's intentions. Actually, as 
94previously noted , Wingate did know that Zaghlul was liable to make demands 
for more independence, but when he saw Zaghlul he had no suspicion that the 
Foreign Office would refuse to receive the Nationalists.
In offering to submit his resignation if the British Government was no 
longer pleased with his work, Wingate emphasised his belief that he had acted 
in the best interests of Great Britain. In a private undated note to himself, Wingate
92 Ibid.
93 Graham to Wingate, n .d . (probably written in late December or early 
January), SA171/1.
94 Above, Chapter VI, pp. 159-60.
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remarked that not even his staff had known he had submitted this offer to
95
resign to Hardinge . However, Wingate's 'resignation' was in no manner an
official one, and was not couched in particularly strong term s. Wingate was
apparently satisfied with Graham's reassurance that the Foreign Office placed
every confidence in his work and looked forward to seeing him in the near
96future to discuss the Egyptian problem .
Despite British arguments, Rushdf refused to withdraw his resignation,
and the Egyptian government continued without Rrime M inister. British
officials had by this time gathered together a fairly complete list of the Egyptian
Nationalists and their affiliations. That the lists included names of some
government officials caused alarm in the Foreign Office, which promptly
ordered that these men should be warned that their activities endangered their 
97jobs . To minimise Nationalist reactions, Wingate, acting on Brunyate's
suggestion,proposed that the British should issue a declaration of intent. This
idea was vetoed by the Foreign Office, especially by Graham, who felt that
98Brunyate merely wanted approval for his programme . The Foreign Office 
was anxious to prevent, at all costs, a discussion of the legal status of Egypt 
at the Peace Conference. Since most of the Allied powers had already accepted 
the Protectorate over Egypt, only the Central Powers remained, and they were
95 Wingate note, n .d . SA174/3.
96 Graham to Wingate, n .d , SA171/1.
97 These lists were sent to Balfour on December 8 > 1918, Foreign Office 
to Wingate, January 3, 1919, FO371/3204.
98 Wingate to Foreign Office, December 11, 1918, Graham minute FO371/3204.
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99to be required to do so at the Conference . As Balfour and his staff were to
attend the Conference, at which the Egyptian Nationalists were definitely not
welcome, the Foreign Office saw no reason for the delegation to leave Egypt.
This viewpoint seemed logical in London, but in Egypt where feeling was
beginning to intensify, the matter was more difficult to explain.
In a conversation with Fu* ad on December 12, Wingate was informed
that the Egyptians had expected strong foreign support for independence. The
refusal of Great Britain to consider the question had come as a great shock to
the Nationalists. Fu’ad offered to talk with Rushdl in order to stress the
willingness of Britain to enter discussions after the Conference. Rushdl
argued that Egyptians wanted immediate negotiations, and would consider him
a traitor if he agreed to a delay. For 'reasons of conscience1, he was compelled
to resign; he was supported by <A d li '^ . Faced with the intransigent attitude
of the ministers, Wingate was forced to recommend that their resignations be
accepted. He noted that he 'fully appreciated the undesirability of a serious
101crisis in Egyptian affairs at this juncture,' but that it had been impossible
99 Foreign Office to Wingate, December 11 , 1918, F0141/773.
100 Wingate talk with Fu*ad, December 12, 1918, summarised to Balfour, 
December 14, 1918, F0141/773. Graham wrote to Rushdi, December 13, 
1918, SA170/1. Wingate note on interview with Rushdi, December 13,
1918, SA171/1. Brunyate note on conversations with ‘Adli and Tharwat 
on December 13, 1918. Submitted December 15, 1918, SA171/1, ‘Adli 
firmly supported Rushdi and demanded negotiations begin at once.
101 Wingate to Foreign Office, December 18, 1918, FO141/773. Wingate to 
Balfour, December 18, 1918, F0141/773.
to find an acceptable solution. Wingate frankly stated that Rushdi had been 
forced to resign because he could not withstand the growing Egyptian 
nationalism.
Even this blunt statement on the popularity of the Egyptian Nationalists
failed to awaken the officials in London to the danger it presented. Graham was
convinced that after Fu»ad and his ministers came to London, the Foreign
102Office could easily persuade them that they had acted foolishly . What
Graham failed, or refused, to recognise was that Nationalist fervour had spread
beyond a few relatively unimportant Egyptian politicians, and had begun to
appeal to all levels of the society. The extent of this failure to understand is
revealed in a Foreign Office memorandum on Egyptian leaders, in which
Zaghlul was described as leading a national party, hostile to the British and
103
lacking any support from the fellahin. Graham added that Zaghlul was
'generally regarded by the better informed Egyptian opinion as a discredited
104adventurer who is playing for his own hand. * Graham based his analysis on
the current situation on his earlier experience in Egypt; he drew parallels and
comparisons which were faulty in the post-War context. Aware of the Foreign
Office error, Wingate continued to advocate the publication of a declaration of
105intent and the dispatch of a commission to investigate the Egyptian situation
102 Graham minute on Wingate dispatch to Foreign Office on December 18, 
1918, FO371/3204.
103 Memorandum on Zaghlul, December 22, 1918, FO371/3204.
104 Ibid. A sim ilar report was attached to the Eastern report XCIX, 
December 19, 1918, FO371/3204.
105 Wingate to Foreign Office, December 18, 1918. Graham maintained 
that the Sultan could not issue a declaration, and that the entire trouble
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When these suggestions were rejected, Wingate recommended that Rushdf and
*Adli should proceed to London, but be delayed in Paris for a few weeks.
Wingate admitted that the scheme, which had been conceived by Sirri, had its
106faults, but that it would help the ministers to save face . After receiving 
this dispatch, Graham drafted a telegram in which the possibility of Rushdi 
arriving in February was considered. This was cancelled by Robert Cecil.
Instead, the Foreign Office wired that a delay in Cairo might make the ministers
. , 107reconsider
Wingate told the Foreign Office that the demands for independence
represented a different force, not m erely a revival of the old nationalist
feelings. He connected Egyptian nationalism with the developments caused by
108the War and the Arab revolt, which had been encouraged by the British . His 
plea that the Nationalists should be permitted to leave Egypt was based on 
the following;
If a deputation from the Extremists is permitted to take 
passage by the Military Authorities, it is not necessary  
for Mr. Balfour to see them unless he so desires, but my 
own view is, as I stated, that more good than harm may 
result from a straight talk with them at home - They know 
that Indian "reformers" are allowed to go to London and to
had begun with the interview of November 13. Graham minute on 
Wingate dispatch of December 23, 1918, FO371/3204.
106 Wingate to Graham, December 22, 1918, SA171/1. Wingate to Foreign 
Office, December 23, 1918, F0141/773.
107 Draft telegram, number 1593, cancelled, FO371/3204. Foreign Office 
to Wingate, December 23, 1918, FO141/773.
108 Wingate to Foreign Office, December 26, 1918, F0141/773.
be interviewed and they think themselves superior to 
the latter. 109
hi a private letter to Graham, Wingate remarked that he was prepared to travel 
to London, but stipulated that he should proceed before the Nationalists, who, 
he recommended, should be detained in Paris for a few days, so that he might 
talk with Hardinge and Graham before they arrived in London'^.
On December 30, Fu’ad told Wingate that he was making every effort to 
convince Rushdi and ‘Adi! that the High Commissioner was doing everything 
possible to obtain the acceptance of their resignations. If they were not 
satisfied, Fu’ad told them to go directly to the Residency. Understandably, the 
two men were becoming impatient that their resignations had been held in 
abeyance for three w eeks. Actually, Wingate was striving for the early grant 
by the British Government of permission for the two m inisters to proceed to 
London. He thought that if he could obtain that permission, Rushdl would re­
consider. On December 31, the Foreign Office wired that it would accept the 
two ministers in February, but they were not, under any circumstances, to 
stop in Paris. Wingate was further directed to reassure the ministers that no
steps concerning Brunyate’s proposed constitution would be taken without con-
,  .  H Isultation
109 Wingate to Hardinge, December 28, 1918, SA237/10; HP, Vol. IV (39), 
1918.
110 Wingate to Graham, December 29, 1918, SA237/10.
111 Foreign Office to Wingate, December 31, 1918, sent January 1, 1919, 
and received January 2, 1919, FO371/3204;SA172/3.
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On January 2, 1919, the Foreign Office received Wingate's dispatch
urging a decision on the m inisters1 resignations. For the first time, Curzon
minuted an Egyptian dispatch. After Balfour's departure for Paris, Curzon
took control of the Foreign Office, and immediately sought to bring himself
up to date on all problems. Not the least of these was the Egyptian question.
Curzon asked for a complete history of the Egyptian situation, while Graham
112remarked that there was a large file ready for his perusal . Curzon’s
remark reveals that he had not been acting previously in Egyptian affairs, and
that Graham alone had been responsible for whatever decisions had been taken
prior to the end of December 1918. Graham formulated policy, then passed
it to Hardinge, who faithfully concurred. There are no indications that Balfour
did anything but accept the advice of Hardinge and Graham.
Wingate's projected journey to London to discuss the Nationalist problem
received more attention during the first week in January 1919. As early as the
first of January, officials in the Foreign Office were thinking in terms of
Wingate's dism issal, not his temporary absence. Cecil wrote to Balfour on
January 4, 1919, that he had requested Wingate to come to London.
Before sending it / “telegram to Wingate^ I spoke to the 
P. M. and suggested that if Wingate was recalled home 
Allenby would be a suitable successor. This he warmly 
approved . . .  But the P.M. wanted nothing done which would 
preclude Wingate's return to Egypt if that were decided on 
. , .  But I ought to add that everyone to whom I have spoken 
about W. is confident that he is not up to the job. 113
112 Wingate to Balfour, January 1, 1919, Graham and Curzon minutes, 
F0371/3711.
113 Cecil to Balfour, January 4, 1919, Balfour Papers, F0800/215.
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Cecil's telegram to Wingate told him to arrive in London before conversations
114with the Nationalists were held, probably in mid-February . Cecil's
letter to Balfour clearly indicated that he did not expect Wingate to return to
Egypt; he had even chosen the likely successor for Wingate - Allenby.
Wingate remained ignorant of the men in London who objected to his
return to Cairo as High Commissioner. In fact, his correspondence during
this time shows that, although he recognised the seriousness of the situation,
115he was optimistic . He informed the Foreign Office that the popularity of
the Nationalists was growing, as their call for independence appealed to the
fellahin, who had suffered during the War. Wingate noted that the movement
also had support from the educated c l a s s e s O n  January 14, Wingate told
Rushdi and 'Adi! that they could begin to make travel plans, and formulate
their demands for discussions with Balfour. Wingate told the men that he had
117received instructions to go to London and would be leaving on January 21
118Following this, Cheetham and Brunyate were informed of the plans . By 
failing to inform members of his staff of the impending departure directly after
114 Balfour to Wingate, January 4, 1919, written by C ecil. Balfour Papers, 
F0800/215.
115 Wingate to C. E , Wilson, January 9, 1919, F0141/813.
116 Wingate to Balfour, January 5, 1919, F0371/3711. Dunlop wrote on 
the student support for the Nationalists on January 7, 1919. SA172/1.
117 Wingate notes for conversation with Rushdi, January 11, 1919,
FO141/773; SA172/1.
118 Wingate to Curzon, January 16, 1919, F0141/773; F0371/3711.
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he heard of it, Wingate further alienated officials who already doubted his 
capabilities
Confident that he could persuade the Foreign Office that the Nationalists
should be received in London, Wingate impressed upon Rushdi the importance
of not telling Zaghltll and his followers of the impending departure of the High
Commissioner. Wingate told Rushdi that when the travel embargo was removed,
120Cheetham would arrange with the military authorities for the passports 
If Wingate had not been certain that he could convince the Foreign Office to 
change its stand, he would not have encouraged Rushdi in this manner. Un­
fortunately, officials in the Foreign Office were becoming more obdurate against 
the Nationalists, as A .T . Loyd’s minute of January 30 indicates.
I gather that S . Z. holds the field, the Sultan says that 
the Extremists will only take the answer from H.M .G.: 
the position of the Ministers in the eyes of the Extremists 
must not be weakened: the Ministers will not come to 
England unless the Extremists are allowed to come too: 
the Ministers lay stress upon the importance of conciliating
the nationalist party - It is all to be fought out in London -
There are objections to such a course but it may yet prove 
to be the best solution - to deport S. Z. and Ismail Sidky from 
Egypt. 121.
Graham concurred with this view, because he remained convinced that there was
122no point in Zaghlul travelling to London.
119 Herbert diary, January 9, 1919, PPG, At this time the staff knew
Wingate planned to leave, but had not been officially informed of i t .
120 Wingate to Curzon, January 16, 1919, F0371/3711.
121  A .T . Loyd minute on Wingate dispatch of January 1 6 , 1919, written on 
January 30, 1919, F0371/3711.
122 Ibid.
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Meanwhile, Wingate was making preparations to return to London for the
first time since 1914. Allenby heard of the plans, and wrote that he was glad
Wingate had the opportunity to discuss the problem in London; he added that
123he saw eye to eye with Wingate on all Egyptian matters . Wingate, accom­
panied by his wife, Symes, and Mervyn Herbert, left Cairo on January 21. 
Before departing, he wrote a note for the Nationalists and the m inisters, to
the effect that he was going to London, and that, in his absence, which was not
124to be prolonged, Milne Cheetham would act as High Commissioner , Wingate
planned to stop in Paris to see Lloyd George, Balfour, and Hardinge, before
proceeding to London.
The day after Wingate left Egypt, Graham wrote to Hardinge to explain
the history of the Egyptian problem. Graham based this account on a verbal
message from Cheetham, which had been delivered by Burnett-Stuart,
formerly in the Ministry of the Interior and a close friend of Graham's.
According to Graham, Wingate had used the highly irregular method of private
125interviews with the Nationalists in an attempt to halt their growing influence
He advised Hardinge to refuse the request of the Nationalists to leave Egypt,
because the Foreign Office had no intention whatsoever of dealing with them.
It would surely be better to tell them that their movement 
is  frankly seditious, that we will have nothing to say to it 
or them, and that we shall not facilitate their journey to 
Europe in any way. 126
123 Allenby to Wingate, January 15, 1919, SA172/1.
124 al-Ahram, al-Muqattam, January 22, 1919. Wingate note on departure, 
January 21, 1019, SA162/1. Repeated to Khartoum and Jeddah, F0141/757.
125 Above, Chapter VI, p.
126 Graham to Hardinge, January 22, 1919, HP, Vol. II (40), 1919.
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Graham predicted that the ministers would resign, but that it was better to 
face the problem squarely, since the ministers, once they realised their 
folly, would reconsider.
Hardinge showed this letter, in which Wingate's entire policy was
criticised, to Balfour. In reply to Graham, Hardinge noted that the autumn
events in Cairo presented:
. . .  a curious mixture of weakness and a love of doing things 
behind other people's backs. I am quite certain you are right 
in considering that the position ought to be faced squarely 
and that the movement should be treated as seditious.
When Ministers do come we should be frank and give them 
"a good dressing-down". That is really what they want 
before we can listen to any schemes of progressive develop­
ment in Egypt. No doubt some progress must be made in 
Egypt, but it should be on steady lines, not on the lines now 
advocated for India, which in my opinion constitute too big a 
jump all at once. If Wingate comes to see me on his way 
through Paris you may be quite sure that I shall speak per­
fectly frankly to him in practically the same sense as you 
have written to m e. 127
Thus the officials in Paris and London had made up their minds long before 
Wingate had the opportunity to discuss personally with them. Although Wingate 
certainly did not envisage an acceptance of the programme for complete inde­
pendence (he had staunchly supported annexation), he recognised that the 
climate of Egyptian opinion in 1918 demanded that some concessions be made, • 
and that, if properly handled, the Nationalist group headed by Zaghlul would not
be intractable, but could be persuaded to work with the British along moderate 
lin es .
127 Hardinge to Graham, January 24, 1919, HP, V ol. 11(40), 1919.
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CHAPTER VII 
WINGATE SUPERSEDED AS HIGH COMMISSIONER
Following his arrival in Paris on January 20, Wingate saw Hardinge,
A.J. Balfour, Robert Cecil, and Eyre Crowe. Wingate spoke with Lloyd
George and Philip Kerr on February 1, at which time he explained the
critical situation in Egypt, During these interviews, Wingate was not given
any indication of British policy with regard to Egypt, but was referred to the
Foreign Office where policy was supposedly made*. It should be remembered
that Hardinge, Cecil, and Crowe were ill-disposed to Wingate’s viewpoint,
while Lloyd George had been informed by Cecil that Wingate was not a suitable
2
High Commissioner . That the men in Paris did not advocate Wingate ’s 
policy of negotiation with the Nationalists - even after he had talked personally 
with them - implied that he had failed to convince them of his ca se . Wingate, 
however, seemed unaware of his failure; having presented the problem in Paris, 
he left to discuss the matter in London, where he arrived on February 3. Once 
in London, Wingate promptly went to the Foreign Office where he expected to 
meet Lord Curzon who was directing British policy concerning Egypt. To 
Wingate’s surprise, Curzon was not immediately available; indeed, two weeks
1 Wingate to Cheetham, February 1, 1919, SA237/1, Wingate note on
his v isit to Paris and on the Egyptian situation, August 31, 1919,
SA217/8.
2 Above, Chapter V, p. 188.
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were to elapse before he was permitted to see him.
In the interim, the situation in Egypt continued to become more 
volatile. Wingate recognised that time was a critical factor, but found it 
impossible to convince the Foreign Office, because Cheetham, the Acting 
High Commissioner, continued to send dispatches describing the Egyptian 
political situation in optimistic term s. Cheetham wrote that he did not 
think that trouble would arise in the near future, since the popularity of the 
Nationalists appeared to be diminishing. Cheetham gave this analysis, 
although he had been informed that the Nationalists planned large demonstra­
tions to mark the anniversary of the death of the Nationalist leader, Mustafa 
3Kamil . In addition, the United States military mission in Egypt predicted
4that armed disturbances were imminent , although the United States rep­
resentative in Egypt tempered the warning with a report which concluded that 
uprisings were unlikely. In the Foreign Office, the prediction was dism issed  
with the remark:
. . .  the American Military authorities imagine Egypt is 
"seething'* when in reality she is only "teething". 5
Actually, the Nationalists had been far more successful in their attempts
to gain support among the Egyptians than the British officials expected. The
3 Acting High Commissioner (Cheetham) to Foreign Office, February 3, 
1919, number 182, FO141/773.
4 Cheetham to Foreign Office, February 3, 1919, number 184, F0371/ 
3711.
5 Ibid., Graham minute.
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gathering of 600 Egyptians at Mustafa Kamirs tomb on February 11 revealed
that groups of Egyptians other than the members of al-Hizb al-Watani had
become involved in the struggle for national independence. It was not, as
British officials reported, a sign of the demise of Zaghlul1 s power .
Rather, Zaghlul's control over the Egyptians who wished independence
had steadily strengthened since the formation of the delegation, and the
creation of its programme on November 23, As previously noted, Zaghlul
had requested permission to leave Egypt on November 20 and again on November
23. After these requests were refused, Zaghlul and his supporters continued
their struggle for recognition through a series of telegrams presenting their
7case to the United States, France, and Great Britain . On January 14, a 
group of 150 leading Egyptians gathered at Hamad al-Basil's home to hear 
Zaghlul speak. At this time, Zaghlul called for constitutional government and 
remarked that:
The occupation, which had no right to remain in Egypt, 
was changed into a Protectorate by the mere wish of the 
English and without the agreement of Egypt. Hie Pro­
tectorate is contrary to international law and dramatically 
opposed to the new priciples by which humanity has
been delivered from this terrible war. 8
6 Cheetham to Foreign Office, February 16, 1919, number 78, F0371/ 
3714.
7 Above, Chapter VI, p. 174.
8 Note by Keown-Boyd on party at Hamad al-Basil's home, written on 
January 16, 1919, SA172/1; FO141/810.
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By this time, Zaghlul*s home had become known as Bayt al-Umma (House
9
of the Nation), and was the centre for meetings of Egyptian leaders . On
January 20, Zaghlul travelled to Asyut where he was well received*^. Formerly
»
Minister of Education, he was both well known and well lilced among the students, 
and was, therefore, able to enlist their support for the cause. These acti­
vities indicate that he was making a concerted effort to gain wide-spread 
support for the wafd. Nor were Zaghlul and his followers merely content to 
make their programme known throughout the countryside. They organised 
wafd adherents in villages and towns into councils with presidents, which were 
closely linked with the central organisation in Cairo. Al-Azhar acted as the 
central headquarters, where students were delegated special tasks, and where 
meetings occurred daily. Through this system the wafd was later able to arrange 
strikes and boycotts; the system also proved to be effective for the collection 
of funds to maintain the wafd in Paris, and to pay subsidies to striking workers**, 
The well planned and co-ordinated demonstrations, which began after Zaghlul 
was deported, and which continued intermittently throughout 1919, attest both to
9. Fahmi, p. 82. * Al-Umma* is the Koranic word for people and came to 
mean the community of believers. The word gradually evolved in meaning 
until it was applied to the nation and the people who inhabited i t .
10. Intelligence reports, January 20, 1919, FO141/810.
11 Intelligence reports by C.F.  Ryder, April 17 and April 18, 1919. F0141/
780. Ryder termed the councils or cells in the provinces, ’Soviets1, which 
should not be confused with the Bolshevik system, although officials in 
London periodically worried lest the Nationalists join the Bolsheviks. For 
more on the organisation of the wafd supporters in Egypt see: al-R afi'f, 
pp. 150-52; Ants, whose book is a collection of letters by ‘Abd al-Rahman 
Fahml, wlu organised most of the strikes and who wrote regularly to
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the efficiency of the organisation, and to its hold on the m asses of the 
Egyptian people.
That the leaders of the wafd were able to gain support from the Egyp­
tians was due, at least in part, to the fact that the people were dissatisfied  
with the economic situation in Egypt, while holding various grievances against 
the British civilian and military administrators who had requisitioned men
and materials during the War. These grievances are clearly reflected in
12the Egyptian press during the winter of 1919
On the other hand, British officials in Egypt underestimated both the
ability of the Nationalists to coalesce their supporters and the extent of the
discontent among the fellahin. Cheetham expected the Foreign Office would be
persuaded to see Rushdf and others, and, for this reason, was probably
inclined to minimise the power of the Nationalists. Acting on the belief that
Rushdi would be received in London, Cheetham wired the British Commander-
in-Chief in Egypt to reserve places on a ship bound for Europe at an indefinite
13date in the near future for the Egyptian ministers . He also asked the
Zaghlul. At a later date, secret societies, many of which had tenuous 
connections with the wafd, developed. Members of these groups led 
strikes and engaged in some terrorism. Intelligence report, November 5, 
1919, FO371/3720.
2b) al-Ahram, Wadf * 1-Nil, al-Wat an, and al-A hali. These newspapers
contain numerous articles on the need for reorganisation of the adminis­
tration, educational and economic system s. The Peace Conference and 
the Fourteen Points were also discussed.
13 Cheetham to C-in-C, February 3, 1919, F0141/773.
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Foreign Office when a reply could be expected concerning the departure of 
14the Egyptians . The Foreign Office answered that the question was under 
consideration with Wingate, and that the decision would be communicated 
shortly to Cairo
When this telegram was sent, Wingate had not yet seen Curzon. R ealis­
ing that time was essential, Wingate wrote to Graham on February 7 to say that
16he was anxious to talk with Curzon at the earliest possible moment . The longer 
that the Sultan and the ministers were forced to wait, the more likely an 
outbreak of Nationalist agitation becam e. With this in mind, Wingate wrote 
to Cheetham that the men in Paris appeared to support the plan for the 
Egyptian ministers to come to London, although Curzon had not considered 
the problem. Wingate's optimism was qualified by his comment on Curzon.
. .  .The whole matter now rests with Lord Curzon and I 
believe he has not yet had time even to peruse the som e­
what bulky dossier on the subject - I am told that he never 
will discuss complicated matters of this sort unless he has 
fully mastered the details on paper. I am at the Foreign 
Office nearly every day and am making every effort imagin­
able, but so far without su ccess. 17
Finally, on February 14, the Foreign Office informed Wingate that Curzon
18would be 'delighted1 to see him on February 17 .
14 Cheetham to Foreign Office, February 6, 1919, F0371/3711.
15 Graham drafted the reply on February 10, but the telegram was not
sent until February 13^  1919, F0371/3711; F0141/773.
16 Wingate to Graham, February 7, 1919, SA172/4.
17 Wingate to Cheetham, February 13, 1919, SA172/4.
18 Foreign Office to Wingate, February 14, 1919, SA172/4.
199.
During the week of February 14, Cheetham minimised the difficulties 
in Egypt, although he was forced to report the demonstration at Mustafa 
Kamil*s tomb (at which some students were arrested) and the meetings which 
had been held at al-Azhar. Graham remarked that the developments seemed 
’trivial* . ^  in view of these optimistic reports, Curzon was unlikely to 
regard seriously Wingate's warnings. At the meeting on February 17 with 
Curzon, Wingate repeated his request that the Egyptians wishing to travel to 
London should be allowed to do s o . He predicted that if the recommendation 
was rejected, the 'Nationalists would almost certainly intimidate the Sultan 
and so terrorise prospective Ministers that it would be impossible to form a 
new Ministry. Unimpressed by Wingate's caution, Curzon maintained that 
the advice was incompatible with the wishes of the government, and that Great 
Britain refused to allow the Nationalists to 'hold a p i s t o l t o  its head. None­
theless, Wingate submitted to Curzon for Balfour's approval a draft telegram
2*7which stated that the Egyptians would be permitted to leave
Curzon subsequently sent to Balfour Wingate's telegram, along with
19 Cheetham to Curzon, February 16, 1919, Graham minute. Curzon's
initials do not appear on this dispatch. F0371/3714,
20 Wingate notes on the political situation in Egypt, 1918-1920, SA151/8.
21 Ibid.
22 "Wingate draft telegram, February 17, 1919. The telegram read: 'I
shall be glad to see Ruchdi and Adly Pasha in London and to hear their
views on Egyptian questions as soon as it is convenient for them to 
come to England. Sir Reginald Wingate has explained their anxiety 
that members of the Extremist Party should not now be prevented from 
leaving Egypt. The extravagant opinions apparently held by this party 
preclude any possibility of its members being represented here officially 
or being regarded as an Egyptian delegation but I have no objection to 
your exercising discretion in granting permits to leave Egypt to such
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his own, which advocated that the Nationalists should not be permitted to 
come to London. Balfour’s papers do not contain Curzon*s private letter on 
the matter. Since Curzon did not keep copies of his correspondence it is 
unlikely that the letter will be found in his papers when they are opened for 
public viewing. One may therefore only surmise that the officials in Paris 
acted upon Curzon's recommendation that Wingate*s advice should be ignored. 
They had heard Wingate’s interpretation of the situation, but had been strongly 
warned by Hardinge, acting on Graham's advice, and by Curzon, that Wingate 
was mistaken. Wingate's capabilities had been questioned by politicians of 
the stature of Robert Cecil, who had frankly suggested that Allenby should 
replace Wingate. With a prominent array of high officials acting against him, 
Wingate stood little chance of securing his requests. He did not, however, 
seem aware at this time that Hardinge and Graham also opposed him. He 
attributed his difficulties in gaining a hearing to the vast amount of work with 
which the men in London and Paris had to d e a l^ .
After Wingate's interview with Curzon, the Foreign Office received a
communique from Cairo which reported that the political scene was improving.
On February 27, 1919 Cheetham wired:
The agitation which they /  the Nationalists^/have organised 
is dying out or is at any rate quiescent in the country at 
large. A noteworthy feature is that this agitation has from 
the beginning been entirely pacific in character,
Egyptian politicians as may apply as private individuals for sam e. 1 
SA162/2.
23 Wingate to R. Greg, February 18, 1919; Wingate to Stack, February 18,
1919, SA 172/4.
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The present movement, however, cannot be compared 
in importance with that of Mustapha Kamel and there seems 
no reason why it should affect the decisions of His Majesty’s 
Government on Constitutional questions and the proper form 
to be given to the Protectorate. 24
This dispatch confirmed Graham’s opinion that time was working in favour 
of Great Britain. He thought that any political crisis which might ensue would
oc
be less serious than if it had occurred in December . Curzon agreed entirely 
with Graham's estimate. Acting on this information - not on Wingate’s warn­
ings - the Foreign Office cabled Egypt on February 26, 1919, that the matter 
of travel permits for those Egyptians who requested them had been carefully 
considered, in cooperation with Wingate.
It must however be remembered that these Nationalist 
Leaders who with possible exception of Aziz Bey Fehmi appear 
to be men of doubtful standing and antecedents have openly 
placed themselves at the head of a disloyal movement to sever 
connection between Egypt and the Protecting Power and have in 
furtherance of their aims organised an agitation throughout the 
country causing petitions to be signed and subscriptions to be 
raised in support of it. In the circumstances to facilitate their 
journey to England I shall be relaxing existing restrictions on 
travelling £ s i c /  or to go further by receiving them at the 
Foreign Office if they came would imply a measure of counten­
ance and recognition to which they are certainly not entitled 
and of which if conceded they would be likely to make the same 
illegitimate use they did of their original reception at The R esi­
dency. . .H .M .G . therefore adhere to the attitude which they had 
previously adopted on this question.
24 Cheetham to Foreign Office, February 24, 1919, number 294, F0371/ 
3711.
25 Ibid., Graham minute.
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You should now inform the Sultan and Ministers that 
H.M .G. renew their invitation to Rushdi Pasha and Adly 
Pasha or to any Minister or Ministers deputed by His 
H ighness.. .  They will receive a cordial welcome and full 
and sympathetic consideration will be granted to any rep­
resentations or proposals they may desire to submit both 
in regard to the future relations between Egypt and the 
Protecting Power and to Egyptian Internal Reform s. 26
In a private telegram, Graham, who had written the official dispatch, told 
Cheetham to avoid a political cr isis if possible. After hearing that their 
requests for Zaghlul and his supporters to leave Egypt had been rejected, 
Rushdi and ‘Adli once again submitted their resignations. Cheetham imme­
diately wired London that the cr isis was inevitable^?.
During the ensuing weeks, Fmad supported the British administrators 
and even offered to help form a new Ministry. Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hamid 
asserts that Fu’ad was willing to aid the British because he felt Zaghlul had 
split the country by refusing to allow Rushdi and ‘Adlf to represent the
OO „
nation . Fu’ad's willingness to help met with Graham’s satisfaction, for he 
was convinced that a new Ministry could be form ed ^ . When Curzon heard 
of the new developments, he remarked, ’So far so good.
Knowing that Rushdi could not be persuaded to reconsider, Fu»ad 
accepted his resignation on March 2, after which he met with Wahba, Tharwat,
26 Foreign Office to Cheetham, February 26, 1919, number 268, 
F0371/3711.
27 Cheetham to Foreign Office, March 1 , 1919, F0371/3711.
28 Abd al-Hamid, p. 102.
29 Graham minute on Cheetham*s dispatch of March 1 , 1919, written
on March 3, 1919, F0371/3711.
30 Ibid., Curzon minute.
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and Sirrl, in an attempt to form a new Ministry. These men hesitated, 
since a new Ministry would lack support from Egyptian ruling classes and 
the leading politicians. Fu’ad's acceptance of Rushdi *s resignation was 
greeted with regret by the Egyptian press and by the members of the delega­
tion. The wafd publicly denounced the acceptance of the resignation: their
displeasure may have derived in part from their desire to keep RushdTs
31Ministry in office, but without the ability to act .
On March 2, Fu’ad received a petiition signed by 15 Nationalists, led 
by Zaghlul and Sha'rawf, in which the case for independence was presented, 
and demands issued for permission to place the matter before the Peace Con­
ference . The petitioners concluded that Rushdi and Adli had resigned in 
order to demonstrate their disapproval at the repeated denial of Nationalist 
requests.
Le peuple etait convaincu que si Votre Hautesse s' est 
trouvee obligee peut-etre, pour les considerations 
dynastiques, d'accepter le trone de Votre . . .  Pere, devenu 
vacant par la mort de Votre Frere, le Sultan Hussein, cette 
acceptation sous le regime dfun protectorat prcvisoire est 
nul en droit, ne pouvait avoir pour effet de vous d£tourner de 
travailler pour l ’ind&pendance de Votre pays. 32
After reading this petition, which was more firmly worded than previous National 
ist communiques, Cheetham wrote to the Foreign Office that it was *a deliberate
^  al-Ahram, al-Umma, al-Mahrusa.
32 Petition to Sultan Fu’ad, March 2, 1919, translated to French,
enclosed in Cheetham’s dispatch to Foreign Office, March 5, 1919,
F03 71/3714.
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attempt to intimidate Sultan Fuad and deter him from using his influence. 1 
It now became obvious, even to Cheetham, that the Nationalists were tired 
of waiting, and were about to take more active steps to realise their 
demands. They were using all their available resources to ensure that a 
new Ministry was not formed.
Finally awakened to the dangers represented by the Nationalists under 
Zaghlul's leadership, the British quickly adopted a firm er attitude. For 
this reason, Cheetham ordered the Commander-in-Chief of the British Ex­
peditionary Force in Egypt, General H.D, Watson, to inform the Committee 
of 14 that it was obstructing governmental procedures, an offence which, under 
martial law, was liable to severe punishment. Cheetham told the Foreign 
Office of his order, but added that the Nationalists could not be expected to 
desist from their agitation. After consulting with British advisers, probably 
Brunyate and Haines, Cheetham recommended the internment of Zaghlul in 
India or Ceylon.
Saad has long ceased to listen to reason and spends his time 
in gambling. His movement has reached a point at which 
it must resort to more violent methods in order to retain 
its hold on intelligentsia , and moderates and more sensible 
Egyptians are wondering why we have permitted it to go so 
long unchecked. It may be unfortunate that I should ask for 
removal of a political agitator at present moment, but Saad, 
in view of insidious character of his propaganda, is more 
dangerous than those interned at Malta since beginning of 
w ar. I recommend his immediate arrest and deportation,
33 Cheetham to Curzon, M archS, 1919, number 98, F 0371 /3714 .
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and, for the sake of the Sultan*s prestige which is a political 
interest to us, I would beg for an early decision. 34
By deporting Zaghlul, Cheetham and his advisers thought they could rid 
Egypt of the troublesome nationalism which seemed to be gaining adherents. 
They failed to foresee that in removing the leading Nationalist leaders they 
would precipitate the riots and chaos which they had worked so hard to avoid 
since the A rm istice.
Acting on Cheetham*s request, Graham immediately drafted a reply 
in which he assented to Zaghlul's deportation to Malta. This decision was 
taken in accord with Curzon and Robert Cecil. Graham ordered Cheetham 
not to deport ‘Abd al- ‘Azfz Fahmf or any more Egyptians than was necessary 
to keep the peace^5 . On March 8 , Zaghlul, Sidqi, Majimud, and Hamad al- 
Basil were arrested and were put on a ship sailing for Malta on the next morn­
ing. Although Fu»ad expressed his gratitude to the British advisers for ridding 
- 36him of Zaghlul , the men had no sooner been deported than the British 
advisers began to doubt the wisdom of their action. Cheetham wondered if 
the Egyptians might not sympathise with Zaghlul and his friends, but remained 
in doubt as to the extent the deportations would effect the populace^?.
34 Cheetham to Curzon, March 6 , 1919, number 348, F0371/3714.
35 Foreign Office to Cheetham, March 7, 1919, number 309, drafted by 
Graham, seen by Curzon and Cecil, F0371/3714.
36 Kedourie, *Sa ad Zaghlul and the British*, p. 143. Kedourie d is­
cusses Fu’ad's co-operation with Zaghlul, but notes his desire to use 
the movement for his own purposes. By March, Fu*ad obviously 
feared the movement had grown too strong and threatened his position.
37 Cheetham to Foreign Office, March 9, 1919, number 364, received 
March 12, 1919, F0371/3714.
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Wingate was isolated from the Foreign Office throughout the days
preceding Zaghlul's arrest. He took no part in the decision to deport the
leaders, and, in fact, noted in a letter to Hardinge on May 10 that Curzon
38and Graham were too occupied to see him . As Wingate was High Com­
m issioner of Egypt, his advice was theoretically that which should have been 
adopted, but it is evident that Curzon and Graham acted independently and 
did not even consult regularly with him. If Wingate was aware that he was 
gradually being shifted away from the focus of power, and relegated to the 
position of a political cypher, he did not reveal the fact in his private cor­
respondence. In his letters to Hardinge, he mentioned that before returning 
to Egypt he wanted a brief holiday in S c o t l a n d ^ . Wingate even suggested that 
Allenby could offer useful advice when he visited Paris in March, while also
recommending that a Royal Commission be sent to Egypt to study the situation
40and make proposals for the future administration . From these letters,
it is obvious that Wingate expected to resume his work in Cairo after a short
interval. The Egyptian press had also reported that Wingate was expected
41to arrive in Egypt in the middle of March
Not until Zaghlul had been deported, did Wingate write a note on the 
Egyptian situation. In this note, dated March 9, Wingate wrote that Zaghiul's
38 Wingate to Hardinge, March 10, 1919, HP, Vol. 11(40), 1919.
39 Ibid. Stamfordham, private secretary to the King, wrote to Wingate, 
March 8 , 1919, to say that he trusted he would take a holiday before 
returning to Cairo. SA23 7 / 1 .
40 Wingate to Hardinge, March 10, 1919, HP, Vol. 11(40), 1919. 
al-'Adl, February 3, 1919.
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deportation would produce a temporary reaction in favour of the British
49and would facilitate forming a new Ministry ^. Wingate wanted a new 
Ministry to be formed immediately, because he disliked the idea of the 
British governing Egypt solely under martial law. Although he realised  
there was a possibility that Rushdi might organise opposition against a new 
Ministry, he felt that the former Prime Minister could be managed. In 
this note, Wingate reiterated his request that a Royal Commission be d is­
patched in the autumn to have discussions with moderates, thereby creating 
Anglophile sympathies. As the note indicates, Wingate thought that the for­
mation of a Ministry was the major problem facing British officials. Like 
most British administrators, Wingate did not expect that the Nationalists 
could initiate nation-wide demonstrations, or that discontent was so prevalent 
as to produce mass participation.
However, the British officials had misjudged the extent of the organisa­
tion of the Nationalists. When Zaghlul and his friends were arrested,they
were detained overnight in prison, and then taken to the ship Caledonia
43which transported them to Malta , but their movement did not die with their 
absence from Egypt. The central committee (lajna markaziyya), under the 
leadership of Mahmud Sulayman, was left in charge, while the councils
42 Wingate note on the Egyptian situation, March 9, 1919, made official 
in the Foreign Office, F0371/3714.
43 Isma'il Sidql, Mudhakkarati (Cairo, 1950), p. 19.
208.
44throughout the countryside were informed on the situation . When the 
news of Zaghlul's arrest became known in Cairo, the students immediately 
filled the streets and began demonstrating in his favour. They were joined 
by workers and groups of women. The first demonstrations in Cairo on 
March 10 were dispersed by the city police, who drove directly into the 
crowds. The damage was fairly great, and disciplinary measures were 
promptly considered by the British.
While the demonstrators were shouting in the streets, the Sultan and
45the Residency received petitions from Nationalist groups . Even these did
not alarm officials, who were assured by Richard Wellesley, an Inspector
in Lower Egypt, that the better class Egyptians were against the Nationalists,
as were the fellahin. By June, Wellesley was to report that the entire country 
46was in chaos . Throughout the week following the deportation of the National­
ist leaders, the rioting continued and was made more extensive by strikes 
among clerks in the Ministries of Public Works and Education. Workers in 
Public transport and the Canal zone also went on strike. Transportation 
and communication lines were particularly heavily damaged, and it soon be­
came evident that there was a co-ordinated attempt to disrupt communications 
in Egypt. When the strikes and riots showed signs of spreading into the
44 Anls, p. 1 1 . al-R afi‘i, discusses the riots and their consequences, 
pp. 127-90.
45 Cheetham to Foreign Office, March 10, 1919, number 368, F0371/3713; 
F0141/773.
46 Ibid. , Graham minute. Wellesley to Graham, June 27, 1919, F0371/3718.
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provinces, Cheetham admitted:
Without wishing to exaggerate results of present d is­
turbances. . .there is a perceptible movement towards 
disorganising of Government machinery results of which 
if it continued would be serious. 47
In fact, the demonstrations diowed no signs of abating. Rather, they tended
to increase after the first deaths caused by the riots occurred on March 11.
To counteract this dangerous development, Cheetham recommended that the
Commander-in-Chief should send British detachments to the provinces to
restore law and order.
To explain the position of the British advisers, Cheetham wrote pri­
vately to Graham.
When Saad Zaghlul began his campaign of intimidation I 
felt quite certain that drastic action had to be taken at 
once and I believe that this view has since been univer­
sally approved here. If we had left the Nationalists alone 
any longer Saad would have become the moral dictator, 
and his hold on the educated classes would have been still 
more difficult to get rid o f. As I hope will have been 
apparent from my telegrams, we have had to deal both 
with student disturbances, which have been joined by roughs 
and resulted in rioting, and at the same time with an 
arranged scheme of the Nationalists to prevent the Public 
Services from working.
. .  .The country has really been governed by the Advisers 
for three and half months, and the situation without the 
Ministers is therefore in reality less extraordinary than 
it would appear. 48
47 Cheetham to Foreign Office, March 11, 1919,,number 378, received 
March 15, 1919, F 0 3 7 1 /3 7 1 4 /
48 Cheetham to Graham, March 12, 1919, F0371/3714.
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Graham remarked that this letter had been written prior to the extensive 
49rioting . Actually, rioting was widespread by the twelfth when the letter 
was written. In fact, Cheetham himself had wired the Foreign Office that he 
was sending troops to quell the trouble. Both Cheetham and Graham were 
attempting to justify the deportation of Zaghlul, which had been the immediate 
cause of the demonstrations. Graham was, therefore, supporting the man 
whom he had criticised a few years before for being slow and inefficient^ .
By March 15, Cheetham and his advisers realised that the military 
authorities could not immediately halt the rioting. They were forced to 
admit that matters were out of control, and would continue to be. Every 
effort was made to restore order, but the Nationalist fervour had spread 
throughout Egypt. Strikes, largely organised by ‘Abd al-Rahman Fahmi, a
close associate of Zaghlul, continued to paralyse business and transport.
51Students led the protests, and public education virtually ceased . Owing to 
the loss of public order, and the continued rioting, Cheetham asked if the 
Nationalists could travel to London: this was, then, a return to the policy
49 Ibid. , Graham minute.
50 Above, Chapter II, p. 39.
51 These demonstrations were reported in the Egyptian press, which was 
generally favourable to them. Al-Muqattam, however, demeaned the 
demonstrations and reported that they were composed predominantly of 
'riff-raff1. Nationalist papers, al-Nigam, and al-Ahram, were frequently 
censored. Edward Atiya, An Arab tells his story (London, 1946), tells  ^
of Victoria College in Alexandria, which remained open during the riots, 
and whose students continued to attend. The attitude of the author and
of his teachers indicates how far removed the British teachers and their 
students were from the political situation in Egypt. They remained a l­
most totally isolated from the r io ts .
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advocated by Wingate in November. Cheethamfs telegram was relayed to
Balfour in Paris. Following this, Curzon wrote to Balfour on March 16
52that the situation in Egypt was ’anxious' and could become critical. In 
spite of the worsening situation, Curzon was opposed to granting concessions 
to the Nationalists, although he did recognise that the officials in Egypt might 
not be able to control the situation. Lest this occur, Curzon recommended 
the following:
Had Allenby been in Egypt I should have placed him hi full 
charge. But I understand that he arrives in Paris tomorrow 
and will not be free to return for a few days. Will you 
consult with him, as to steps to be taken? I understand that 
there are plenty of troops in Egypt and that there need be no 
military anxiety. May I be favoured with immediate reply. 53
This was the second occasion that Allenby's name had been suggested as the
individual to govern Egypt, but Curzon did not wait to receive Balfour *s
response concerning the matter. Rather than delay the decision until Balfour's
advice arrived, Curzon accepted Graham's telegram to Cheetham which
refused permission for the Nationalists to leave Egypt.
It must be remembered that these leaders have committed 
themselves to sever the British connection with Egypt; there 
is, therefore, no common ground on which we can meet them 
for discussion. Moreover, to allow them to proceed here 
after the recent events you have reported would make it appear 
that we were yielding to force when persuasion had failed of its 
effect. 54
52 Curzon to Balfour, March 16, 1919, F0371/3714.
53 Ibid,
54 Foreign Office to Cheetham, March 17, 1919, number 349, F0371/3714. 
Curzon added that this telegram 'will do very w ell1.
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In this telegram, sent on March 17 at 11:15p.m ., Cheetham was ordered to 
restore law to the country, to repress the rioting, and to encourage reason­
able Egyptians. As regards future policy, the British government was to 
consider all the possibilities, but had not yet decided upon a definite course 
of action.
The Foreign Office did not receive Balfour's directive until the next 
day at noon - one day after Curzon had taken the initiative and refused con­
cessions to the Nationalists. In his dispatch, Balfour agreed that law and 
order had to be promptly restored, but was not altogether opposed to 
offering concessions.
. . .  in the meantime there need be no concealment of our 
readiness, after this has been satisfactorily accomplished, 
to discuss in London. . .grievances with Egyptian Ministers.
If they think their task would be better performed if they 
were accompanied or immediately followed by persons 
qualified to represent the nationalist case even in its ex­
treme form, I can see no objection. 55
In a private addendum to Curzon, Balfour added that this advice was the best
he could offer owing to his incomplete knowledge of Egypt, and the dearth of
informed officials in Paris. Graham concluded from the remark that Balfour
was placing the matter into Lord Curzon's hands, and that further reference
to Paris was unnecessary. He steadfastly maintained that the Foreign Office
would not allow the Nationalists to leave Egypt, as to do so would constitute
55 Balfour to Foreign O ffice, March 18, 1919, number 518, F 0371 /3714 .
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56a reversal of past policy and weaken British standing in the Middle East 
Curzon concurred, although he was unlikely to disagree, since he and 
Graham had taken matters into their own hands before Balfour's moderate 
advice had been received.
On March IB, the Foreign Office received Cheethamfs dispatches (nos.
400 and 403). The first noted that Cairo and Tanta, centres of Nationalist 
discontent, were fairly quiet, but that the rioting had spread into other pro­
vinces . In Allenby's absence, General Bulfin took command, but Cheetham 
still felt that they did not have enough troops. On March 17, a huge demonstra­
tion in Cairo of teachers, students, workers, and lawyers started from
57al-Azhar and worked its way to Abdin Palace . On March 18 a surprise
attack on a train in Dayrut ended with eight British soldiers being killed.
This incident resulted finally in 91 charges against Egyptians and 34 death 
58sentences ; it also aroused British officials to the danger inherent in the
Egyptian situation. News of these incidents did not reach London until March
19. In the interim, Graham had been reassured by Cheetham *s telegrams
(nos. 400 and 403), which had been sent before he had received the refusal to
59permit the Nationalists to leave Egypt .
56 Ibid., Graham minute.
57 al-Rafifi ,  p. 152.
58 Ibid. , Allenby to Curzon, July 10, 1919, F0141/629.
59 Graham minute on Cheetham dispatch, March 16, 1919, number 
400. Received on March 18, 1919, F0371/3714.
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This refusal did not arrive in Egypt until March 19 at 11:12a.m . The
delay in delivery was partly caused by the disruption of the telegraph service
after the lines had been cut. Thus Cheetham*s more optimistic reports had
been written based on the assumption that concessions would be offered.
If we are to make some concessions we should act as quickly 
as possible.
I think some concession is necessary, but its nature 
appears to me to depend on general position in Paris.
We should be able to count on support from moderates if 
a new and definite situation could be announced.
There may be grave objections to such a decision, but we 
cannot neglect the strength and universality of sentiment which 
supports the deputation.
. . .  I should make it clear that present movement in Egypt is  
national in the full sense of the word. 60
After receiving the rejection of the Foreign Office for concessions, 
Cheetham appealed for the matter to be reconsidered. This appeal is an 
example of an attempt to remove the blame for the Nationalist disturbances 
from the British. It also tacitly agreed with Wingate's predictions.
No one in Egypt at that time could have believed that 
actual insurrectionary outburst was possib le. Its sudden 
appearance and rapid growth is astonishing to the oldest 
m em bers.
. .  .British officials incline to the belief that whatever National 
instigation there may have been in the last few months the 
feeling now exhibited must have been growing during several 
years, and than an explosion at some time was inevitable.
60 Cheetham to Foreign Office, March 17, 1919, number 403, F0371/ 
3714.
215.
. . .  A concession if it can be devised which would facilitate 
such an understanding, and equally lighten the task of 
governing Egypt in the future is in my opinion urgently 
needed. 61
After receiving this appeal, Graham admitted that the situation was more
serious than he had anticipated, but felt that if the movement were nationalist,
then it would have broken out eventually, and that it was better that it had
62done so while British troops were stationed in the country . Graham drafted 
a telegram to Balfour reporting the deterioration of the situation. He suggested 
that the officials in Paris consult with Allenby, who was due to arrive in Paris 
on March 19,
I am sure that you will agree that his early return to Egypt 
is advisable and I trust therefore that you can arrange that 
his business in Paris should be expedited and that he should 
be able to leave for Egypt by the end of the week. 63
It was also reported that Wingate and the military authorities had been consulted.
Although this was reported to Paris, the officials were not, in fact, in
contact with Wingate who was in Scotland; nor had he been consulted during the
crucial days between March 16 and March 18. The Foreign Office did not
64wire for Wingate to return to London until March 19 . On that morning,
Wingate had written that he was available at any time, and that Graham knew
65how to contact him . Having received orders to return to London, "Wingate
61 Cheetham to Foreign Office, March 19, 1919, number 408, F 0371/3714.
62 Foreign Office to Balfour, March 19, 1919, F0371/3714.
63 Graham to Wingate, March 19, 1919, SA237/2.
64 Wingate to Graham, March 19, 1919, SA237/2.
65 Wingate to Graham, March 19, 1919, SA237/2.
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replied that he would arrive at the Foreign Office on Thursday, March 20,
66between eleven and twelve in the morning . He wrote to Cheetham, at the 
same time, that he wished that the Foreign Office had agreed to the policy 
originally advocated in November, thereby avoiding the difficulties which had 
arisen in M arch^.
When he returned to London on March 20, Wingate was aware that he had 
little or no official support. Symes, his secretary, had been in London canvas­
sing opinion throughout Wingate's absence, and wrote on three occasions to 
report that most officials believed ‘Wingate's return to London had been a pre­
lude to voluntary resignation. When this did not happen, the officials decided 
to keep Wingate in London for as long as possible. Symes reported that many 
officials thought that the administration in Egypt needed to be changed, but 
that with the outbreak of violence Wingate's chances of returning to Cairo 
improved. He informed Wingate that Lloyd George, who would have the final
68word on the matter, depended upon Balfour, who was influenced by Robert Cecil 
On March 18, Symes wrote that Allenby was to discuss the Palestine issue 
when he arrived in Paris, but that he would also be questioned concerning Egypt. 
Symes believed that Graham and Cecil wanted Allenby to return to Egypt.
6 6  Wingate to Graham, March 19, 1919, SA172/5.
67 Wingate to Cheetham, March 19, 1919, SA172/5.
68  The disagreements between Edward Cecil and Wingate have been noted, 
Chapter V,pp.119-23.-Aspreviously mentioned, Robert Cecil had decided 
in January that Allenby was a suitable successor. Chapter VI, p. 188.
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Cecil supported Allenby because of his great personal prestige, while
Graham opted for Allenby because he thought a military man would deal
69resolutely with the Nationalists . Graham may also have had personal
designs on the position and entertained the hope that Allenby would make a
good temporary High Commissioner.
From Paris, Hardinge wrote that he and Balfour had discussed granting
concessions after Cheetham's recommendation. Hardinge emphasised that
Curzon had consulted them, and that the officials had all agreed that law and
70order had to be restored before concessions were granted . Balfour's 
telegram of March 18, which permitted concessions, was not mentioned to 
Wingate, nor was he aware of until much later. It is possible that even Hardinge 
and Balfour did not realise that Curzon had rejected the concessions prior to 
receiving instructions from Paris. Certainly Wingate's advice was not con­
sidered by officials in Paris or in London, After his note on Zaghlul's deporat- 
tion on March 9, he was excluded from policy formation. His effective 
functioning as High Commissioner ceased after his advice was rejected follow­
ing his interview with Curzon on February 17.
On March 19, General Allenby, the greatest British hero to emerge from 
the First World War, arrived triumphantly in Paris to consult with Lloyd 
George and Balfour. In the course of these discussions, Allenby was given the
69 Symes to Wingate, March 12, 1919; March 13, 1919; March 18, 1919, 
SA172/5.
70 Hardinge to Wingate, March 19, 1919, SA237/3; HP, Vol. 11(40), 1919.
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post of Special High Commissioner to Egypt with the duty of restoring order.
On the day Wingate returned to London, the Foreign Office received directives
from Balfour in Paris to prepare an:
immediate letter of appointment for General Allenby on 
lines indicated in my 540 and telegraph text here and 
to General Allenby en route. He is most anxious to receive 
formal letter as soon as possible. 71
Officials in the Foreign Office asked where telegram number 540 was to be
72found, and were informed that it was a private one from Balfour to Curzon
It is not found in the Foreign Office files, but may be in Curzon's private
papers. The text of the communication was undoubtedly to the effect that
Allenby had been appointed as Special High Commissioner. Curzon secured
the King’s formal assent to the appointment by telephone, and drew up the
73letter requested by the men in Paris . This letter, dated March 21, gave
Allenby, in the absence of the High Commissioner, full military and civil
74authority in his capacity as Special High Commissioner . Allenby promptly 
left for Egypt where he arrived on March 25. The Egyptian press announced 
his arrival on the next day, along with articles on the continued rioting and 
demonstrations. Allenby was referred to as na’ib al-m alik, the same phrase 
which was applied to the regular High Commissioner: Wingate was not
71 Balfour to Foreign Office, March 20, 1919, number 541, received
March 21, 1919, F0371/3714.
72 Ibid., A .T , Loyd minute.
73 Ibid., Curzon minute.
74 Foreign Office to Allenby, March 21, 1919, F0371/3714.
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mentioned .
Wingate was officially informed of Allenby’s appointment in a letter
76written by Balfour on March 20, which stated it made ’no technical change’
in Wingate’s position. Ironically, almost the same words were added to the
77telegram sent to Cheetham, informing him of Allenby’s appointment
Hearing that he had been superseded by Allenby, Wingate wrote to Curzon
78that he was prepared to return to Egypt at any time . To this letter,
Graham minuted that Wingate was to be told that his services were required 
79in London . After Allenby's appointment, Wingate wrote a lengthy note on
80the Egyptian situation giving his advice for future action . He recommended 
the sending of 10, 000 British troops, marines from the Mediterranean Fleet, 
and the 26th Division from Dobrudja. He felt that prompt repressive measures 
should be adopted, but that the sending of a Royal Commission should also be 
considered. Curzon marked the passage concerning repressive measures 
with a large ’X’ for he sincerely agreed with this emphatic statem ent^\
Before Allenby’s arrival in Egypt, British officials in London and Cairo
75 al"Muqat;fam, al-Ahram, al-Ni?am.
76 Balfour to Wingate, March 20, 1919, number 548, received March 21,
1919, SA237/3.
77 Foreign Office to Cheetham, March 20, 1919, F0371/3714.
78 Wingate to Curzon, March 21, 1919, SA237/10; F0371/3714.
79 Ibid., Graham and Curzon minutes.
80 Wingate note on Egyptian situation, March 21, 1919, FG371/3714.
81 Ibid., Curzon minute.
obviously intended to increase the number of soldiers in Egypt and to
employ force to stop the disturbances. Cheetham wired that the ’situation
had developed considerably . .  .2T*and/ drastic military action is now justi-
82fied and unavoidable. ’ Graham agreed that the situation was gloomy, but
83thought Cheetham was exaggerating . Wingate tried to placate Cheetham
by telling him that Allenby’s arrival would improve the situation, As a
last gesture, Wingate suggested that Allenby should live in the Residency
and use the appointments which had been left behind when the Wingates
84hurriedly departed .
In letters written after Allenby’s appointment, Wingate suggested that 
the British government should issue a proclamation which would promise
85concessions after the instigators of the riots had been appropriately punished 
To Allenby, Wingate wrote that he wished that the officials in London had 
sanctioned his return to Egypt, for he was certain that together they could 
evolve a just settlement. It was particularly goading to Wingate, himself an 
army officer, that Allenby had been appointed largely for his military stature.
He cautioned against making concessions to the Nationalists. Wingate justi­
fied his reversal from his former position in the following manner:
82 Cheetham to Foreign Office, March 20, 1919, number 4 1, F0371/3714. 
War Office to Commander *-m-Chief, Constantinople, March 19, 1919, 
ordered the preparation of the 26th Division. War Office to Commander- 
in-Chief, Egypt, March 19, 1919, suggested reinforcements. The G.O.C.
Ei Egypt told the War Office, March 23, 1919, that the Nationalist organisa­
tion was deeply rooted and well planned. F0371/3714.
83 I b i d Graham minute,
84 Wingate to Cheetham, March 22, 1919, received March 26, 1919, F0141/773.
85 Wingate to Hardinge, March 23, 1919, seen by Balfour, HP, Vol. 11(40), 1919.
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Y/hen I failed to carry my point the psychological 
moment for making concessions had passed. To give 
way now, after the agitators have been guilty of every 
sort of breach of law and order, might produce tern- 
porary tranquillity, but when extremists know that they 
can terrorise our government by lawless methods, they 
will unhesitatingly resort to them again whenever they 
cannot get their way. 8 6
To his personal copy of this letter, Wingate later attached a note to the
effect that he had written because he wanted to warn Allenby who ’really knew
87
nothing of the situation' .Wingate thought that Allenby ignored the advice, 
probably on official suggestion. As will be explained, Allenby acted on his 
own judgement and by granting concessions incurred the wrath of Curzon and 
others in the Foreign Office. Wingate's volte face may, in some degree, 
have been caused by his realisation that Curzon and Graham supported a strong 
British policy and the maintenance of the status quo. By advocating retaliation 
and the punishment of the Nationalists, Wingate may have hoped to improve 
his standing in the Foreign Office circles, and thereby to increase his chances 
of returning to Cairo.
Allenby, for his part, seem s to have gone to Egypt with an open mind as
88to what course to adopt against the Nationalists . Informed observers sur­
mised that Allenby was influenced by Clayton, who was judged to be an uncertain
8 6  Wingate to Allenby, March 23, 1919, SA162/1.
87 Ibid.
88  Allenby to Foreign Office, March 27, 1919, number 443, F0371/3714.
'I do not regard myself as committed to act with any section of opinion.
It is too early to know results of declaration of maintenance of protec­
torate implied by terms of my appointment.'
89quality in crucial times . At any rate, Clayton met Allenby in Alexandria 
and was later given the important position of Adviser to the Ministry of the 
Interior. Clayton had supported Wingate’s suggestion that Zaghlul should go 
to London; he probably continued to think that this was the best solution to 
the problem ^.
Matters promptly improved when Allenby entered Cairo. The official
correspondence was no longer full of dire predictions concerning the rioting,
while requests for military aid and additional troops ceased entirely. On
March 26, Allenby invited a group of Egyptians to the Residency, where he
delivered an address ordering a return to law and order. The military
authorities issued warnings that outrages were prohibited and would be severely
punished. Upon Allenby's behest, a group of ‘ulama*, ex-m inisters, and
Nationalists signed a statement urging the Egyptians to stop the demonstrations.
That these men agreed to sign such a statement indicates that the demonstra-
91tions had spontaneously grown beyond the control of the Nationalists * In
reply to this statement, the wafd sent a long, but moderate memorandum which
noted that the disturbances had been caused by the ’general feeling that
92Egyptian views have not been allowed expression. ’
Because of this statement and the quelling of the rioting, Allenby recom-
89 Symes to Wingate, March 18, 1919, SA172/5.
90 Clayton to A. P. Wavell (L t.-C ol. with Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 1917- 
1920; later 1st Viscount Wavell), March 20, 1919, SA473/3. Clayton Diary, 
January-March 1919, SA473. Clayton memorandum on Egyptian situation, 
March 18, 1919, SA473/3.
91 al-Muqattam, March 27, 1919. Signatories included: Rushdi, Abd a l - ‘Aziz 
Fahmi, Lutfi al-Sayyid, George Khayyat, Yusuf al-Nahhas, and Hafiz Afifi.
92 Allenby to Foreign Office, March 31, 1919, number 465, F0371/3714.
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mended on March 31 that any ’respectable Egyptian who wished to do so
93be allowed to travel to Europe’ . This request was sent directly to the 
Foreign Office and to Balfour in Paris. Whereas Wingate only wrote to the 
Foreign Office, and then in moderate, sometimes vacillating terms,
Allenby took matters firmly in hand, and expected prompt action. It is 
important to remember that Allenby was a war hero; both Egyptians and 
Europeans hailed him as a military victor. For these reasons, he was able 
to demand more from British politicians than Wingate had done. As Balfour 
expressed the matter to Wingate:
The somewhat unexpected emergence of violent and wide­
spread sabotage would seem to demand the peculiar combination 
of great military prestige with the civilian moderation and firm ­
ness which General Allenby possesses in a very rare degree.
So long then for as General Allenby is dealing with the exist­
ing cr isis  your services will hardly be required. How long this 
exceptional period will continue, and what shape the future 
government of Egypt will take neither I nor any other man can 
say with confidence. 94
Nonetheless, Allenby’s request that the Nationalist leaders should be allowed
to leave Egypt shocked the Foreign Office which had expected him to exercise
his military powers.
Although Balfour had told Wingate that his services were not required
while Allenby was in charge of the crisis, Wingate was consulted after Allenby’s
unexpected request was received. Wingate’s advice on this occasion may have
93 Ibid.
94 Balfour to Wingate, March 25, 1919, SA237/3.
been governed by the fact that he realised his weak position; however, he
may have felt that to make concessions after the riots was an error. What­
ever his motives, Wingate advised that ’before any concession is made to
the Extremists they should be required to express their contrition in writing
95and give pledges for their good behaviour in the future.T This advice was
given only a week after Wingate had written to Curzon in justification of his
recommendations made in November.
I am of opinion that it is to the credit of these Nationalists 
that they should have come in the first instance to expose 
their views to the High Commissioner, thus showing confi­
dence in the Representative of H.M.G.
Had they kept secret their very advanced views which 
had been strengthened by the issue of the self-determination 
proclamation for Syria, Palestine, Arabia and Mesopotamia, 
we might have been face to face with serious revolutionary 
activities at a much earlier date.
Nationalism has been in the air for the last twenty-five 
years in Egypt - but its dormant embers were fanned into 
a_bright flame by the great war and the self-determinating 
A s ic /  ideas which were so widely propagated during the 
many months prior to the signature of the A rm istice. 96
However, Wingate only gained the support of Curzon after he adopted a firmer
attitude against the Nationalists.
Curzon even mentioned Wingate’s advice when he wrote to Balfour to
urge him to reject concessions. Of all the men in the Foreign Office, Curzon
was, in all likelihood, the most surprised by Allenby’s moderation. Only two
95 Quotation of Wingate's advice on A .T. Loyd minute, April 1, 1919, 
number 465, F0371/3714.
9 6  Wingate to Curzon, March 25, 1919, SA237/3.
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days before Allenby's request, Curzon had written that he hoped Allenby
97would not be 'too fierce' . In justification of the Foreign Office, Curzon
wrote that it had not been kept well informed on the ’growing estrangement
98and hostility of the fellaheen. *
Curzon proposed that a mission, headed by Milner, with whom he had 
spoken privately, should be sent to investigate the Egyptian situation. After 
receiving Allenby1 s request for concessions, Curzon objected vigorously to 
Balfour that the recommendations were identical with those rejected in 
November and March. Curzon reiterated Wingate's advice against granting 
concessions after the occurrence of violence. He felt that Allenby had m is­
judged the Egyptian scene, and that he was unaware of the plan to send a 
99mission . Interestingly, Wingate had proposed the dispatch of a mission as 
October 20, 1917, and had revived the idea in March 1919, when it was 
rejected by G r a h a m I n  lieu of concessions, Curzon resurrected the idea
97 Curzon to Balfour, March 29, 1919, Balfour Papers, F0800/215.
98 Ibid.
99 Curzon to Balfour, April 1 , 1919, Balfour Papers, F0800/216.
100 Wingate to Hardinge, October 20, 1917, HP, Vol. VI(34), 1917.
Wingate note, March 9, 1919. Graham minute, 'I do not much like 
this suggestion. We have brought Sir R. Wingate over here and have
invited the Ministers to co m e .. .We can hardly suggest, simultaneously, 
sending a commission to Egypt.. .It would represent a rather feeble 
attempt to placate and postpone.' Curzon added: 'I see no ground for 
such a Commission which would may be interpreted as a mark of 
weakness. ’ The mission was also suggested by Bulfin, Cheetham to 
Foreign Office, March 17, 1919. Parliament members discussed
the possibility, too. Walter Guiness to C. Harmsworth, March 27, 
1919, F0371/3714.
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of a mission, in the hope that it would be accepted instead of Allenby's 
moderate plan.
This was not the case, for on April 2, Balfour replied that the govern­
ment could not reject Allenby's advice, since he had just been appointed.
While he did not completely reject the idea of a mission, Balfour proposed
that the plan should be submitted in a separate telegram to Allenby, not as
101
an alternative to giving passports to the Nationalists . Even though
Balfour concurred with Allenby, the Foreign Office was convinced that
concessions were neither necessary nor desirable. Graham wrote that he 
102was 'in despair* over Allenby's suggestion. He thought that concessions
103would achieve 'immediete calm and the eventual loss of Egypt.' There­
fore, he urged Hardinge and Curzon to do all in their power to prevent 
Allenby's policy from being accepted.
On April 1 , Wingate, Curzon, and Bonar Law met to discuss the policy 
of Great Britain in Egypt. Curzon and Wingate argued that to grant con­
cessions was a drastic error, while Bonar Law retorted that the matter 
could only be decided in the Cabinet. Wingate reported that Curfcon went 
white after Bonar Law said this and did not reply. At this time, Wingate did 
not know that Balfour had acquiesced on March 18 to grant passports to the 
Nationalists, nor did he realise that Curzon had rejected the idea on March 17,
101 Balfour to Foreign Office, April 2, 1919, number 621, received April 3, 
1919, F0371/3714.
102 Graham to Hardinge, April 3, 1919, HP, Vol. 11(40), 1919.
103 Ibid.
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104a day before Balfour's advice had been received . Following the meeting,
at which nothing definite was decided, Curzon asked Balfour to reconsider
Allenby's advice and stressed his inexperience v is-a -v is  Wingate's long
administrative career.
We have here in Wingate a man whose experience has 
extended over 35 years, whom you selected to be H.C. 
who is High Commissioner now, whom we have retained 
here to advise us in this crisis; and this m a n .. .  the author 
of the very policy to which Allenby is apparently a con­
vert, but which has twice been turned down by H. M.G. and 
yourself - who might therefore a priori have been expected 
to welcome this indication of his advice, comes to me and 
says that its acceptance now would be a d isaster.
I am not without knowledge of the East m yself and this 
rapid and complete abandonment of our position after the 
events of the past fortnight will in my judgement have a 
repercussion that will extend far beyond the borders of 
Egypt.. .  It will be said that an openly disloyal party has merely  
to murder Great Britain's officials in order to bring the 
British Government to its knees and to win its own ends. 105
On the other hand, Bonar Law wrote that Allenby's suggestions were 
not drastic, although the idea of a mission could be mentioned to him. He 
expressed his belief that Wingate was not at all suitable to be High Commissioner 
and made a poor impression1^ . Bonar Law was not the only man to tell 
Balfour that Wingate was not capable of the work, for, although Curzon was 
willing to emphasise Wingate's advice when it agreed with his own, he also
104 Wingate notes on the interview with Curzon and Bonar Law, April 3, 1919, 
SA227.
105 Curzon to Balfour, April 3, 1919, Balfour Papers, F0800/216.
106 Bonar Law to Balfour, April 3, 1919, Balfour Papers, F0800/216;
Bonar Law Papers, 101/3/40.
reported that Hogarth, Director of the Arab Bureau, opposed Wingate’s
return. Hogarth thought that Wingate should not return because the
107Nationalists believed he had betrayed them . None of the Egyptian 
memoirs or newspapers refer to this, nor do they indicate that the National­
ist leaders felt Wingate had misled them.
In official c ir c le s  it was evident, if it had not been so at a much earlier 
date, that it was impossible for Wingate to return to Egypt; however, he 
was retained as the nominal High Commissioner.
In answer to the letters of Curzon and Bonar Law, Balfour replied that 
the Foreign Office was to tell Allenby that it agreed with his request, but 
also suggested, as an alternative, the dispatch of a m ission under Lord Milner.
Balfour emphasised that the Foreign Office was to stress its support for Allenby,
108no matter what decision he took . Allenby replied on April 6 .
Outwardly quiet prevails, but Extremist feeling is increas­
ingly violent and dangerous.
. .  .1 shall issue tomorrow proclamation to following effect:
"Now that order has been in great measure restored, I 
declare in agreement with His Highness the Sultan that there 
are no restrictions on travel, and that Egyptians who wish 
to leave the country will be free to do so."
Further I have decided that Saad Pasha Zaglul, Ismail Pashi 
Sidky, Mohammed Pasha Mahmoud, Hamad Pasha El Basel
107 Curzon to Balfour, April 4, 1919, Balfour Papers, BM49734; F0800/216.
108 Balfour to Curzon, April 5, 1919, Balfour Papers, F0800/216. Milner 
had been suggested by Curzon in a letter to Balfour on March 29, 1919, 
but he must have asked Milner at an earlier date, because Montagu wrote 
to Balfour on March 25, 1919, that he had heard Milner was to go.
Montagu considered Milner a 'newcomer to Middle East affairs', and 
wanted the Foreign Office to hold a meeting to discuss the matter. Balfour 
Papers, F0800/218. Foreign Office to Allenby, April 5, 1919, F0371/3714.
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shall be released from internment and be given similar 
freedom of movement.
I have carefully considered alternative proposal of 
Commission under Milner. Such a Commission will be 
desirable later but would be useless now. 109,
Whereas Wingate had asked again and again for the Nationalists to be per­
mitted to travel, Allenby told the Foreign Office and Balfour what he intended 
to do. The proclamation which allowed the Nationalists to leave Egypt and 
freed those interned in Malta was published in the Egyptian press on April 7, 
and was greeted with favourable editorials by the press, and with rejoicing 
by the populace'*' ^ . Some of the celebrations were so extensive that they 
had to be halted by British troops, which caused more deaths and damage.
Following the announcement, the Nationalists made plans to present 
their demands at the Peace Conference. They no longer advocated negotiating 
directly with the British in London, because they had not been recognised by 
them. Thus, by refusing to see the Nationalists, the Foreign Office caused 
the development of what they had hoped to avoid - the presence of the Egyptian 
Nationalists at the Peace Conference. On April 11, the members of the 
Committee of 14 still in Egypt left for France, where they joined Zaghlul,
Sidqi, Mahmud, and al-Basil*11. These men presented the Egyptian case to 
the members of the Peace Conference, while their supporters in Egypt
109 Allenby to Foreign Office, April 6 , 1919, F0371/3714.
110 al-Watan, al-Ahalf, al-Ahram.
m  al~Ahalf, April 15, 1919, to June 19, 1919. The members who went to Paris.
were; Sa‘d Zaghlul, Muhammad Mahud, Hamad al-Basil, Isma‘11 Sidql,
Maljmud Abu’l-Nasr, Muhammad ‘Alf Bey, ‘All Sha£r^wf, Husayn Wa?if,
Sfnut Hanna, £Abd al- ‘Aziz Fahmf, Hafiz 'AfifiJ Abd al-Khaliq Madkur,
Wfsa Wasif, and Hamid Badr.* # ^
continued to organise strikes and demonstrations to underline Egyptian 
agreement with the wafd.
When Wingate heard that the Nationalists had left Egypt, he asked Curzon
119
what attitude he was to adopt towards them if they approached him ". Curzon 
answered:
I regard them as responsible for the troubles occurring 
the past three weeks and would have no truck with them.
What Mr. Balfour may wish to do, I have no idea. He, 
and not I, is responsible for bringing them over, and if 
he desires to see them the responsibility will be his.
I doubt however their receiving much attention in Paris. 113
In Cairo, Allenby recognised that the policy of permitting the Nationalists to
leave Egypt had originated with Wingate, and he wrote to say that he wished
114that the Foreign Office had assented to the policy in November . Wingate, 
however, maintained that Allenby and Clayton had erred by granting con­
cessions. The Foreign Office agreed. Hardinge wrote that Great Britain had 
been deceived by Allenby, who had been appointed to carry out a firm policy 
against the Nationalists, but who had, once in Cairo, given way to their 
demands*^.
While the Foreign Office bemoaned the developments in Egypt, Wingate
116began to prepare the defence of his policies as High Commissioner . He
112 Wingate to Curzon, April 11, 1919, SA237/3.
113 Curzon to Wingate, April 13, 1919, SA237/3.
114 Allenby to Wingate, April 13, 1919, SA162/2; Allenby to Wingate, April 21,
1919, SA173/2.
115 Wingate note on Allenby letters, 1922, SA162/2. Hardinge to Sir Bulter 
(Harcourt) Lucknow, April 23, 1919, HP, Vol. 11(40), 1919.
1 1 6  Ulrich Alexander to B. Patterson, May 18, 1919, SA162/2.
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sent letters and a long memorandum concerning his activities in Egypt to the
leading persons in the Cabinet and the Foreign Office, and continued to
117maintain that he was prepared to return to Egypt . Wingate's position
was an awkward one, because he was technically still High Commissioner.
The Foreign Office hesitated to remove him from office when he had not
been responsible for the violence, nor were there personal reasons for which
he could be asked to resign. Because he had not been responsible for the
rioting, which might have been prevented had his original advice been heeded,
Wingate felt he was paying for the mistakes made by the Foreign Office. He
118demanded to be allowed to resign and to ask for a full judicial enquiry
This made Curzon uneasy, and he wrote to Balfour:
The long-expected has happened, and Wingate, who has 
been showing symptoms of increasing uneasiness and 
annoyance at his own position - which I admit is rather 
equivocal - has now definitely come out with a letter to 
me.
..  .Graham did not conceal - as, indeed, he could not - 
that at one stage, namely that of the early interview with 
Zaghlul the Foreign Office thought that Wingate might 
^adviselydiave acted in a different way.
My own inclination, subject to your consent and that of 
the Prime Minister, is to deal with the case as follows, 
proceeding always upon the assumption, which I gathered 
in Paris, that it is not desirable that Wingate should go 
back as High Commissioner to Cairo. Upon that I believe 
there is an absolute consensus of opinion. . .At the same time,
117 Wingate to Curzon, May 19, 1919, F0371/3717; Wingate to Graham, 
May 20, 1919, SA162/2.
118 Wingate to Curzon, June 3, 1919, SA173/7. This letter was written 
after Wingate had complained about his ambiguous position to Graham.
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we do not want to present this decision to Wingate in a 
form that may be at all painful to a man who has had a 
very distinguished career and is himself quite uncon­
scious at the present moment of having done anything to 
merit even the slightest animadversion from the govern­
ment . 119
Curzon suggested that he talk with Wingate, with whom he was on friendly 
terms, to inform him that the government considered him a valuable public 
servant, but that Allenby had been sent to Cairo, owing to his military 
reputation, to restore order. Since normality had not returned to Egypt, the 
government desired Allenby to remain. Curzon recommended that the 
government should keep Wingate in London, and confer a peerage upon him.
Balfour dutifully discussed the question of a peerage with Lloyd George, 
who replied that Wingate could either have a peerage or a full statement of his 
position - not both. Lloyd George's response did not satisfy Balfour, who 
thought Wingate had been:
a very valuable and distinguished public servant. He gave 
specific advice on a difficult problem, warning us that if 
his advice was not followed, trouble would ensue. His 
advice was not followed, and trouble did ensue. Thereupon 
we practically tell him that he is not the man most com ­
petent to deal with the situation thus created, and that som e­
body else must be put in his place’.
. . .  Events have turned out most unluckily; and though I do 
not quite see where we were to blame, I quite understand 
that he should have an embittered sense of grievance. 120
119 Curzon to Balfour, June 4, 1919, Balfour Papers, F0800/217.
120 Balfour to Curzon, June 9, 1919, Balfour Papers, BM49 734.
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In hopes of lessening Wingate's sense of grievance, Curzon, with
Milner's assistance, offered Wingate the governorship of the Straits Settle- 
121ments . Curzon urged Wingate to accept this position, which he considered
was in keeping with Wingate's reputation and past position. Wingate refused,
feeling that his acceptance would be interpreted as proof that he had erred
122during his tenure as High Commissioner . Curzon never understood 
Wingate's refusal. He acted coldly to him thereafter, and denied help 
when he subsequently had difficulty in securing his pension or other govern­
mental employment.
The summer months dragged by for Wingate, who technically remained 
High Commissioner. Although he wrote repeatedly to the Foreign Office for 
an explanation of his suspension, the officials there were too occupied with 
other tasks to attend to his persistent complaints. Nor were they willing 
to admit the responsibility for the decision to reject Wingate's advice. Curzon 
and Graham were the two men chargeable for the formation of policy for
Egypt, but Curzon, and Balfour, disavowed their responsibility for rejecting
123Wingate's recommendation . In September, an official at the Foreign 
Office asked if Wingate had been informed that he was no longer High
121 Curzon to Wingate, July 23, 1919, SA237/10.
122 Wingate to Curzon, July 23, 1919, SA237/7. Curzon to Wingate,
October 4, 1919, SA238/1.
123 Balfour to Wingate, September 22, 1919, SA237/7. Curzon to Wingate, 
October 4, 1919, SA238/1.
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124Commissioner . Hardinge replied that he should be informed that his
appointment was terminated, and he should be praised for his 'long and
125most meritorious se r v ic e .1
While V'ingate's dism issal was being discussed in the Foreign Office,
Allenby was in London to confer about the Milner Mission. Originally,
Allenby had wanted the Mission to arrive soon after the Nationalists had 
126left for Paris . Curzon proposed that it should not take the form of a
127Royal Commission, but closely parallel Dufferin's Mission . Members
of Parliament had become interested in the Mission, and were continually
128asking who was to participate in it and when it was to be sent . Milner,
however, absolutely refused to go to Egypt before September, and wanted
Allenby to be informed of the fact, since he had desired the Mission to 
129arrive promptly . Allenby was finally told on May 9, 1919, that the
Mission would not arrive before autumn. He thought the delay would be
acceptable since he had just succeeded in forming a new Ministry under 
130Muhammad Sa‘ id
124 Minute on Wingate's letter to Balfour, September 18, 1919, F0371/3727.
125 Ibid., Hardinge minute.
126 Allenby to Foreign Office, April 19, April 23, April 25, 1919, F0371/ 
3715.
127 Curzon to Balfour, April 28, 1919, Balfour Papers, F0800/216.
128 Parliamentary Debates, May-June, 1919.
129 Milner to Curzon, May 9, 1919, MP164.
130 Foreign Office to Allenby, May 22, 1919, MP164. Allenby to Foreign 
Office, May 24, 1919, F0371/3717.
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This delay gave the Nationalists time to organise a concerted
plan to boycott the Mission, which had been given instructions to investi-
131gate the Egyptian situation under the terms of the Protectorate . After 
a time, Allenby realised that delaying the Mission meant that it would not meet 
meet the Nationalists in Egypt, and, by its presence in Egypt, would actually 
increase the likelihood of disturbances. The Foreign Office contended that 
it was more important for Milner to head the Mission than for it to arrive 
during the summer; nor did the officials think that a total boycott was pos-
•M 132sible
Once again, the Foreign Office miscalculated the extent of the 
Nationalist organisation. By the end of the summer it was clear to Allenby 
that the Mission's arrival would usher in a new series of strikes and demon­
strations, for the Egyptians were determined to show their disapproval of 
the terms of the Mission, and to force the British to negotiate with the wafd.
Allenby repeatedly warned of this danger, but the men in London refused to
133delay the Mission permanently , Milner, who strongly deprecated delaying
131 The terms for the Mission were given by Curzon in a speech in the
House of Lords on May 15, 1919. The Egyptian press objected 
vigorously to these terms which implied that the Protectorate was
to continue. This became the focal point for Nationalist opposition to 
the Mission. al-R affi, Vol. II, 28.
132 Graham minute, May 15, 1919, G.H.Q. reports, May 1919, F0371/3716.
133 Allenby to Foreign Office, August 22, 1919, F0371/3718. Graham to
Curzon, September 4, 1919, reported Allenby was determined to delay 
the Mission. Curzon replied: ’Let him tackle M ilner.' F0371/3719.
the Mission, discussed the point with Allenby when he arrived in London.
They compromised and agreed to delay the Mission until Allenby returned
134to Egypt and reported on the situation . There are no minutes on this 
meeting, but Curzon reported on it on October 3, 1919; therefore, it is 
probable that it occurred on October 2.
On the same day, Curzon wrote terminating Wingate's appointment as 
High Commissioner of Egypt. It is apparent that Curzon wished to have the 
question of the Milner Mission settled before Wingate was removed from 
office and the title transferred to Allenby. With the problem of the Milner 
Mission tentatively settled, Curzon felt free to act. He wrote as follows:
When the serious cr isis of M arch.. .arose in Egypt 
you were already in this country, having been summoned 
here in January in order to consult with H.M.G, by whom, 
no more in all probability than by yourself, was the 
approach of such a cr isis  foreseen. In view of the peculiar 
circumstances of the Egyptian rising and the events by 
which it was attended, it was thought essential for the re s ­
toration of public order and the suppression of organised 
violence that full civil and military authority should be 
concentrated in the hands of a single individual.
. . .  It is to be feared that a very disturbing effect would be 
produced by any change in the existing regim e.
His Majesty's Government have therefore decided to 
appoint Sir Edmund, now Lord, Allenby to be High Com­
m issioner as from October 15th while retaining his supreme 
military command. 135.
134 Milner to Graham, August 26, 1919, F0371/3718. Milner to Graham, 
September 3, 1919. 'Personally I don't care when I go, or whether I 
go at all. Politically I think postponement is a mistake. True, con­
ditions are not propitious but they will certainly not be rendered any 
more propitious by dallying.' Curzon to Allenby, September 29, 1919.
In this letter, Curzon requested Allenby to meet with Milner, F0371/3719.
135 Curzon to Wingatq October 2, 1919, SA238/1.
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Wingate's tenure as High Commissioner to Egypt thus officially ended on
October 2, 1919. A long, tortuous battle ensued over his defence of his
136position and over a just pension settlement . Wingate never held office
again, although after much debate he was given a baronetcy in 1920, an
honour conferred largely owing to the good offices of Curzon and Milner,
both of whom may have felt Wingate had received rather poor treatment
137from the Foreign Office and Cabinet.
Thus, while the refusal of Wingate's requests meant increased difficulties 
for the British in Egypt and a prolongation of open agitation, for Wingate the 
rejection meant defeat, and the loss of his position as High Commissioner.
He had the perception, developed from many years of residence in Egypt and 
the Sudan, to gauge properly the movement led by Zaghlul, but he could not 
convince London that he was correct, nor could he deal adequately with local 
Egyptian grievances. Therefore, his administration of Egypt was of brief 
duration and ended brusquely when he could no longer formulate policies or 
retain the confidence of the British government.
136 F iles F0371/3724, F0371/3719, SA175/4 contain Wingate's dossier 
submitted to the Milner Mission and which is composed of an eight 
part summary of his work as High Commissioner. Also see: Lloyd 
George Papers, F 48/2 /1 .
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